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Abstract
In 1883, Otto von Bismark had a “change of heart” regarding colonialism. 
Through shrewd diplomacy and secrecy, the German Chancellor was able to 
spring the reality of German colonies on the world, particularly in the last 
available or unclaimed regions in Africa and Oceania where the Germans 
subsequently encroached upon British territory. One of Germany’s first colonies 
was Southwest Africa, or present-day Namibia, where a German businessman 
secured the purchase of a large tract of the Skeleton Coast from indigenous 
rulers and then requested the protection of the German Reich, which Berlin 
granted to him. The result was a vicious dispute of private claims between 
German and British citizens and an entangled diplomacy between the two 
empires.
In Britain, both Tory and Liberal governments tried to prevent the 
Germans from establishing themselves so close to their precious Cape Colony 
and both later attempted to confine the German territory so that the Afrikaners in 
the Transvaal could not link up with the Germans. Eventually, London and 
Cape Town would only succeed in the latter. Both Britain and the Cape failed to 
produce any evidence of prior official claims to the Skeleton Coast. In fact, any 
official British presence there had been previously withdrawn, leaving a 
vacuum, because of the bloody wars between the indigenous tribes. They had 
“left the door wide open” for the Germans to walk into southern Africa, and when 
they tried to close this door, the British found Bismark’s foot firmly established in 
it. Humiliatingly, Bismark forced both London and Cape Town to support 
Germany’s control of Southwest Africa by turning down offers of annexation
from indigenous tribes or from British traders (with one such trader even trying 
to establish an independent republic) who wanted a British presence there. In 
the end, Britain admitted to the world that this was German soil.
Although Southwest Africa was not a prosperous German colony at first, 
requiring many subsidies from the Reich, it became the most popular desti­
nation for German colonists far exceeding the other German colonies in Africa 
and Oceania due to the relatively small native population and large tracts of 
seemingly vacant land. Yet as the 20th century came, Southwest African 
mining began to profit and the discovery of diamonds created an economic 
boom which finally made Southwest Africa a valuable asset to the German 
Reich.
The German colonists did have, and created, some problems with the 
indigenous population or particularly with the Herero and Nama tribes.
Although the German colonial government was able to gain control over them in 
the 1890’s, they had an explosive rebellion in the early years of this century 
which pushed German policy to a horrifying extreme, rivaling even the later 
Third Reich in its brutality. Yet just as the German colonial government had 
gained total control over Southwest Africa and just as the colony had become 
profitable with a hopeful future, World War I gave Britain and the Union of South 
Africa the pretext to invade the German colony. Despite the South African rule 
over the territory until just recently when Namibia became independent, the 
German impact on the region is as fundamental as the genetic makeup of a 
living creature.
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Preface
Southwest Africa, or modern-day Namibia, extends from Angola to the 
Union of South Africa on the Atlantic coast and inland to the Zambezi River and 
the Kalahari Desert. Namibia’s Skeleton Coast was named for the skeletons of 
ships which wrecked along the thousand miles of quicksand-infested shore 
where the great battle between the cold, rough Atlantic and the fierce Namib 
Desert took place. The latter is the oldest desert in the world where dunes can 
reach nearly a thousand feet high and at times create an impenetrable barrier. 
The average temperature in this southern hemispheric country is around sixty 
degrees fahrenheit in July and the mid- to upper seventies in January. Only 
between the Namib and the Kalahari is there land of any agricultural value. In 
the southern region, called Namaland, the karakul sheep thrive in the semi- 
desert where over seventy acres of land are needed to support one animal. In 
the central region between the great deserts lies Hereroland where the capital 
of Windhoek was eventually established by the Germans. Here, with somewhat 
more rainfall, the indigenous population and European settlers were able to 
raise larger livestock such as cattle (though some cattle can be raised in 
northern Namaland as well). In seasons with enough rain great grasslands 
form, but in years of drought thousands of livestock die and the earth becomes 
parched. Ovamboland is the last great region lying in the extreme north where 
there is enough rainfall for cultivation and settled agriculture. Nearly half the 
population of Southwest Africa or Namibia, both in its history and even now, 
lives in Ovamboland. In addition, Giraffes, wildebeest, lions, oryx, elephants, 
and many other great African animals still roam the countryside in and between
vii
Hereroland and Ovamboland. 1
The ethnic make-up of Southwest Africa is rather varied. The tribes 
consist of two major linguistic groups: the Khoisan and the Bantu. The Khoisan 
peoples, who originally inhabited all of southern Africa were increasingly 
pushed south and west by the Bantu migration towards the more arid regions of 
the Kalahari and Namib. One group of these Khoisan retained their stone-age 
culture of nomadic life and were called “bushmen” for their miraculous survival 
in such harsh conditions. The Bushmen have been hunted down or used as 
slaves by nearly every other tribe in Southwest Africa. Another group called the 
Nama, labeled “Hottentots” by outsiders, represent a mixture of the Bantu and 
Khoisan blood with some indigenous to the region and others later pushed into
Southwest Africa from South Africa by Dutch colonists between 1800 and 1830.
/»
Another group, the Herero, represent the Bantu invasion from the north into 
Southwest Africa directly and became the most powerful tribe in the central 
region probably due to their more centralized tribal system whereas the others 
remained divided and scattered. Another Bantu tribe, though much weaker, 
called the Berg Damara was pushed into the mountainous fringe of the Namib 
by both the Herero and Nama. Not until the German colonists had almost wiped 
out the Damara’s enemies were they to flourish and gain a significant 
population. Another small group, called the Basters (or “Bastards”), a mixture of 
Bantu, Malay (from Madagascar), and Dutch blood, was pushed out of South 
Africa and allowed by the Herero in the 1870’s to move north slipping past the 
Nama to form a buffer for the Herero from their southern Nama enemies. The 
last major ethnic group, other than various tribes which inhabited the Caprivi 
Strip or panhandle of the country, were the Ovambo. These people,
viii
like the Herero, were Bantu who had invaded from the north and settled in the 
region north of the Herero. The Ovambo make up almost half the population of 
Southwest Africa or Namibia and are able to raise corn in their land that 
receives on average 22 inches of rain per year (compared with the only 5 
inches of rain per year in the southern region of Namaland) .2
The first Europeans to visit Southwest Africa were the Portuguese in 
1484. They named a natural harbor on the Skeleton Coast, on their way 
towards the Cape of Good Hope, “Angra Pequena” which would later have 
some significance in the region’s history. The Dutch, who created their colony 
south on the Cape, were the next to make expeditions along the coast, visiting 
Southwest Africa as early as 1670. Yet neither the Portuguese nor the Dutch 
ever annexed or settled there with the Portuguese confining themselves to 
Angola and the Dutch remaining on the Cape. One reason was the lack of 
readily apparent resources, including drinking water. One exception was a 
1791 Dutch expedition which discovered gold, but it was dismissed by the Cape 
with skepticism. Most expeditions for gold actually ended up being mere 
hunting excursions for exotic animals. In 1796, a year after the British took over 
the Cape Colony, one English ship sailed up the coast to take temporary 
possession of six places along it, though the Napoleonic wars drew London’s 
attention away from the Skeleton Coast where nothing permanent or official 
was ever done. The only valuable resource found by Europeans and exploited 
prior to Germany’s entry, were the islands off the coast near Angra Pequena. 
These islands had guano (bird dung) deposits as much as seventy feet thick, 
which entrepreneurs excavated and later sold as rich fertilizer to Europe. They 
removed hundreds of thousands of tons between 1843 and 1848, when at one
point three hundred ships anchored off one island alone. However, by 1847 
one company gained a monopoly over the guano, De Pass, Spence & 
Company, which represented nearly the only permanent European presence in 
Southwest Africa beyond the missionaries which crossed the Orange River 
boundary of the Cape into the region as early as 1802.3
I would like to note to the reader that many regions are identified by 
different names, but I have attempted to standardize most of them. For Walvis 
Bay, as an example, which was also known as Walfisch or Whale Fish Bay, I 
have strictly used the contemporary identity. Also, regions like Hereroland or 
Namaland which have been at times identified as Damaraland or Namaqua- 
land respectively I have tried to standardize in their use to hopefully ease any 
confusion. Furthermore, I have tried to refer to Britain’s bureaucratic branches 
involved in this affair as the Foreign and Colonial Offices whereas for the 
German government I have referred to the applicable entities as the Foreign 
Ministry and the Colonial Department For the most part these are the accepted 
names anyway, though some individuals involved and some historians writing 
their accounts mix the terms in the whole affair. Hopefully this will make my 
account clearer than some.
The bulk of my primary material comes from British government docu­
ments, therefore one should expect a somewhat more thorough British view. 
However I have supplemented this with documents from the German Foreign 
Ministry and the records of a particular official there who was in office for nearly 
the entire lifespan of the German colonies. I chose him for his tendency to avoid 
political circles, in which he seemed to play the more neutral and objective role 
in that office. I hope the balance which I sought was achieved.
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1Chapter 1 
Open Doors Entered
In the middle of 1915, as the weather became increasingly colder in the 
southern hemisphere, the bulk of the German forces defending Southwest 
Africa from the South African invasion surrendered near Tsumeb in the northern 
part of the colony. The Germans had been hopelessly outnumbered and were 
only able to fight a delaying war which lasted into July, well after the fall of the 
capital of Windhoek. The retreating German forces bad had only one hope for 
escape: to reach the Caprivi Strip and fight their way across the British trans- 
Zambezi region to reach other German forces on Lake Tanganyika in East 
Africa. Unfortunately for them, they were out-flanked and cut off by the South 
Africans. Thus with Germany losing this and eventually all of her colonies, and 
with South Africa gaining control over Southwest Africa, a door which had been 
misfeasantly left open long ago by Great Britain and the Cape Colony (South 
Africa), now had been closed once and for alU
In 1883 Prince Otto von Bismark, Chancellor of the new German Reich, 
was fully engaged on two fronts: to maintain the European balance of power 
and pax that he had orchestrated with Germany on top, and to keep his 
Conservative imperial government in power. Germany was one of the most 
vulnerable nations in Europe. Prior to unification it had two conflicts with Austria 
and Denmark, followed by a successful war with France to defend German 
unity. The result was the birth of the German Reich with Prussian aristocrats 
and other Conservatives leading the government under the former Prussian 
king, now German emperor, Wilhelm I. Following unification, Chancellor 
Bismark embarked on a dream policy of balancing friends and foes in a way
2that would prevent a war against Germany. He allied the three emperors of 
Germany, Austria, and Russia and made authorized rapprochement efforts with 
defeated France.2 Bismark vacillated between conflicting policies playing off 
each nation’s fears and distrust of one another in an effort to segregate and 
diffuse any threat from growing against Germany. Although the Chancellor had 
a distaste for Britain, he used England to play off French and Russian fears and 
vice versa. However, with new powers emerging like the United States, Italy, 
and Japan, with new technologies making European war increasingly dynamic, 
volatile, and out of control, and with new international rivalry on the rise, 
Bismark's system of juggling began breaking down in the final decades of the 
nineteenth century. Furthermore, despite Bismark’s distaste for democracy, he 
had to deal with the new Reichstag and the public opinion of the new German 
electorate. Although control was fairly centralized within the imperial 
government on most matters, the Reichstag possessed “the power of the purse” 
when it came to two particular matters that were fairly new to Germans: naval 
priorities and colonies. Nor did Bismark’s Conservatives rule by themselves; 
there were liberal, moderate, and socialist parties and factions represented in 
the Reichstag and in the government as well. Only through alliances between 
Conservatives and the National Liberal and Center parties could the imperial 
agenda be assured. That meant at times giving in to more industrial and liberal 
planks, such as colonies, which Bismark and his Prussian agrarians would 
have otherwise liked to forego.3
Just as enthusiasts, industrialists, and public opinion divided and pushed 
many German Conservatives into colonialism, British Liberals in control of 
London were also divided and prodded. Traditionally British Liberals had been
3against new colonial expansion or any rejuvenated imperialism which had 
waned since mid-century. The Liberal Cabinet in Britain from 1880 to 1885 
refused to accept any increase in cost or responsibility which new colonies or 
expanded colonies would incur. William E. Gladstone, as Prime Minister, stated 
this well in March of 1882: “Throughout the whole of my political life . . .  I cannot 
recollect an occasion on which I gave a vote or took a step . . . except on the 
side which was opposed to [further] annexation.” Gladstone further believed 
that the goal of British colonization was to eventually create independent, 
anglophile nations--“so many happy Englands”--in which London would be the 
model, and yet not necessarily the leader responsible for them. The Prime 
Minister even demanded that no further annexations be considered unless the 
expressed and authenticated “wish of the people to be annexed” was g iv e n .4 
However the Prime Minister’s anti-imperial influence began to lose its effect, 
especially with those who disagreed with his 1872 opposition to the annexation 
of Fiji, his 1881 offer of autonomy to the Transvaal (in which Gladstone had 
British public opinion against him), and his 1883 prevention of Australian efforts 
to annex New Guinea. Gladstone’s own Cabinet had varying degrees of 
concurrence and even dissension. The Lord Chancellor and Home Secretary 
were both well known for their hostility against new or larger colonies, while 
Gladstone’s Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby (Edward Stanley), though likewise 
evasive of increased cost and responsibility, gave into pressure from the British 
colonies themselves in the issues of expansion. Others in the Cabinet went 
much further, calling for the English race to rule the world. Yet even these 
radicals underestimated any rumors of possible German colonization and the 
effects it would have, and even believed that this remote possibility would be
4preferable to any further French gains. 5
Such diversity of opinion was just as apparent in Bismark’s government, 
though initial German interest and involvement in southern Africa came without 
any official sanction or control. German missionaries were the pioneers in this. 
They had been active under the London Missionary Society (LMS), which had 
access to Southwest Africa ever since the first missionaries began crossing the 
Orange River into Namaland in 1802. After the LMS and the later Wesleyan 
Missionary Society (WMS) had failed among these indigenous peoples who 
seemed to vigorously oppose the cross, the Rhenish Missionary Society (RMS) 
based out of Germany was given exclusive rights over Southwest Africa by the 
LMS in 1840. This embarked them on a course of cultural imperialism that 
increasingly drew more German involvement into Southwest Africa. However, 
the evangelical field remained very wide in this land where natives resisted the 
Christian faith. The RMS therefore helped and encouraged the Finnish 
Missionary Society (FMS), which was also Evangelical Lutheran, to set up 
amongst the Ovambo in 1870 well to the n o rth .6
The sociopolitical climate of Southwest Africa was as severe as its 
physical climate, which did not help evangelical or mercantile enterprise. The 
Nama and Herero had been at odds over cattle and land in the region’s 
heartland ever since the Nama entered the land from the south colliding with 
the Herero who had entered from the north during the Bantu migration. 
However, the 1864 Herero-Nama war exploded with particular vigor and 
complexity when Western weapons and personalities, mostly traders, entered 
the picture. English traders and the Swede merchant Charles Andersson (who 
was given the Herero title “regent and military commander for the period of his
5natural life or as long as he desired”) assisted the Herero. After several defeats 
by the aided Herero, the Nama made a raid in 1868 on Andersson’s shop and a 
RMS mission. The RMS later requested protection from Prussia, but the 
Franco-Prussian war and German unification diverted any attention. A tentative
i
peace in 1870 between the Nama and Herero also dropped the matter for a 
while.7
The British Cape Colony became involved when it sent William Palgrave 
to the scene as “special commissioner in Southwest Africa” on a four year 
mission to gain tribal allegiance to Cape authorities. However, by 1876 only the 
Basters (who the Herero allowed to move past the Nama northward to become 
a buffer around Rehoboth between their own tribe and the Nama) agreed to 
Cape overseers. The Herero wanted complete protection from any Nama 
revenge, but the Cape was not willing to offer it entirely. Palgrave tried likewise 
to bring the Nama under the Cape’s sphere, but the Nama wanted nothing to do 
with the British. Palgrave reported to the Cape that eventually the British colony 
needed to invade the Nama te rr ito ry .8  However for now, the imperial powers 
simply did not want to go to any great effort or expense in the colonies, which 
such protection in Southwest Africa for the missionaries, traders, and Herero 
would cost. No one wanted to “foot the bill.” In 1878, the British Cape only 
occupied Walvis Bay as a symbol of their protection of the Herero.9 The Herero 
paramount chief Maherero, also known as Kamaherero, commented that British 
protection was not what he envisioned: “The British flag flew here [at Walvis 
Bay]. It waved this way and that; we attached ourselves to it, and we were 
waved backwards and forwards with it."io The Herero fell away from any
6commitments to Britain as more and more Boer settlers entered their territory 
without any Cape efforts to stop it, and with little evidence of British protection 
from the Nama offered.
In 1880, London received its first hints of increased German interest in 
Southwest Africa. In a letter of July 19 (which usually took over 20 days to be 
sent from Cape Town to London and vice versa), Cape Governor H. B. E. Frere 
sent a copy of an article by Ernst von Weber published in the Berlin 
Geographische Nachrichten of November 1879 in which the writer argued for a 
German colony in southern Africa after having visited the region in 1871. The 
Cape Governor claimed that this idea had been “much discussed in German 
commercial and political circles even before the Franco-German War.” He 
added that a possible colony was “one of the immediate motives of the German 
mission of scientific inquiry which visited Southern and Eastern Africa in 1870- 
71.” Governor Frere also warned London that “recent events have drawn 
together the German and Dutch Republicans in the colony” and that Weber’s 
article noted that the Dutch Boers have the same “Teutonic blood” as 
Germans. 11 Weber supported the idea of a German occupation of Delagoa Bay 
in Mozambique, which he claimed Germans possessed from 1776-1781, and 
then push “forward, little by little, a chain of German trading stations as far as the 
Upper Zambesi” such that the Boers in the Transvaal would have an open door 
out of British encirclement. 12 London took the matter seriously. The Colonial 
Office quickly forwarded the dispatch to the Foreign Office in September 1880, 
after which the latter made inquiries to their embassy in Berlin. The British 
ambassador there made an accurate assessment of the poor support for 
colonies in the German imperial government. He cited that Germans preferred
7to emigrate to lands controlled by republican national governments rather than 
colonial ones. The Ambassador felt that Germany was “more the want of 
soldiers than of colonies” and that the rejection of the Samoa Bill in the 
Reichstag had “marked its disinclination to acquire distant dependencies 
however advantageous to German enterprise.” He assured London that “under 
present circumstances therefore the plan for a German Colony in South Africa 
has no prospect of success.” London then assured the Cape that such was the 
case. However, those circumstances soon changed. 13
In 1880, the Herero-Nama war began anew. This war began because of 
a water hole incident where both the Nama and Herero had cattle herds. One 
cow was found missing among thousands, and accusations were made which 
led to open conflict. Cape authorities sent the HMS Dwarf to Walvis Bay as a 
show of force, which did little or nothing to aid the Herero. The conflict became 
very bloody. Whites who had intervened in tribal affairs before or who had 
unfairly traded with the indigenous population, found themselves to be targets. 
Traders and missionaries lost property and sometimes their lives. The Cape, 
instead of trying to provide protection for the whites or to resolve the conflict, 
pulled the few officials it had there back to Walvis Bay and constructed a fort 
there to protect them. When the RMS appealed to the Cape for protection 
(while Germany appealed on their behalf to Britain), both London and the Cape 
stated that only Walvis Bay was British, and they could only provide protection 
th e re . 14 The British Foreign Secretary told the German government that “Her 
Majesty's Government cannot be held responsible for anything that may take 
place outside of British Territorial limits, which the latter only includes [Walvis]
8Bay and a small portion of country surrounding it.”i5 This statement would later 
come back to haunt British officials, as they now left an excuse for the Germans 
to become more actively involved in Southwest Africa to protect their subjects 
there. To make Britain’s tenuous hold on the region worse, when London had 
given the Cape powers to annex Walvis Bay in 1878, the latter dragged its feet 
despite only needing to pass an act of annexation. Therefore the only area 
occupied by Britain on the mainland of the Skeleton Coast was not even 
officially British or Cape territory. The door was left completely open. 16
In 1882, the Cape tried working out the foundations of a peace in the 
Herero-Nama conflict; but as soon as they lifted the threat of an attack on Walvis 
Bay they left the rest of the peace effort to the German missionaries. In mid- 
June the RMS concluded a peace on paper between the Herero and Nama at 
the Baster capital of Rehoboth. However, conflicts still smoldered for a while 
with Nama raids on Herero and Baster cattle. The Boers who had moved into 
the region even joined in this pillage, which created further difficulties between 
natives and whites. Finally by late fall the peace became more evident. Yet the 
RMS made appeals once more to Germany for protection of their life and 
property, distrusting the entente between the tribes.
At this point, Bismark was still completely opposed to intervention in or 
creation of colonies, as were most Prussian Conservatives. The Chancellor 
called colonies versorgungsposten or “maintenance posts” which took 
resources and troops away from the Fatherland. 1 As early as 1868, before a 
united Germany even existed, Bismark had expressed that private organiz­
ations should colonize, not governments which then had to construct a navy to
9protect them and which would embroil themselves with other governments. He 
felt it “difficult to justify the imposition of heavy taxation upon the whole nation for 
the benefit of a few branches of in d u s try .”i8  in the negotiations of 1871 over the 
French surrender, the Iron Chancellor refused French offers of colonies in Asia. 
In the following two years he likewise refused requests from Fiji’s ruler and the 
Sultan of Zanzibar for German protection in the Pacific and East Africa 
respectively. In early 1873 a British official reported to London that “colonies, in 
his opinion, would only be a cause of weakness, because colonies could only 
be defended by powerful fleets, and Germany’s geographical position did not 
necessitate her development into a first-class maritime power.” i9 Three years 
later Bismark denied approachments by German merchants (led by Weber and 
F. A. E. Luderitz) for a German protectorate or colony in the Transvaal. This 
position continued into the next decade, with the Chancellor boasting in 1881 
that “so long as I am Chancellor we will carry no colonial p o lic y .”2o Bismark’s 
policy against colonies was further evident when his Foreign Ministry sent a 
dispatch to one of its officials in Egypt (which was occupied by Britain in 1882) 
that: “The consciousness of being a major Great Power must not seduce us into 
pursuing a policy based on prestige in the French fashion. In reality our 
international and overall European interests are not sufficiently great to allow us 
to take the lead in Egyptian affairs.”21 Britain, under Gladstone’s Liberal 
government, even requested Germany’s position in Egypt. Leo George 
Leveson-Gower (Lord Granville), Gladstone’s Foreign Secretary, in a letter to 
Bismark said that a statement by Germany of its overseas role would be “a most 
useful guide and probably prevent some unnecessary mistakes being made.”
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The German Chancellor responded that he “was not in a position to endanger 
Germany’s relations with the other Powers by making suggestions for English 
policy.” At this point, Germany was not going to get in the middle of France and 
England in the contest over Egypt or any other colonial matter, nor endanger 
relations with Russia by allying with Britain. The only suggestion Bismark made 
to England was to “throw Gladstone out” which reflected his favoring a 
Conservative rather than Liberal government in London as well as in Berlin.22 
At this time, Bismark valued good relations with Russia above those with Britain. 
The main concern for the Chancellor in 1882 was Russia’s superior railway 
which everyday could move 20,000 more troops to the field than Germany. In 
November, Bismark deemed the construction of defensive forts along the 
eastern frontier with Russia as “urgently necessary” whereas the idea of 
sending German troops overseas was unfathomable.23
Even into 1883, Bismark was more concerned with the European 
balance of power than any extension of German power abroad, which in his 
view might weaken the German position in Europe. With Germany’s endless 
fear of encirclement, officials were carefully monitoring the turbulent situation in 
and the uncertain policies of France and the possibility of a Franco-Russian 
alliance that would threaten Germany. Berlin was actually encouraging Paris 
and St. Petersburg to spend their resources in possessions outside Europe 
rather than have them focus their efforts on the home continent. The secretary 
of the German embassy in Paris, Bernhard Bulow who would later be head of 
the Foreign Ministry and even German Chancellor, reported to Berlin that 
France was entrenched in colonial matters with conflicts in Madagascar and 
Tonkin. Germany feared that if the present French government fell it would
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“disengage France from her colonial enterprises in order to be able unhindered 
to devote herself to building up a European coalition against us.”24 Berlin 
successfully played British and French fears off each other, for instance pointing 
out to London French gains in southern China. Paris was then infuriated by 
British resistance to French colonial efforts which restored the balance in 
Germany’s favor. Bulow pointed out in December that Britain’s exclusion of 
France in the Egyptian Question was the worst French setback since 1871 
when Germany defeated her in war. Germany’s embassy in Paris made efforts 
to convince France that British and French interests clashed across the globe 
whereas German and French interests only clashed in Alsace-Lorraine. Bulow 
wrote to Berlin that “a more active French colonial policy is capable of making 
the French aware of the disadvantages of the notion of revanche, of 
demonstrating to them that they have other rivals besides ourselves, and, above 
all, of improving their feelings towards us.”25 into the next year, Bulow had the 
German embassy submit anonymous articles in French newspapers, supporting 
a more active French colonial policy. It was clear that the German imperial 
government looked at colonies as being a liability that a foreign power could 
exploit rather than being an advantage.26
Bismark had mainly opposed colonies because of their cost in resources, 
that the German navy was too small to defend them, that they would hurt 
Germany’s balance with other Powers, and that the German people were not 
ready for them. By 1883, circumstances changed. Differing with Bismark, some 
Germans came to believe that founding colonies in Britain’s neighborhoods 
would actually help rapprochement efforts with France, while retaining Britain’s
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dependence on Germany to keep France out of British colonial ventures such 
as Egypt. Also, German Crown Prince Friedrich, the heir apparent to the 
Kaiser’s throne, was a Liberal diehard and supported such factions in the 
Reichstag in opposition to Bismark. To complicate it further for Bismark,
Friedrich was an adamant anglophile having married Queen Victoria’s 
daughter. Therefore, it would be in Bismark’s favor to create colonies that 
would estrange the Crown Prince from England before Friedrich and his wife 
ascended the German throne. Also, the German public was very much ready 
for colonies now--despite the reality of Germany being only little more than a 
decade old. Deputies in the Reichstag were making speeches for colonies. 
German newspapers were reporting a public colonial hunger. The Deutsche 
Kolonial Verein, a colonial society, was founded with others soon to follow. In 
the first year membership grew into the thousands, reaching well over ten 
thousand within two years. By January 1884, membership was strong enough 
to support the publication of the Kolonialzeitung which was to voice public 
demands for German colonies. The public had already read about the 
exploration and exploitation of Africa by England’s Stanley and France’s Brazza 
and could now read about Germans like Bohm, Kaiser, or Reichard in the 
Tanganyika region, Buchner, Wiesmann, Wolff, Schulze, or Kund in the Congo, 
or Peters and Nachtigal in other parts of the “dark continent.” By the 1880’s 
explorers and scholars were calling for German colonies in southern Africa 
before Britain gained it all. A sense that a door of opportunity for Germany was 
closing created in early 1884 a colonial frenzy, called the Torschlusspanik or 
“door-closing-panic,” which effected that year’s Reichstag election. Bismark 
was acutely aware of all of th is .27
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However, Bismark’s greatest objection to colonies had been the cost 
which still remained despite the colonial frenzy in the German electorate or the 
beneficial effect it would have on Bismark’s enemies-especially the heir to the 
German throne. Despite attempts by Adolph Woermann (a Hamburg merchant 
who owned one of the largest trading firms in Africa especially in Cameroon) 
and F. A. E. Luderitz (a Bremen merchant and entrepreneur interested in the 
Skeleton Coast of Southwest Africa) to convince Bismark to extend German 
protection or simply annex territory in certain areas, Bismark was hung up on 
the cost. Regarding this fiscal challenge, Heinrich von Kusserow, a privy 
councillor in the Foreign Ministry, came to Woermann and Luderitz’s rescue. In 
April 1883, misinterpreting an Anglo-French agreement to respect each other’s 
life and property in Sierra Leone as a trade agreement, Kusserow warned 
Bismark to “beware of France and Britain” and that the two, with Portugal, would 
gobble up the unclaimed regions of A fr ic a .28 in February Bismark had 
requested Britain to protect Luderitz in Southwest Africa since Germany had no 
interest there. However by August, under Kusserow’s guidance, Bismark had 
the German Consul in Cape Town announce German protection over Luderitz’s 
enterprises. Kusserow had suggested that a British style charter system would 
make colonies painless to the German taxpayer, unlike a French style imperial 
system which Bismark feared. With the public responding favorably to 
Bismark’s extension of protection to Luderitz and the fear of cost dispelled, 
Bismark decided to throw his weight towards backing Luderitz. His change 
caught London and his own Foreign Ministry completely off guard. Although the 
Iron Chancellor had enforced German commercial rights abroad before (such 
as in the South Pacific in 1876 and 1879), this endeavor seemed different from
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the start.29
In his office on 128 Leadenhall Street in London, Daniel de Pass sat 
down to read the Daily News of July 12, 1883, particularly interested in what 
was going on under the South African headlines since he had much invested in 
the region. There he read a telegraphed article from Cape Town, dated July 9: 
“Angra Pequena harbour on the West Coast between [Namaland] and 
[Hereroland] has been bought from the Natives, and occupied by a German 
trading company under an alleged guarantee of the German Government.” It 
was also mentioned that: “Possession has been taken of some miles in  la n d ."so 
De Pass was in shock, he was the one who possessed a lease over Angra 
Pequena harbor, several inland copper mines, and all the guano islands of the 
Ichaboe group which extended from Angra Pequena northward along the coast. 
He immediately notified the Colonial Office, which constituted the government’s 
first news of the German occupation in Southwestern Africa. The alarm sent 
Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby, and Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, 
clambering to deal with the German appearance on the Skeleton Coast. 
However they still retained the belief, which was specifically intended by 
Bismark, that Germany was not securing colonies but only protecting German 
subjects abroad.31
Before England could fully realize what was going on, Luderitz had made 
a second purchase from the Bethanie Nama on August 25, 1883, thereby 
expanding his possession from Angra Pequena south all the way to the Orange 
River border of the Cape Colony and inland many miles. This put the British 
government in a state of confusion, since many officials thought that all of the
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coastline between the Orange River and Walvis Bay had been officially taken 
into possession in 1878, including Angra Pequena harbor. However, the Cape 
Parliament never passed the necessary legislation to officially annex the 
territory. Even Walvis Bay, though under de facto British occupation, had not 
been officially annexed. Britain had left the door open and met the German 
arrival completely u n p re p a re d .32
On July 26, Derby forwarded De Pass’ letter and the Daily News article to 
the Cape requesting information. But before there was an answer, De Pass’ 
company had sent more articles from the Standard and the South African which 
told more of the German occupation. The Colonial Office then began a long 
process of delaying responses to De Pass & Company, since they possessed 
no more information than the business. The Cape administration sent a 
dispatch from the Resident Magistrate of Walvis Bay who reported that “two 
ships with a party of Germans have arrived in Angra Pequena in charge of a Mr. 
Vogelson [Luderitz’s manager], that he has purchased the port from the Chief of 
Southern [N a m a la n d ] .”33 The magistrate feared that the Germans would 
prolong the Herero-Nama conflict by supplying the Nama with modern weapons 
against the Herero (whom the British had given g u n s ).34
On September 6, 1883, Foreign Secretary Granville received a dispatch 
from the British Ambassador in Berlin, who was informed by the German 
government that Luderitz had purchased territory in and around Angra Pequena 
from a Nama chief and that the German government was extending its 
protection of him and his enterprise. However, the Ambassador reported to 
Granville that he believed this protection would only be like that offered any
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other German subject abroad and that London should not consider Luderitz’s 
private possessions a French-like crown colonization process since Berlin was 
only referring to it as a Handelsniederl-assung or commercial colony. On 
September 12, London received news from the Cape that two ships of John 
Spence, an associate of De Pass, reported observing German weapons 
unloaded at Angra Pequena. With Colonial Secretary Derby’s approval, Lt. 
General L. Smyth, the Cape administrating officer, sent the HMS Starling up the 
coast to investigate, which he believed would also have “a beneficial effect on 
the natives. ”35
By autumn, 1883, Bismark was carefully and secretly changing his own 
personal attitudes towards colonies. The Chancellor decided to “raise the ante” 
on Southwest Africa by requesting whether Britain claimed Angra Pequena and 
if so on what grounds. On September 10, Baron Plessen, the German Charge 
d ’Affairs at the London embassy, communicated that the Luderitz claim 
extended from the Orange River boundary of the Cape Colony northward 
through Angra Pequena to the Little Fish River. Derby, on October 2, requested 
that the Foreign Office give Germany the Letters Patent of February 27, 1867 
(official imperial recognition), which backed De Pass’ claims to the guano 
islands off the coast of Luderitz’s purchase. Six days later, the Colonial 
Secretary received a dispatch from the Cape that included a report that the 
guano islands off the Skeleton Coast were claimed for Britain by Captain 
Forsyth of the HMS Valorous on May 5, 1866, and annexed to the colony by 
Cape Act No. 5 of 1874 and then proclaimed by Sir Henry Barkly on July 8,
1874, in accordance with the Letters Patent of February 27, 1867. However, 
having met with Luderitz, Smyth found out that the German company did not
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want the guano islands to begin with and were only interested in the mainland 
and interior of Southwest Africa. Luderitz assured him that he would not 
interfere with preexisting rights and was only given approval by the German 
Foreign Ministry if he did not interfere with such rights. Smyth reported that 
Luderitz believed he could move ships in and out of Angra Pequena without 
disturbing the guano deposits on the islands, as his company had done for five 
years on the west coast of Mexico. Luderitz also revealed to Smyth his belief 
that water was moving under the Namib Desert to the ocean, with only the 
Bushmen hitherto having knowledge of, in which productive wells could be dug 
to enable transportation across the coastal desert into the interior grasslands of 
the Nama and Herero. This too made Luderitz’s enterprise more menacing to 
De Pass & Company, who had failed to effectively access the interior.36
In a dramatic episode, De Pass, Spence & Company took matters into 
their own hands. Smyth sent an urgent telegraph on October 19, 1883, which 
was received by wire the same day in London. The Cape informed London that 
British traders were planning to leave the next day for Angra Pequena to expel 
the Germans physically from the harbor. Granville notified Derby that a gunboat 
should be sent to prevent such a collision between the commercial forces of De 
Pass and Luderitz. The Colonial Office sent a request to the Admiralty which in 
turn sent orders to the Cape commander, Rear Admiral Salmon. On October 
24, the Admiralty reported that the Cape commander sent the HMS Boadicea to 
Angra Pequena. The ship returned a little more than a week later with the 
collision prevented and with it De Pass’ hopes of removing the Germans
forcibly. 37
Meanwhile, Germany had laid the full burden of proof on Britain to argue
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her claims on Southwest Africa, which plunged London and Cape Town into an 
intensive search of their records and archives trying to find evidence. The 
Colonial Office received a report from the Cape on October 30 stating that upon 
investigation they found that Britain and the Cape had failed to officially annex 
Walvis Bay let alone any other stretch along the mainland. Three weeks later, 
after Granville had forwarded to Derby Germany’s request of evidence of British 
claim to Angra Pequena, the Foreign Secretary wrote to the German 
Ambassador, Count Munster, that “although Her Majesty’s Government have 
not proclaimed the Queen’s sovereignty along the whole country, but only 
certain points, such as [Walvis] Bay and the Angra Pequena islands, they 
consider that any claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction by a Foreign Power 
between the southern point of Portuguese jurisdiction at latitude 18 and the 
frontier of the Cape Colony would infringe their legitimate rights.” Granville 
added that Britain could not offer the German government more information until 
a report was received from the Cape regarding Britain’s claim to the mainland. 
Interestingly Granville gave an exact boundary for the Portuguese while giving 
only a vague one for the Cape, trying to have the latter be as inclusive as 
possible. Also, the Foreign Secretary gave Munster the impression that Walvis 
Bay had been officially annexed to the Cape, when the Cape Administrator had 
already reported it had not. That bluff would at least work. For now, Britain 
needed time.38
The Colonial Office received the Cape report on November 28, twenty- 
two days after it had been sent, which contained a letter from Spence who 
enclosed a deed (dated September 21, 1863) signed by David Christian, then 
chief of the Bethanie Nama. This deed gave De Pass, Spence & Company the
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right to mine in the coastal territory near Angra Pequena. De Pass’ associate 
admitted in his letter that the British company had to suspend mining operations 
of copper and silver until there were better roads into Southwest Africa, and that 
therefore the company’s operations on the mainland had been abandoned for 
some time. Beyond Spence’s information, Smyth also enclosed a report from 
the Cape Ministers. The Ministers believed that Spence’s (and therefore De 
Pass’) claim was a private right beyond the Cape Colony and that therefore they 
as ministers of the Cape could not comment on its validity. The Ministers further 
believed that the guano islands were officially annexed in 1867 regardless of 
De Pass & Company’s private claims on them, and that the only possible 
mainland annexation they knew of was Walvis Bay in 1878. The Ministers 
expressed to the Cape Administrator that they were glad Germany’s colony 
would only be a commercial one but that London needed to make a more exact 
definition of British or Cape claims to Southwestern Africa.39
Smyth then forwarded a report from Rear Admiral Salmon, commander- 
in-chief of naval forces in southern Africa, enclosing a report from the HMS 
Boadicea on its trip to Angra Pequena to prevent the collision of commercial 
interests from becoming violent. Captain Church of said ship reported that 
Luderitz wanted duties from British ships (i. e. De Pass & Company) that 
entered the harbor, but would not enforce it. The Germans presented the British 
warship with a deed of sale from Chief Joseph Fredrick of the Bethanie Nama, 
and affirmed that De Pass’ deed for the mainland, which was only a mining 
lease, was null and void. Captain Church believed RMS missionaries had 
helped Luderitz secure the sale of land, but also reported that a resident of 
Angra Pequena, John Grove (although an employee of De Pass), asserted that
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Angra Pequena harbor to be British despite there being no records to back this 
up. Church enclosed a copy of Luderitz’s deed of sale. It follows: “On this day, 
the 25th August 1883. . . (Chief) Joseph Fredriks, of Bethanie, did sell and give 
up to the firm of F. A. E. Luderitz, of Bremen, in Germany. . . a portion of his 
country, namely the entire coast from the Great or Orange River up to the 
twenty-sixth degree of south latitude, inclusive of all harbours and bays, up to 
20 geographical miles inland, reckoned from every point along the coast.”4o 
This information sent both London and Cape Town scrambling. Derby received 
a letter from Smyth on December 6, 1883, in which the Cape Administrator 
argued that Angra Pequena was annexed by Captain Forsyth of the HMS 
Valorous on May 5, 1866. The Colonial Office then forwarded the report of 
Captain Church of the HMS Boadicea to the Admiralty on December 12 and 
requested any “record of the proceedings of Her Majesty’s Ships” that might 
support that Angra Pequena had been annexed by Britain so that they could 
answer Germany’s request for evidence.^
Britain, true to form for all the colonial powers until Germany’s entry and 
the subsequent scramble for the last unclaimed regions of Africa and Oceania, 
was still not willing at this point to spend a great amount of resources on the 
colonization process. Both London and Cape Town passed the economic and 
political responsibility for colonial expansion back and forth, with neither party 
willing to be responsible for the increased expenditure. Derby sent a dispatch 
to the Cape Administrator on December 13, finally responding to Smyth’s letter, 
in which he warned the Colonial Secretary that even Walvis Bay remained 
officially unannexed. The Cape had wanted London to extend the Imperial Acts 
26 & 27, which set and documented the boundaries of the British colony, to
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include Walvis Bay, but Derby refused:
Her Majesty’s Government are not prepared to propose such 
legislation. . . . you are aware that a solution of the question would be 
afforded by legislation on the part of the Cape Parliament, under Her 
Majesty’s Letters Patents of 14th December 1878 for the annexation 
of [Walvis] Bay to the Cape Colony; but I understand that the Colonial 
Parliament would not be willing so to legislate, and in such case it will 
become a serious question whether Her Majesty’s sovereignty can 
continue to be maintained at that place.42
Obviously London had made arrangements in 1878 for the Cape to annex 
Walvis Bay, but the Cape only dragged its feet. This began a long process of 
both London and Cape Town passing the responsibility back and forth and in 
effect doing much of nothing. The door remained open. This bought a 
tremendous amount of time for Germany--time it needed for an about-face in 
colonial policy.
On December 27, 1883, the Admiralty responded to the Colonial Office’s 
request for evidence that a British ship had claimed Angra Pequena in the past. 
The answer was not what Derby wanted to hear. According to the Admiralty’s 
records, the HMS Grecian “visited Angra Pequena in 1851, but there is nothing 
to show that the ship took possession of any portion of land on behalf of the 
Crown.” A decade later, the HMS Furious visited the coast and annexed 
Ichaboe Island, twenty-four English miles north of Angra Pequena, but the 
Admiralty warned that “it must be observed that the ‘Furious’ did not call at 
Angra Pequena in 1861 on her way to Ichaboe Island.”^  The Admiralty then 
reported that Captain Forsyth of the HMS Valorous in 1866 annexed the rest of 
the islands of the Ichaboe group that “extend from Hollam’s Bird Island, in 
latitude 24 38’ S., . . . to Sinclair’s Island, in latitude 27 41’ S., . . . [with] Ichaboe
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forming about the centre.” The Colonial Secretary had wanted to hear that 
more than just the guano islands had been officially claimed and annexed by 
Britain. Derby had his office request the records of Captain Alexander of the 
HMS Star from the Admiralty, who was thought to have visited Angra Pequena 
in 1796, to see if he possibly made any official British claim to the mainland; but 
nothing was found to that e n d .44 Derby was “grasping for straws,” and he had 
yet to respond to the German request whether Britain claimed Angra Pequena 
and if so on what grounds.
On December 31, 1883, Bismark had his ambassador in London, Count 
Munster, who he had intentionally kept in the dark about Germany’s true 
aspirations, deliver a message to Granville, which was then forwarded to Derby 
in the new y e a r .45 Germany knew Britain had no evidence of claim to the 
mainland of Southwest Africa with the exception of possibly Walvis Bay. Berlin, 
through Munster, was in the process of calling London’s bluff: “ I have 
communicated to my Government the reply which your Lordship [Granville] 
gave . . .  to my inquiry ‘whether England maintained claims to the territory of 
Angra Pequena, and, if so, upon what foundation.’ The tenor of your Lordship’s 
answer was that Her Majesty’s Government had not indeed proclaimed the 
sovereignty of Her Majesty the Queen throughout the country, but only at certain 
points, as, for instance, at [Walvis] Bay and on the Angra Pequena islands.” The 
German Ambassador regurgitated Britain’s stand “that the pretension of any 
other Power to sovereignty or jurisdiction over the territory lying between . . . the 
Portuguese [frontier] and the frontier of Cape Colony, would be an infringement 
of [Britain’s] legitimate rights.” Munster told Granville that Berlin doubted “the 
legal ground of the claims of the British Government” and announced
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Germany’s stand: “That the British sovereignty beyond the frontier of Cape 
Colony was limited to [Walvis] Bay and the islands off Angra Pequena, is on the 
hypotheses under which the Imperial Government is entitled and bound to grant 
the house of Luderitz the protection of the Empire for a settlement which this firm 
contemplates establishing on territory outside the sovereignty of any other 
Power, on the southwest coast of Africa.” Ambassador Munster then used 
Britain’s own words and actions of the past, particularly in regard to the 1880 
pullout due to the Herero-Nama war, against London’s arguments that the 
region was within her sphere of claim: “ In consequence of an application from 
the [Rhenish] Missionary Society for protection for their missionary and trade 
settlements in [Namaland] and Herero[land], your Lordship had informed me in 
your note of 25th May 1880 that the district under British sovereignty was 
restricted to [Walvis] Bay and a small extent of surrounding territory.” Munster 
then added: “An instruction to the Governor of Cape Colony, dated 30th 
December 1880, from the then Secretary for the Colonies, Lord Kimberley, 
communicated to the British Parliament under the heading of South Africa,
1881, stated in its 28th paragraph that the Orange River was to be regarded as 
the northwest frontier of Cape Colony, and that the Government of Great Britain 
would not carry out any plan for the extension of British jurisdiction over 
[Namaland] and H e re ro [ la n d ] .”46 The German Ambassador recalled to 
Granville’s attention a dispatch of January 13, 1881, from London to Cape Town 
which cited such legislation limiting British jurisdiction to Walvis Bay and 
territory south of the Orange River when London denied the application of the 
RMS for British protection in Southwest Africa. Munster even stretched this to 
the point of asserting that the Cape Parliament Act of 1873 annexing the guano
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islands would be in conflict with London’s commitment to the Orange River 
boundary established in December 1880. Yet Munster quickly added that 
Germany was not questioning the island claims. Britain had painted itself into a 
corner with its own arguments. What made matters worse was that the German 
Ambassador pointed to Britain’s arguments in March 1875 against Spanish 
claims to the Caroline and Pelew Islands in the Pacific. England at that time 
maintained that a power must have de facto control over the territory to claim it. 
Munster followed this example with Britain’s negotiations with Spain over the 
Sooloo Archipelago in March 1877 using the same argument. Thus using 
Britain’s own policy, Southwest Africa-save possibly Walvis Bay and the guano 
islands-between Portuguese Angola and the Orange River of the Cape Colony, 
remained open. There was simply no defense that Britain could offer against its 
own arguments. Therefore, London tried to buy time by delaying any response 
to Berlin, while trying to get Cape Town to take action.47
However Bismark had kept up the appearance, with even Munster kept in 
the dark to the true reasons, that Germany was still only seeking protection for 
German traders and missionaries, and possibly creating some commercial 
system abroad. Yet even at this point, London sensed that the ante had been 
raised by Bismark despite believing that Germany had no colonial aspirations. 
On February 5, 1884, Derby sent a dispatch to the Cape Administrator 
requesting the Cape Government to annex or establish jurisdiction over Angra 
Pequena, or else it would “be difficult to resist representations made by the 
German Government that, failing other protection for German subjects there, 
they would be compelled to assume jurisdiction over the place.” Cape Town 
sent back a telegraphed reply the next day: “Angra Pequena. Ministers ask
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matter be kept open, pending Cabinet meeting here. Premier away.”48 a  quick 
response was not to be had. Smyth had sent a dispatch to Derby that enclosed 
a report by Colonel J. T. Eustace, the Cape’s official in contact with Namaland. 
Eustace, Smyth reported, had met with Bethanie Nama Chief Joseph Fredrick 
“successor of his uncle, David Christian.” The Nama Chief had indeed sold 
Angra Pequena to Luderitz in May 1883 for 100 British pounds and 200 guns. 
Joseph Fredrick then admitted to selling Luderitz the entire coast from the 26th 
south latitude to the Orange River and twenty German miles inland for 600 
British pounds and 60 more guns. The Chief denied the sale of any lands by 
David Christian to anyone and stated that his uncle had only given leases.49 
Derby also received a dispatch from the Cape which enclosed a report 
from the Ministers regarding Walvis Bay. The Cape Ministers presented the fact 
that the Cape had already informally annexed Walvis Bay to the Cape to gain 
“some sort of control over one of the main inlets of the trade in munitions of war” 
(i.e. the arming of the Herero) and called to Derby’s attention that the Cape had 
bore the cost of such venture. Therefore, the Cape Ministers wanted to see 
London make the first move in formally annexing Walvis Bay or any other part of 
the Skeleton Coast “leaving the question of the settlement of the amount of 
effective control and provision to be made in that behalf to be arranged between 
Her Majesty’s Government and the Government of the [Cape] Colony.”so Again 
the buck was passed with no one wanting to “foot the bill.” Both London and 
Cape Town dragged their feet in the matter through the spring of 1884. In April, 
Berlin had to respond to Cape doubts whether Germany would truly enforce its 
claimed right to protect Luderitz in Southwest Africa. After being notified
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through the German Charge cTAffairs in London, Granville reported that 
“Bismark has instructed the German Consul on the spot [in Cape Town] to say 
that no doubt exists as to this right.”51
Germany was not alone in becoming frustrated at being practically 
ignored by delays in London to buy time. De Pass & Company wrote to the 
Colonial Office on May 6, 1884, asserting that they had not heard anything from 
the government on its request for more information since August 1883. De Pass 
wanted to know if there were any truth in the newspaper articles which reported 
German intentions to establish a naval station to protect German settlements 
“on the Gold Coast and at Angra Pequena.”52 However, the Colonial Office 
continued to stonewall De Pass probably because they had no more answers 
than the newspapers. Derby’s office could only tell De Pass “that the question 
is still engaging the attention of Her Majesty’s Government.”53 De Pass 
followed this by sending to the Colonial Office a clipping from the Standard of 
May 14 entitled "Germany and Africa” which read:
The German Government intends to take over the suzerainty 
of Angra Pequena and all the neighbouring territories acquired [by]
Herr Luderitz, of Bremen, the English claims in that part of the coast 
being regarded as altogether invalid. German law courts will be 
established, and a position will be assumed similar in all respects 
to that of the French Republic in T u n is .54
However, Derby declared the article to be u n fo u n d e d .55
On May 7, 1884, feeling the increased pressure to give a reply to Berlin, 
the Colonial Office sent a telegraph to the new Cape Governor, Sir Hercules 
Robinson, that: “ It is necessary to tell German Minister what is intended by Her 
Majesty’s Government respecting Angra Pequena and if [the Cape] Government
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desire that it should be under British jurisdiction they should immediately 
express readiness to accept responsibility and cost.” Governor Robinson sent a 
telegraph back on May 15 that read: “New Cabinet making inquiries re Angra 
Pequena, and hope to send definite reply within ten d a y s . ”56 The delays 
continued.
Meanwhile, Granville had his Foreign Office send a letter to the Colonial 
Office to force it into action regarding “the alleged assumption by the German 
Government of sovereignty over Angra Pequena.” The Foreign Secretary 
hoped “no unnecessary delay would be allowed to occur in giving an answer to 
the inquiries made by Count Munster in the month of December last.”57 it had 
been six months since the German Ambassador first requested whether Britain 
claimed Southwest Africa and if so on what grounds. Further pressure on 
Derby came form the Royal Colonial Institute which wrote to the Colonial Office 
on May 28, expressing their concern over German actions regarding Angra 
Pequena and their hopes that Britain would “maintain the r ight . . .  to exclude 
foreign powers from the occupation of this valuable harbour and the country 
adjacent thereto.”58 The Foreign Office again wrote to the Colonial Secretary 
on the 29th requesting an answer soon, though it assured Derby that according 
to Ambassador Munster Berlin had not taken any further steps beyond their 
inquiry into British claims.59
Of course, London did not realize that Bismark was keeping his own 
ambassador in London in the dark as to his true intentions. However, London’s 
delay in responding to German requests for British claims and evidence was 
frustrating Bismark’s plans. Earlier in December of 1883, Bismark had to deny a
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German lobby from annexing Cameroon, despite rumors that the British Consul 
there was back in London trying to get Britain to annex the region. Bismark 
could only suggest that a commissioner might be sent to Cameroon to make 
commercial agreements with the indigenous leaders. Therefore, along similar 
lines, Bismark’s patience was wearing thin by March 1884, with still no 
response from Britain claiming or disclaiming Angra Pequena. Bismark 
considered this delay Deutschfeindlichkeit or “hostility to Germany.” The 
Chancellor came to believe that London was using this time to annex Angra 
Pequena for themselves rather than give an honest reply to the German inquiry. 
The Anglo-Portuguese treaty regarding the Congo, rumors that Britain was 
planning to annex Togo (where German traders had already set up)., and the 
return of Luderitz from the Cape Colony with news that the Cape believed it had 
documents to support British claims to Angra Pequena all pushed Bismark’s 
patience towards breaking-point.eo
It was at this point that Kusserow, the colonial proponent in the Foreign 
Ministry, began to win over Bismark. He suggested the British-style charter- 
system for colonization in which the colonial proprietors bore the full cost for the 
colonies. Berlin would just hand Luderitz an imperial charter for the colony 
without any drain on the resources of the Reich. It was on April 8, 1884, that 
Kusserow’s suggestion in memo took hold of Bismark, as the Chancellor 
confessed years later that it was then that “Kusserow dragged me into the 
Kolonialtummel” or “colonial whirl.”61
With the worries of cost aside, Bismark received news by wire that same 
day from Luderitz’s men in Cape Town that the British colony was prepared to 
annex the Skeleton Coast, including Angra Pequena. The Chancellor told
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Kusserow that the time had come, “now let us act.”62 Bismark was now 
prepared to have Angra Pequena, Togo, and Cameroon annexed, but it all had 
to be done before those in the British government found out the plans and 
annexed those locations for themselves. On April 24, 1884, the German Consul 
in London was ordered to declare that Angra Pequena was “under the 
protection of the Reich.”63 This was meant to confuse London. Germany stuck 
its foot through the door just in case Britain or the Cape tried to close it, yet 
without revealing Bismark’s new policy beyond just seeking protection for 
German settlers. The same information was sent to Lord Ampthill, the British 
Ambassador in Berlin, and to Berlin’s own ambassador in London, Count 
Munster. Munster, and for that matter most of the Foreign Ministry, was misled 
as to the real plan. In May, Bismark had a secret telegraph sent to a German 
explorer on the German ship Mowe to raise German flags and establish the 
Reich’s claims at Togo, Cameroon, and then Angra Pequena. Unfortunately, 
Bismark estimated that Angra Pequena would not be annexed then until at least 
July. Other possible plans to get to Angra Pequena were later explored. The 
Chancellor hoped the declared protection over Luderitz would delay any British 
response while he put his plan in motion.64
Good news came for Derby when Robinson telegraphed on May 29: 
“Ministers have decided to recommend [Cape] Parliament to undertake control 
and cost of coast line from Orange River to [Walvis] B a y .”65 That spring the 
Cape Parliament had finally, after Derby’s threat of a British pullout from Walvis 
Bay, passed Cape Act No. 35 of 1884 which after six years of dragging their feet 
officially annexed the British outpost. The Colonial Secretary wrote to Granville
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on June 2, 1884, that the Cape had finally accepted responsibility and cost in 
annexing Southwest Africa’s coast, at least between Walvis Bay (which was 
now finally annexed itself) and the Orange River. Derby wanted the Foreign 
Secretary to immediately have Germany informed that after finally 
communicating with the Cape, German subjects may be placed under the 
protection of the British flag and that a possible joint commission could be 
created to sort out the private claim disputes between De Pass, Spence & 
Company and Luderitz. Also, upon being notified that a German warship was 
heading for Angra Pequena, Derby suggested to Granville that a British warship 
should also be sent “in order that there may be no ground for alleging that the 
continued absence of British protection has rendered German intervention
necessary. ”66
However, on June 3 the Foreign Office sent Derby a copy of a dispatch 
from their Berlin embassy. British Ambassador, Lord Ampthill, enclosed a 
clipping from an article in the previous day’s Nord-Deutsche AHgemeine 
Zeitung which published a telegram from Bismark to the German Consul in 
Cape Town, W. A. Lippert:
According to statements of Herr Luderitz, Colonial authorities 
doubt as to his acquisitions north of Orange River being entitled to 
German protection. You will declare officially that he and his estab­
lishments are under the protection of the Empire.67
The Zeitung followed with: “Up to the present time nothing further has come to 
our knowledge with regard to this matter.”
Up to now, Germany had not heard anything from Britain since their 
inquiry of December 31. London had yet to furnish any proof of ownership for 
any part of Southwest Africa, though admittedly the Germans let the British off
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the hook regarding Walvis Bay which Berlin acknowledged to be British. At the 
same time, Bismark had not confessed his change of heart regarding 
colonization. Through Ambassador Ampthill, Granville stated that he believed 
the Standard article of May 14 “respecting the alleged assumption of the 
sovereignty over Angra Pequena by the German Government [to be] 
unfounded.” Bismark’s bluff was still working at this point, though Ampthill sent 
another dispatch the same day warning London that Luderitz’s brother was 
planning the departure of an expedition, to be led by Lt. Siegmund Israel (who 
had been on two expeditions with Stanley), to find a road between Angra 
Pequena and the Congo. Obviously the Germans thought Angra Pequena 
might possibly be the door into all of central Africa. Ampthill asserted that 
German warships will carry the expedition to Angra Pequena but that “this 
would appear to be the limit of the support expected from the Imperial 
Government to the enterprise.”68 The Foreign Office then followed this with a 
note of June 7 from Ampthill, who reported a meeting of the West German 
Society for Colonization and Export Trade which met at Dusseldorf and passed 
a resolution to be sent to Bismark:
The society recognises with grateful satisfaction the recent 
preparatory steps taken by the Imperial Government to protect Ger­
many’s present and future interest in the district of the Congo,and 
on the West Coast of Central Africa. With still greater gratitude and 
satisfaction, the society has received the declaration of the Imperial 
Chancellor that Angra Pequena and the coast line of the Great Nama- 
qua country have been placed under the protection of the Empire.
The society expresses a confident hope that the protection of the Ger­
man Empire will also be extended to the more northerly coast line of 
the Herero country.69
London was only beginning to see that something much bigger than a Bremen
32
merchant on the Skeleton Coast was brewing in the policies of Berlin.
Four days after Derby was finally notified of the Cape’s willingness to 
annex the Skeleton Coast from the Orange River to Walvis Bay, Cape officials 
gave the same news to the German Consul in Cape Town. With Bismark yet to 
be given a response from his inquiry made December 31 via Munster in 
London, and with the secret expedition of the Mowe reported unable to make it 
to Angra Pequena, Bismark exploded. The Chancellor sent his son, Herbert, 
first to talk with the British Ambassador and then off to London to speak with 
Granville personally.™ Having met with Herbert, the British embassy quickly 
reported back to London that “while [the Chancellor] still entertained the same 
friendly feelings towards Her Majesty’s Government and was desirous of 
supporting [British] policy in Egypt, his thought that [Britain] should be warned 
that the feeling in Germany as regarded the colonial question was so strong that 
with best wishes, he felt that he would be unable to afford us the same friendly 
assistance hitherto.”71 Bismark had his son “hit them below the belt” with Egypt, 
in which Britain needed German support against France if the British were 
going to retain exclusive control over the Nile and the Suez Canal. It was 
blackmail. Herbert himself arrived in London on June 13, 1884, and was in the 
Foreign Office meeting with Granville the next day. Herbert immediately “laid 
the cards on the table” declaring that Britain had delayed in answering Berlin in 
order to have the Cape annex Southwest Africa from under the G e rm a n s .™  
Granville, to Herbert’s surprise, took full responsibility with Derby on the delay in 
responding to Germany which had so insulted the Chancellor. The Foreign 
Secretary confessed to Herbert: “It is very hard for me, as I have so much to do,
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that I cannot go into detail on these colonial questions. . . . Besides this, a part of 
the Parliamentary business falls on me as leader of the Upper House in this 
difficult time. On top of this I have to conduct the awkward Egyptian 
negotiations.”^  Granville had even written Derby in early June: “ I had 
mentioned in the House of Lords the other day that any blame that was due as 
regards the [six month] delay in the correspondence attached to our side, 
though it had been unavoidable owing to the change of the [Cape] Ministry.”?* 
Whatever the excuses, the truth remained that London had no idea Bismark 
wanted a colony for himself at Angra Pequena and just believed the effort was 
to afford protection--just the impression that the Chancellor had intended.
When Herbert made his father’s true intentions known, followed with the threat 
to the Egyptian question, it was enough for Gladstone’s government, so they 
capitulated. Herbert reported to the Foreign Ministry from London that Germany 
“should be somewhat friendlier [now] towards the English in order that they may 
see that it is to their advantage to comply with our wishes . . . [in] coming years 
they will find themselves in a pickle on account of Egypt anyway, no matter what 
one does n o w .”75 However, this was not the last time Germany would use 
Britain’s precarious position in Egypt as blackmail for colonial gains, at least 
until Britain consolidated its position on the Nile.
On June 17, 1884, Derby telegraphed Governor Robinson in Cape Town 
that the Cape Government “better not bring forward vote [on] control and cost 
[of] coast line and Angra Pequena, at present, in order to avoid any misunder­
standing between Her Majesty’s Government and German [Foreign] Ministry, 
with whom communications are proceeding.” Although the Colonial Secretary
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was calling the Cape off for now, he did ask how long the Cape Parliament 
would be in session just in case the situation changed and London could give 
them the nod to annex Luderitz’s possession. Robinson telegraphed back two 
days later a short message: “Session will last another month.”76 With the Cape 
finally coming to a point of accepting cost and responsibility for annexing the 
Skeleton Coast, London had called them off for now. Chancellor Bismark had 
already been making speeches in the Reichstag calling on the assembly to 
support protectorates over German enterprises abroad, though he made it clear 
that they would be charter colonies. By June 21 London had finally accepted 
the German diplomatic victory and accepted Germany’s sphere at Angra 
Pequena and communicated this to the Foreign Ministry the following day. The 
door could not be shut and Germany was allowed to walk uncontested into this 
part of Africa.77
On June 26, the Colonial Office also received a letter from De Pass, who 
had been disheartened that the Colonial Office had not provided his company 
with any information. De Pass admitted he could only rely on information from 
the press and then cited that day’s Times which reported Bismark’s speech to 
the Budget Committee of the Reichstag professing German protection for 
Luderitz. De Pass soberly commented: “ It would appear that Herr Luderitz’s 
recent purchase will override that of mine, and of my occupation for so many 
y e a r s .”78 Derby sent De Pass’ letter to Granville with the suggestion that a joint 
commission might be created now with Germany to deal with such private claim 
disputes. But that was as far as Derby would go on De Pass’ behalf.79
In the meantime, the Foreign Office forwarded a dispatch from their Berlin
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embassy containing a copy of Bismark’s speech made on June 23 in the 
Reichstag as summarized in the Zeitung. It included the statement by Bismark 
that since London had denied RMS missionaries protection in 1880 because of 
the strict Orange River boundary, Germany had been pursuing a policy to find 
the means to protect them. Bismark reportedly cited the Foreign Ministry’s 
request of December 1883 sent to London on whether Britain formally claimed 
Southwest Africa and if so on what grounds. The Zeitung continued that:
For a long time no answer was received, although it could 
undoubtedly have been possible to furnish one out of the official 
documents relating to the actual extent of England’s colonial poss­
essions. Instead of this a correspondence commenced between 
London and Cape Town, which was looked upon there as if we had 
expressed a desire for English protection for a German settlement.
A ministerial crisis occurred in Cape Town, and consequently a de­
cision on this point was postponed there. Upon the circumstances 
becoming known here, it appeared only natural, in order to clear 
away that misapprehension, that the German Consul in Cape Town 
should be instructed to inform the authorities there that Herr Luderitz 
and his establishment were under the protection of the Empire. . . . Ac­
cording to a telegram received yesterday from London, [the Chancel­
lor] thought that he might consider the question settled. . . .The Imperial 
Chancellor further declared his present intention to be to place un­
der the protection of the Empire and similarly established settlements 
in the future.80
Bismark also revealed Germany’s support of the Belgians in the Congo and 
anticipated “securing German interests by a treaty which would give us 
complete freedom of trade and communication” there. Bismark’s speech 
reportedly affirmed:
In this manner, therefore, His Majesty the Emperor had endeav­
oured to keep the wide domain of Central Africa open for free devel­
opment. As to the form in which the Settlement of Angra Pequena 
would receive the protection of the Empire, the Government had in 
view the idea of issuing for it an Imperial Letter of Protection, similar 
to the Royal Charter given by England to the East Indian Company,
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and lately to the North Borneo Company. This system would poss­
ibly be supplemented by the establishment of coaling stations [for 
warships] and an extension of the Consular system. This system 
might possibly be also applied to other enterprises of the same na­
ture on the African coast and in the South Sea.81
Bismark’s speech was ringing through the halls of the Reichstag while Germans 
were making their way along the west coast of Africa towards Angra Pequena. 
The Zeitung then reported Bismark's final plea to the Reichstag for Germany’s 
new colonial policy: “Once foreign nations had recognised the firm will of the 
German nation to protect each German according to the motto Civis Romanus 
Sum , it would not be difficult to afford this protection without any special display 
of force. But if, indeed, foreign nations were to see that we were not united, we 
should then be powerless to do anything, and we do better to renounce all idea 
of any development beyond the s e a . ”82
On July 2, 1884, Granville’s office forwarded another dispatch from 
Ampthill in Berlin that included his own summation of another speech made by 
Bismark in front of the Reichstag, obviously concerned about the resistance of 
his own Prussian agrarian Conservatives against colonization. Ampthill 
reported that Bismark “repeated that he was entirely opposed to the creation of 
colonies on what he considered a bad system, namely, to acquire a piece of 
ground, appoint officials and a garrison, and then seek to entice persons to 
come and live there.” Bismark considered what was happening in Angra 
Pequena and elsewhere different, where Germans were already settled and 
requesting a German protectorate. Ampthill wrote that the Chancellor 
“approached the whole subject with great reserve, he admired the energy of the 
men who wished to found these colonies, and he had said to himself how [he’d]
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be justified if he replied to them that Germany was too weak to found colonies; 
her fleet not strong enough; and that difficulties might arise with foreign 
Governments.” The British Ambassador continued that “it was impossible for 
him, the first Chancellor of the newly created Empire, to say to these men, even 
if he believed it, ‘Germany is too weak and too poor for such undertakings.’”83 
Ampthill reported that Bismark then proceeded to give a full account of the 
negotiations with England on the subject of Angra Pequena to the Reichstag. 
Bismark emphasized Britain’s inability to furnish evidence for any official claim. 
The German Chancellor had anteed up, called England’s bluff, and was now 
grabbing for the winnings.
Meanwhile Cape Governor Robinson sent an urgent telegraph to Derby 
on July 9 at the request of Cape Ministers:
As [the Cape] Parliament will soon be prorogued, Ministers 
are anxiously awaiting information relative to negotiations with Ger­
man Empire on question of [Skeleton] Coast. . . . Ministers advise me 
that feeling in Colony is strongly in favour of retention of British au­
thority over coast line from Orange River upwards, and that rumour 
that British jurisdiction over [Walvis] Bay is to be abandoned has 
caused great uneasiness. Annexation of [Hereroland] to German 
Empire is also greatly deprecated.”84
The Cape was still ready to annex Southwest Africa, and it had no intentions of 
having German neighbors who would undoubtedly sympathize with and 
possibly support the Boers. Also, on July 4, De Pass had written to the Colonial 
Office that he had two other harbors south of Walvis Bay in which Luderitz had 
not set up claim yet, at Sandwich Harbor and Hottentot Bay. De Pass urged 
them to have the HMS Boadicea sent to claim them before a German warship 
heading for Angra Pequena could. Derby replied, however, that he had ceased
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trying to establish British claims in Luderitz’s domain saying that Britain was “not 
in a position to oppose the intention of the German Government to afford its 
protection to German subjects having duly acquired concessions or formed 
establishments where no British sovereignty exists.”85 Yet, the Colonial 
Secretary did point out to the Foreign Office that De Pass’ establishments at 
Sandwich Harbor and Hottentot Bay could be possible annexation points for the 
Cape if Granville concurred. On July 12 Granville gave his concurrence and 
asserted that he was requesting assurances from Germany that British subjects 
would be protected in the German sphere, that no penal settlement would be 
created, and that a joint commission could resolve private claim disputes. Two 
days later Derby, with Granville’s support, sent Governor Robinson a dispatch 
giving up on Luderitz’s possession but asked if the Cape was willing to assume 
cost and control over De Pass’ establishments at Sandwich Harbor and 
Hottentot Bay if they were proven to be beyond Luderitz’s claim. However, with 
Luderitz’s deed from the Bethanie Nama granting the entire coast and all its 
harbors and bays from the Orange River to the 26th south latitude, there was 
little support for such claims.86
In his reply to Derby Governor Robinson displayed how far behind 
London had left Cape Town in the dark regarding the international situation; 
reporting that the Cape Parliament passed a resolution declaring it “expedient” 
to annex the Skeleton Coast to the Cape. Robinson also reported that the 
Parliament was going to dismiss the next day, so he needed London’s nod 
immediately. The Governor added that the Cape wanted to annex the coast 
from Walvis Bay north to the Portuguese frontier as well. However, with the end 
of the Cape Parliamentary session went the hopes of keeping Southwest Africa
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British, with London failing to give them approval for an annexation vote.87 
Ampthill accepted the German protectorate but warned that “no doubt can be 
entertained as to [Walvis] Bay and the islands adjacent to Angra Pequena being 
British.”88 On August 6, Munster called on Granville to accept the British 
acknowledgement. All that was needed now was the inevitable flag raising.
Cape Town gave a suspicious glance at any German ships in the region. 
For example, a July 23 report from Rear Admiral Salmon reached the Colonial 
Office in August, 1884, that the German warship Wolf was spotted arriving in 
Cape Town from Singapore bound for Angra Pequena or the Congo. Although 
waiting for the inevitable, the Cape at this point had problems of its own, 
requesting more rockets from England “as [the British commander] still 
anticipates trouble in Zululand.”89 Then came a telegraph from Governor 
Robinson that the German frigate Elizabeth, had arrived along the Skeleton 
Coast and claimed the Luderitz territory from the Orange River to the 26th south 
latitude, including Angra Pequena, for the German Reich. However, the 
German commander of the Elizabeth mistakenly claimed all the guano islands 
within cannon shot of the coast as well as 'the mainland. This began a new 
diplomatic struggle.^
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Chapter 2 
The Scramble
When news reached the Cape that the commander of the German 
warship Elizabeth ignorantly annexed the islands as well as the mainland of the 
Skeleton Coast, save of course Walvis Bay, the Cape Ministers were infuriated. 
They immediately had Governor Robinson ask London to inform Germany that 
those islands were officially and formally claimed by the Cape as British territory 
under the Letters Patent of 1867, in which Britain officially recognized and 
authorized the annexation, and under the Act of Cape Parliament No. 4 of 1874, 
in which the actual annexation was carried outJ Yet, when news reached 
Germany of the commander’s misfeasance, Berlin seemed content to let the 
matter slide for a while to see where it went rather than immediately correct it.
During 1884, however, Berlin was having its own challenges to deal with 
now that it was trying to become a colonial power. Many colonial supporters in 
Germany by this time criticized Bismark’s government for its slow progress.
Even Kaiser Wilhelm I openly criticized Leo von Caprivi, head of the German 
Admiralty, for not sending warships to Zanzibar on the east coast of Africa to 
protect German interests that were in competition with Britain. Coolheaded 
Foreign Ministry officials, according to Senior Councillor Friedrich von Holstein, 
were trying to protect Caprivi from the new frenzied Kolonialtummel that 
seemed to throw all “caution to the wind.” Caprivi simply did not want to 
disperse his fleet, which was much smaller than Britain’s anyway, across the 
globe while the possibility of Anglo-German hostility remained. At the same 
time, Ambassador Munster had become the scapegoat for any difficulties that 
arose with Britain. Herbert Bismark wrote to the Foreign Ministry after his visit to
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London that Munster “ruins everything there; it would be far better not to have 
any ambassador. . . .  to embroil oneself with a Power unnecessarily is a great 
mistake.“2 This seemed ironic since it was Herbert himself who had laid down 
the law with Granville regarding Germany’s bid for colonies, while Munster was 
misinformed the entire time by Berlin. While Berlin was questioning the 
performance of its own ambassador, the diplomatic situation became more 
uneasy, at least for a short time, when British Ambassador Ampthill died. 
Therefore while London was considering a replacement, opinion grew in Berlin 
that if relations were going to normalize with England, Munster had to be 
transferred somewhere else.3
London had little wait before hearing news of German colonial 
expansion. On August 22, the German Charge d ’Affairs in London, Baron von 
Plessen, visited the Foreign Office and reportedly made the following statement: 
“To the north of the territory which Luderitz acquired last year by treaty with the 
Chief of [the Bethanie Nama], other subjects of the German Emperor have, 
during the last two years, by treaties with independent Chiefs, or by cessions 
from those previously in possession, obtained rights of property, and other 
rights, in the territories of [Namaland] and [Hereroland].” Plessen stated that 
these regions were not recognized as ever having been under British 
jurisdiction and that in reference to the Germans there requesting “the 
protection of the Empire for their acquisitions, the Imperial Government has 
granted it to them. The Imperial Government give their protection as soon as it 
is asked for, whenever German settlements are founded on territory not 
previously occupied by another Power, and when the claim is supported by
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valid treaties which do not violate the rights of third parties.”5
Such statements gave British colonialism new energy and support, 
proving that there was indeed a scramble for the last unclaimed regions of the 
world, particularly in Africa and Oceania. Plessen followed this statement with a 
protest against the Cape government's efforts to claim the area north of 
Luderitz’s possession. In 1880, the British restricted the Cape frontier to the 
Orange River, with the exception of Walvis Bay, and this had not been changed 
or nullified. The day following Plessen’s protest, Granville forwarded to Derby 
the Cape’s suggestion to annex territory north of Luderitz’s, i. e. from the 26th 
south latitude to the Angolan frontier of Portugal’s claim. The German Charge 
d’Affairs complained that “most assuredly the German Government did not 
calculate when they made the [December 1883] inquiry that the definitive 
answer would be put off for more than six months, and that the interval would be 
utilised to push forward rival schemes of English annexations of territory.” 
Plessen further announced Germany’s contention that “it is impossible to admit 
the theory advanced by the Cape Parliament of theoretical annexations of 
extended and unexplored coasts and stretches of land by means of decrees 
published at a distance; it is contrary to the law of nations and to tradition.”6 
Britain’s own arguments against such annexation protocol, particularly against 
Spain, were already in the record books in Germany’s favor. The German 
embassy then supplied arguments on how the Cape had no evidence or 
support for such claims. Both Britain and the Cape had still left doors open 
further north of Luderitz’s claim, and could not legally shut them now, once
again with Bismark’s foot in those doors.7
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Reports of further German expansion then came when Cape Governor 
Robinson telegraphed Derby on September 7, 1884, and reported that the 
German Consul in Cape Town, W. A. Lippert, announced that the German 
warship Wolf had placed under the German Southwest Africa Protectorate, with 
the exception of Walvis Bay, the entire Skeleton Coast from Cape Frio to the 
Orange River. Robinson noted that the protectorate included the islands of 
Mercury and Hollamsbird which the Cape had claimed as their’s for some time 
now. Interestingly, the Cape Governor telegraphed this German announce­
ment, since his report of August 20 regarding the Elizabeth’s annexation of 
Luderitz’s possession and the guano islands had been conventionally written 
and thus delayed in reaching London. The Cape was now taking advantage of 
the technology at hand finally to deal with the increased tempo of colonization 
that Germany had brought to Africa. However a conventional report followed 
the telegraph enclosing a letter from the German Consul which included the 
actual report of Captain Schering of the Elizabeth. Consul Lippert reported that 
the guano islands were now German territory according to the Law of Nations 
which “means and includes all the islands within gunshot distance of the 
mainland.”8 Governor Robinson also included a letter from his Ministers who, 
although accepting the German Protectorate over the mainland, insisted that the 
guano islands—including Hollamsbird and Mercury-were British territory.
Daniel de Pass also sent his concerns on September 11, after reading in the 
London Times about the German extension north of the 26th southern latitude. 
De Pass reminded the Colonial Office that he suggested to them back on July 4 
to take possession of his establishments there. He was also alarmed by a 
rumor that Germany was claiming the islands and soon sent clippings from the
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Times which confirmed the rumor. His associate John Spence also protested 
the German island claim citing their official annexation in 1866 by the HMS 
Valorous, which of course the Colonial Office already knew. However, the 
Colonial Office ignored De Pass and Spence for a long time in this matter until 
the matter was laid to rest with Berlin.9
Meanwhile, both countries continued to attempt to resolve the 
boundaries of the new German Protectorate and the ownership of the guano 
islands. On September 13, Foreign Secretary Granville acknowledged the 
willingness of Germany to have a joint commission assembled to delimit the 
boundary of Walvis Bay, which was now surrounded, and the German 
Protectorate. Britain accepted Germany’s proposal. 10 Regarding the guano 
islands, the Cape naval commander, Rear Admiral Salmon, provided an 
explanation of the initial German occupation of Southwest Africa in greater 
detail. Salmon told how the German ship Elizabeth from Europe bound to 
Australia stopped at the Cape Colony after annexing Luderitz’s territory from the 
Orange River north to the 26th, including the islands. Salmon reported that he 
informed Captain Schering that England had those islands since 1866, which 
the latter confessed he was not aware of and admitted that he had no 
instructions from Berlin to annex them but just assumed according to 
international law that he should. Salmon told the German captain that when the 
HMS Boedicea last visited there the Union Jack was flying on Seal and 
Penguin islands in Angra Pequena harbor, but Schering told the Admiral that 
he had seen no flags there. Upon Salmon’s inquiry, Robinson wrote back to the 
Admiral that ten islands, rocks, or islets along the coast from the Orange River to 
the 26th were British: Ichaboe, Long, Seal, Penguin, Halifax, Possession,
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Albatross Rock, Pomona, Plum Pudding, and Sinclair’s Island (also known as 
Roast Beef). Hollamsbird and Mercury north of the 26th south latitude were also 
British. 11
On September 23, another question accompanying the boundary issue 
from the British side was whether Southwest Africa was to be “described a 
colony or a territorial political protectorate of a defined type.” However, the 
Germans did not ever really give a definitive answer to Foreign Secretary 
Granville. Though regarding the issue of boundaries, Granville did have the 
British embassy in Berlin inform the German government that “Her Majesty’s 
Government will welcome Germany as a neighbour in those parts of the coast 
which are not already within the limits of the Cape Colony and not actually in 
British possession.”^  Cordial, but to the point. Britain was acknowledging 
Germany’s mainland claim from Cape Frio to the Orange River, save Walvis 
Bay, but standing firm that the islands were British. Immediately the German 
Charge d’Affairs, Baron Plessen, visited Granville and informed him that 
Germany did not claim the guano islands and recognized them as British 
territory which had been the original stand all along. This should have ended 
the difficulty, but there were small islands and rocks that were not specifically 
claimed in Cape records (Note: The German government had not yet informed 
Luderitz of Berlin’s capitulation on the major islands which enhanced the 
difficulty as well). In one such circumstance, Plessen announced to Foreign 
Secretary Granville that “Shark Island, in the Bay of Angra Pequena, which is 
joined to the mainland at low tide, is property of Herr Luderitz, and does not 
appear to have been annexed at any time by the Cape Colony.”i3 So the
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matter remained for the time being. Regarding Britain’s welcome to Germany 
as a new neighbor in the region, Granville acknowledged a note from Bismark 
to Baron Plessen in which the German Chancellor saw it “a first step in that 
direction which he had hoped British policy would take.”1*
However, ownership of these islands became an immediate issue when 
De Pass wrote to the Colonial Office on September 24 that a German ship, the 
Trojan, was about to leave Hamburg with German settlers bound for Angra 
Pequena, and requested that the German government be asked to inform them 
that some portions of that territory were still in dispute. Shark Island, as noted 
above, was only one specific case though De Pass was still entertaining the 
hope of keeping some mainland claims as well. Derby’s office informed De 
Pass of Germany’s claim to Shark Island and requested what evidence he had 
of that island or rock being British. Infuriated by now, De Pass immediately 
responded citing Clause No. 2 of his lease, which was written in Cape Town on 
November 1, 1871: “All rocks and islets lying between Hollamsbird Island on 
the north and . . . Sinclair’s Island on the south, not herein specially named, 
called the Ichaboe Group, shall nevertheless be declared and taken to be 
included in this lease.”15 o f course, this was a lease from the Cape government 
to De Pass with no specific acknowledgement or endorsement of an indigenous 
leader of Southwest Africa recorded. Regardless, the German argument was 
that Shark Island during low tide was attached to the mainland which Luderitz 
had purchased from the Bethanie Nama, whereas De Pass at best had only a 
lease. Therefore Luderitz felt he was De Pass’ new landlord, and as the new 
landlord was simply asking the old tenants to vacate.16
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Making matters worse, London was informed that De Pass now alleged 
having claims on the mainland from Baker’s Cove to Angra Pequena, which of 
course Luderitz had taken into possession. While London seemed content with 
the guano islands and Walvis Bay, and Berlin seemed content with the 
mainland save Shark Island, De Pass was still claiming parts of the mainland 
and Luderitz was still claiming several more islands. The entrepreneurs 
attempted to push their respective governments into confrontation. 1?
German and British newspapers did try to make the public aware of the 
confrontations at hand. The British public read about the German colonial 
invasion of Africa and Oceania. The Times in London reported on September 
4, 1884, that Dr. Nachtigal had annexed parts of Cameroon for Germany that 
summer and had become the German Consul General for the region. The 
article reported that “a protest against the German annexation is about to be 
sent to the Foreign Office in London, it being stated that the majority of the 
inhabitants of Cameroon are desirous that it should remain under British 
control.”18 English readers were informed that Nachtigal was in fact delayed in 
Cameroon so that the German warship Elizabeth was sent to Angra Pequena 
for the flag-raising. Although the event had occurred in August, the Times 
printed a letter on September 16, which had been published in the Zeitung for 
German readers, from the warship’s captain congratulating Luderitz after the 
event: “I beg to add that the act, notwithstanding the wildness of the country, 
made a very promising impression, and will, I hope, form the basis of a good 
future there.” The captain also enclosed his official proclamation which began: 
“His Majesty the German Emperor, William the First, King of Prussia, has
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commanded me to go with his corvette Elizabeth to Angra Pequena, to place 
the territory belonging to Herr Luderitz on the West Coast of Africa under the 
direct protection of His Majesty.” The account also included the Captain’s 
infamous island annexation “according to international law” which had 
provoked such debate and difficulty between the governments. 19 The picture 
was only now unfolding for the British and German public in realizing the tense 
negotiations which had taken place. The Times further reported the next day 
that “Dr. Nachtigal’s mission is by no means at an end, but that he has received 
orders to proceed to the C o n g o .”20 Though there were some articles which 
followed acknowledging the quick German colonization of parts of Africa, the 
Times did offer some reassurance to the British public. In one article, the paper 
reported that German newspapers believed “that at Cameroon and other places 
on the West African coast there has been no annexation in the name of the 
Empire, but only a declaration of protectorate exactly of the same nature as at 
Luderitzland, Angra Pequena.”21 For the time being, the German colonies were 
really believed to be commercial or charter, but economic hardship would make 
them increasingly dependent and therefore controlled by Berlin. However the 
newspapers did make the British public more aware of the “scramble.”
Back on the diplomatic scene, in early October 1884, reports from Berlin 
illuminated how Germany was trying to get control over the Kolonialtummeland 
possibly harness it. The British embassy reported that the German Colonial 
Association had met on September 21 and passed some resolutions in which it 
was known that “the Chancellor had to a certain extent sanctioned the policy of 
the Association.” The Association president reportedly “warned his audience
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against giving in ‘to a sort of colonial fever,’ which might carry the nation further 
than might be prudent. . . and [to] remember the old adage erst wag’s, dann 
wag’s [or ‘look before you leap’].” The Association passed resolutions 
requesting the Chancellor to place German factories in West Africa under the 
protection of the Reich, and for the Reichstag to consider “the establishment of a 
fixed and rapid steam service between Germany and distant lands . . . essential 
for the proper development of German commerce . . . and for the maintenance 
of a close relationship between Germans abroad and at h o m e .”22 The British 
Charge d’Affairs, Sir Charles Scott, who was in control of the Berlin embassy 
since Ambassador Ampthill died, later sent an article in the Zeitung of 
September 27 to London which reported a meeting between Bismark and 
representatives of Hamburg firms that were engaged in trade in West Africa with 
the discussion focused on the future of German settlements there--though 
emphasis was on Togo and Cameroon. The Zeitung was under the impression 
that negotiations with France and England would have a beneficial result for 
German colonization. That same paper the next day reported the organization 
of a West African squadron of German ships, which could also be used to 
protect Southwest Africa, including the Bismark (flagship), the Gneisenau. the_ 
Olga, and the Ariadue. At the same time, Bismark’s other son, William, wrote to 
Holstein in the Foreign Ministry regarding the coming elections in the Reichstag: 
“If I can succeed in securing that the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung only 
rides the colonial horse in the election . . .  I will be very g la d .”23 The Chancellor, 
and those around him, were hoping that his new colonial policy would tap into 
the popular enthusiasm and therefore fill the Reichstag seats with
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Conservatives.24
Meanwhile in Europe the British, under Granville’s leadership in the 
Foreign Office, were requesting friendlier relations with Germany while Berlin 
was making headway in rapprochement with Paris. Bismark believed, and thus 
it was German foreign policy, that friendlier relations with France would make 
Britain respect German interests abroad by feeling threatened. The Chancellor 
would just as soon deal with France than with Gladstone’s Liberal government 
anyway. By now Luderitz had expanded German colonial interests beyond the 
Skeleton Coast in Southwest Africa, with Britain forced to be the spectator. In 
an effort to prevent Germany from acquiring another colony in Cameroon, the 
British Foreign Office informed Germany that as early as 1879 chieftains in that 
region had requested British protection and that in May 1884 London had finally 
sent a consul to accept the cession. This did not impress Berlin. Many German 
officials who had Bismark’s ear believed that Germany would “only gain 
England’s goodwill-if only a goodwill accompanied by gnashing of teeth-by 
way of an alliance with France. . . . [England must be told to be] in colonial 
matters with us through thick and thin; or [England] cannot reckon upon our 
friendship.” Herbert Bismark even asserted that Germany’s rapprochement with 
France would “squash Gladstone against the wall. . . .  but first [Gladstone] must 
ride the English deeper into the mire so that his prestige will vanish even 
among the masses of the stupid English electorate.”25 Furthermore, British 
frustration with the French blockade of southern China in the Tonkin war with 
China, now that it was hurting British commerce, gave Berlin further hope of less 
resistance form London.26
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Soon the German Chancellor began pushing harder in colonial issues, 
and even threw his own criticism Caprivi’s way when the latter refused at times 
to send warships to the aid of German interests in Angra Pequena on the 
southwest coast and in Zanzibar on the east coast of Africa. Caprivi, in his 
distaste of the colonial policy, began referring to the founder of German 
Southwest Africa as “King Luderitz” in jest. Bismark felt he needed to talk with 
his head of the Admiralty. In September, Bismark confessed to Caprivi that he
himself still held “disdain” for colonization and explained that it had all been a
\
ploy to win the coming elections in the Reichstag. Still conservative in heart, 
Bismark had merely ripped the planks from under the liberal-industrial platform 
by using the popular idea of colonies to show how backward many of the 
Conservatives, dominated by Prussian agrarians, had been in resisting the 
idea. Yet the Chancellor did not keep only German liberals in his sights. Later, 
in October, Bismark confessed to his son Herbert that Germany had better keep 
some promises to France in order to “squeeze and isolate England still more, 
until it becomes so bad that even the most stupid of the English Liberals will 
become alive to the folly of Gladstone’s silly policy [of resisting Germany].”27 
This of course exaggerated Gladstone’s resistance to German colonization, 
since his government had basically rolled over for Germany on most issues.
Also, in the latter months of 1884, German officials fumbled the Franco-German 
rapprochement that was suppose to bring Britain to her knees in fear of
Germany. 28
Regarding Southwest Africa, ambiguity still remained over the 
possession of certain guano islands. Therefore Foreign Secretary Granville, 
wanting to give a definitive statement, had the British embassy in Berlin inform
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the German government that all the islands off the coast were indeed British 
and “that further communication will be made to them . . .  in regard to Shark 
Island, and probably some islets and other territory in the same vicinity.”29 It 
seemed the respective governments were standing behind De Pass and 
Luderitz in their conflicting claims to these still disputed areas. On October 3,
De Pass sent word to the Colonial Office that his Captain Spence had been 
warned to leave the islands near Angra Pequena by Luderitz’s company. This 
was supported by a telegraph from the Cape Governor Robinson informing 
Colonial Secretary Derby that Luderitz was claiming all the islands from the 
Orange River border to the 26th south latitude and had called on Spence to 
vacate them. The Cape Ministers labeled Luderitz’s claim unlawful. Granville 
sent information to Derby from British Charge d’ Affairs Scott in the Berlin 
embassy that the German government had already agreed the islands were 
British, save Shark and a few other rocks, and were still willing to have a joint 
commission to sort out the mess. Also, German Charge d’Affairs Plessen in 
London had notified Granville that Berlin declared the captain of the Elizabeth 
wrong in having the German Consul notify the Cape government of the German 
Protectorate. Plessen called it a “mistaken execution of instructions” and that 
the British government should have been notified in London directly.30 in 
addition, De Pass was also around to hound the Colonial Office after reading 
the October 6 Times which reported Luderitz’s demand for Spence to vacate the 
islands, and told Derby’s office that Luderitz was acting on the misfeasant 
annexation by the Elizabeth commander. The frustrated businessman then 
added the smug remark about the lengthy gunshot range claim by the German 
commander: “ I have to hope that the gunshot distance alluded to by the
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German commander may be determined to be that of the longest range of our 
best carrying g u n .”3i
In the first week of October, the Colonial Office sent Foreign Secretary 
Granville a lengthy report reexamining the entire negotiation history concerning 
Southwest Africa, and included the German accusation that the British had used 
their long delay in response to annex the territory from underneath Luderitz.
The Colonial Office admitted that “the extent of Herr Luderitz’s territory was, 
apparently through inaccurate information, understated to the extent of more 
than 2,000 per cent.”32 The long delays in information that could have been 
sent via telegraph from the Cape did not help matters. The current situation 
regarding the guano islands was snowballing for no real apparent reason. The 
German government had already renounced claims to almost all the islands. 
Only Luderitz was claiming more than that. Therefore Derby wanted to send, 
with Granville’s concurrence, a telegraph to Robinson that in fact Berlin did not 
support Luderitz in the guano island claims and with the suggestion that a 
British gunboat should be sent to inform Luderitz thus, to protect the British 
islands, and to finally end the entire matter which had drudged on for months. 
However, Granville told the Colonial Secretary to hold off the gunboat for now, 
and said he would ask the German government to have the Bremen merchant 
withdraw his claim to the guano islands. The German Charge d’Affairs in 
London sent word the next day that the Foreign Ministry in Berlin promised to 
attend to Luderitz immediately. With this new sense of actually accomplishing 
something on the matter, Derby had De Pass notified that the two governments 
were in the process of setting up a joint commission to finally handle the private 
claim disputes. However, this was only met with De Pass’ complaints on
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whether he would be given ample time to prepare his case.33
Despite De Pass’ murmurings, negotiations regarding Southwest Africa 
ran as smoothly as could be expected. Plessen visited the Foreign Office on the 
11th, handing Granville a note that contained Germany’s official approval of the 
joint commission and nominated Dr. Bieber, the newly appointed consul for 
Cape Town replacing Lippert, as their commissioner. Germany wanted the 
commission to meet in Cape Town, and agreed that the disputed islands (Shark 
Island and other islets or rocks unspecified in De Pass’ lease) would be settled 
by the commission. Plessen restated Germany’s disclaim to any other islands 
and agreed to protect the private rights of British subjects in German territory if 
Britain reciprocated. However, Berlin wanted Granville reminded that “no 
British population worth mentioning exists in the coastal region in question, as 
but few British subjects frequent it for trade, seal-hunting or fishing.”34 a couple 
of days later Derby had De Pass informed that Acting Foreign Minister Klemens 
Busch (Note: Busch replaced former Foreign Minister Paul von Hatzfeldt who in 
turn had been reassigned to replace Count Munster as Ambassador to Britain) 
gave assurances that steps would be taken “to prevent any further molestation 
of guano deposits.”35 Busch also offered reasons why Luderitz had yet to be 
informed of Germany’s position not to claim the guano islands, despite the 
commander of the Elizabeth’s misfeasance, with the paramount being the 
absence of any German consul in Cape Town at present. On October 21, the 
Foreign Office sent Derby word that Bieber had left for Cape Town and that 
Plessen inquired whether Britain had nominated a commissioner yet. Four 
days later Granville also had the Colonial Secretary informed that Busch had
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sent for Luderitz to inform him not to interfere with preexisting rights in 
Southwest Africa and that disputes were to be settled by a joint c o m m is s io n .36
Yet after a few days Colonial Secretary Derby still believed Luderitz was 
trying to claim the islands, using the 1880 British proclamation of the Orange 
River boundary with only Walvis Bay given exemption. The Colonial Office 
wrote to Foreign Secretary Granville “that [Luderitz] is dealing with the question
j
of private property and not with that of public sovereignty, and with a singular 
confusion of ideas, he believes that the three-mile doctrine is applicable to 
questions of private ownership as well as to questions of territorial 
jurisdiction.”37 in truth however, De Pass too had made this confusion 
defending his personal property with arguments of British claims to sovereignty 
which had nothing to do with his private grants or leases. Also, Derby’s office 
was in this very statement acknowledging the three-mile doctrine of 
international law that would have recognized many of the islands as being 
German. All sides seemed to merge the issues which could easily go both 
ways. The Colonial Secretary did have Granville informed that a commissioner 
from their side would be appointed soon, and that the Cape Town site would be 
appropriate. However, Derby did strongly assert that the commission should 
visit “the localities in questions” before ruling on them. De Pass was already by 
the end of the month pressing both the Foreign and Colonial offices for 
information on the commission and its protocol. Granville had Derby write De 
Pass that he would be the first to know and that all protocol would be decided 
“on the spot. ”38
Tension grew as the joint commission began to form. On November 5,
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the German embassy in London informed the British government that Berlin
>
was going to back Luderitz’s claims of ownership over De Pass’ claims as 
tenant on the mainland, which was especially critical since De Pass claimed 
several mining leases around Angra Pequena. The embassy had Luderitz’s 
deed of sale forwarded to the Foreign Office which in turn was given to Derby. 
Chief Joseph Fredrick of the Bethanie Nama and successor of David Christian 
described in the deed to Luderitz the “grant [not sale] by David Christian under 
date of 21 September 1863, to . . . De Pass, Spence & Co. of the tract of land 
from Baker’s Cove to the southern corner of Angra Pequena," the very land De 
Pass was now claiming. The Nama chief declared:
That the aforesaid tract of land and my right thereover was 
never sold to Mssrs. De Pass, Spence & Co., but that they acquired 
only the concession (verguming) thereof. Nor have they ever paid 
anything for it. . . . Whereas Herr F. A. E. Luderitz, of Bremen, in Germany, 
in virtue of contracts of sale of May 1, 1883, and August 25, 1883, has 
purchased from me the whole coast from 26 S. latitude to the Great 
[Orange] River, including all havens and bays . . . and is thereby become 
from this time the sole and rightful owner thereof, the abovemention­
ed grant to Messrs. De Pass, Spence & Co. ceases herewith of itself.39
The indigenous authority in the region was also backing Luderitz’s exclusive 
mainland claims. Derby sent the deed to De Pass and the Cape, though he did 
acknowledge to De Pass that Granville believed the documents to only effect 
private ownership not sovereignty. Of course, De Pass was only interested in 
the private issue which effected his wallet. It seemed Luderitz was the new 
landlord, at least until the commission decided anything. By this time Sydney G. 
Shippard was approved as the British commissioner. On November 11, the 
Foreign Office sent the German embassy documents contesting their side of the 
issue, including the full text of the 1866 Proclamation and the Letters Patent o f .
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1867, although these were restricted only to the matter of the islands which 
Germany was not contesting anyway-save Shark Island. However, this 
seemed enough for a fight and De Pass sent a letter to Derby a week later 
disagreeing with the language of Luderitz’s deed stating “whatever may be the 
rights of Josef Fredricks . . .  he only sells havens and bays to Herr Luderitz, no 
mention is made of is la n d s .”40 For the first time, De Pass furnished a map 
showing the location of the islands, which was quickly forwarded to Granville.41 
In November 1884, Britain was getting ready for the West African 
Conference to be held in Berlin and the inevitable repercussions of the Anglo- 
German tension over Southwest Africa. Sir Edward Malet, the former British 
ambassador in Egypt, was now the ambassador in Berlin and England’s 
delegate to the Conference. London expected the worse; that Germany would 
exploit its fairly good relations with France to make huge claims in Africa. 
Granville also sent Percy Anderson, who headed the African department in the 
Foreign Office. His instructions were clear: Give Bismark anything he 
demanded, except the Niger, and block French efforts. Yet when the German 
Chancellor, in the early afternoon of November 15, rose to greet and address 
the conference, he blasted out the “3 C’s” of Livingstone-“commerce, 
Christianity, and civilization.” To the surprise, and delight of the British 
delegation, Bismark laid down the issues of the conference being only to 
promote the free navigation of the Niger, the free trade in the Congo, and to set 
up some kind of protocol for future annexation efforts. With the discussion 
confined only to the future rules for the scramble of colonies and on matters of 
free trade and navigation which Britain supported, London breathed a sigh of 
relief and began looking at Berlin in a more cordial light, though some issues
63
still needed defending. 42
In December 1884 after the conference, the Assistant Under Secretary of 
the British Colonial Office, R. H. Meade, went to Berlin where he met with Dr. 
Busch, the Under Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, and with the Iron Chancellor 
himself. In a December 13 letter to Granville, Meade reported his unofficial 
discussions with Busch on colonial issues. While in Berlin the British official first 
met with Daniel de Pass who was there, and reported to London that De Pass 
“was quite prepared to make terms with the Germans, and only desired to be 
placed in communication with the German Government, so I do not anticipate 
any difficulty in that quarter. If [De Pass] is satisfied and we secure promise of 
fair treatment for any others of our countrymen established within the new 
German Protectorate, I do not think that the Cape would object to the cession of 
these islands and rocks to G e r m a n y .”43 After the British official visited the 
Foreign Ministry, Meade reported that “I assured [Busch] that we at the Colonial 
Office had no jealousy of the recent development of German colonial enterprise, 
that we felt the world was large enough for all.” However, Meade was told of 
German suspicions of British intentions regarding Cameroon, Samoa, and 
Bechuanaland. In regards to Cameroon: “ I said that we were doing and 
contemplating nothing which would militate in any way against their free action 
. . .  we wished the Germans all success . . . that there was, no doubt, some 
natural feeling of irritation on the part of the English residents when the German 
Protectorate was announced, but that his was all past; we certainly intended to 
take the Cameroons, but [Germany] had forestalled us, and we had no other 
wish now than for their success.” Meade assured Busch that “at this moment 
Mr. Baynes, the Secretary of the Baptist Missionary Society, was in Berlin,
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anxious to explain to the Foreign [Ministry] that though he would have preferred 
the sovereignty of our own country, he was quite prepared loyally to accept the 
new order of things.”44 After hearing from Busch of some local British officials 
resisting German intentions in Cameroon, Meade suggested to Granville that 
the officials there “should be careful to cultivate the most friendly relations with 
the German authorities . . . [and that the officials should] smooth the matter 
down, using whatever influence [they] may possess with the natives to accept 
their new masters, and with the English traders to keep quiet, and not raise 
difficulties.”45 Meade did dodge the matter of Samoa, which was far from being 
resolved any time soon.
Regarding Bechuanaland, which had direct consequences for German 
Southwest Africa, Meade described the British expedition of 3,500 men into that 
region as a “clearing out [of] certain freebooters from the British Protectorate” of 
the Cape. This was a creative excuse for Britain wanting to create a buffer via 
the Kalahari between the Germans of Southwest Africa and the Boers of the 
Transvaal who they wished to keep separated.^ Meade “pointed out that 
Angra Pequena, the inland limits of which are stated by Germany to be 20 
[German] miles, is separated from Bechuanaland by over 700 miles, of which 
the greater part is desert, and that there could be no possible connexion [sic] 
between our expedition and the interest of the German Colony.” This of course 
underestimated the true appetite for the hinterland that Bismark wanted, which 
the British had become aware of and wanted to stop before it grew any further 
from the coast. The British official told Busch that Germany should not listen to 
any rumors regarding the British expedition into Bechuanaland, and that when
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“we sometimes heard rumours that Germany had designs on the strip of coast 
between Natal and Delagoa [on the southeast coast of Africa]. . .  we knew that 
this was impossible.”47 Of course Meade did not mention how the Cape quickly 
tried annexing this unclaimed coast before any Germans arrived. Meade 
exaggerated Britain’s lack of suspicions in his criticism of Germany’s skepticism 
over British action in Bechuanaland, which was apparent in another of his 
rebuking examples-regardless how false it was: “ It never occurred to us to 
attribute dark designs . . . when [Germany] sent an unusually powerful squadron 
of five ships to visit their new acquisitions on the West Coast of Africa. We did 
not express any uneasiness and imagine that a coup de main was intended by 
Germany against any of our colonial possessions.”^  Meade then reported that 
Busch told him, regarding Bechuanaland, “that Prince Bismark feared we were 
about to use the large force we had collected forcibly to annex further territories, 
cutting the Germans off from any extension inland beyond their general limit of 
20 miles; but that he was very glad to hear that we had no ulterior objects in 
sending the force . . . [other] than those I had mentioned.” Of course that force 
was cutting off any German expansion too far east, but gave Germany 700 miles 
to “chew on” in the meantime. Meade then reported Busch’s comments on 
Germany’s basic colonial philosophy: “He said he looked on this step taken by 
Germany as an experiment. It might succeed or it might fail. If it succeeded, in 
all probability England would reap a large share of the reward by the opening 
up of fresh trade routes. If, as was possible, it should fail, then at least 
something would have been done by Germany, and whatever fruit there might 
be would then certainly be gathered by England.”49
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On December 14, Busch called on Meade to inform him that the 
Chancellor wanted to see the British envoy himself. In person then, Meade 
agreed that there should be free access to all African rivers, but then the 
discussion quickly focused on Bechuanaland. The Chancellor still believed 
Britain was cutting his colony off from a hinterland in central Africa so Meade 
reported that:
[Bismark] produced a map and showed me the Kalahari De­
sert, and said that he was informed that it was erroneously described 
as a desert, that there are elephants there, trees, grass, and water. I 
told him that we were within our rights in taking over the Kalahari dis­
trict, which merges into Bechuanaland, but that behind the coastline 
of Angra Pequena was a waterless tract some 30 miles broad [the 
Namib], but behind that again was a better country [Namaland], and 
that Lord Granville had said that therejA/as . . .  no objection from our point 
of view to Germany going into the interior even as far as the 20th de­
gree of longitude, which I pointed out to him on his map, and beyond 
which westward we did not propose to go.si
In other words, Britain was not willing to allow Germany to move so far inward 
as to have the ability to link up with the Boers, but London was willing to allow 
Germany to take over the lands of the Nama and Herero.
After Bismark protested British resistance to Germany’s colonization of 
the northern coast of New Guinea, and reminded Meade how Germany had 
supported England in Egypt, Meade made the offer of the guano islands off the 
Skeleton Coast and in Angra Pequena harbor to Germany. Bismark quickly 
interrupted Meade and asked: “Including [Walvis] Bay?” The British envoy 
answered: “Oh no; that is a regular British Settlement on the mainland; I am 
only proposing to deal with the islands.” Meade tried to argue how Germany 
would be better off controlling the islands which are so close to “the very mouth 
of the principle harbour.” But Bismark “attached no importance to it” and barked
67
"I do not find your proposals sufficient.”52 Meade, quite troubled, visited Busch 
after his meeting with Bismark. However Meade’s main objections focused on 
Bismark’s undiplomatic position regarding New Guinea, not Southwest Africa. It 
was then discovered that a note which was suppose to have been given to 
London by Munster back in July, so that England could have had time enough 
to deal with any Australian jealousy, was not. Therefore the whole New Guinea 
affair came as a surprise to London. Again Berlin used Munster as a scape­
goat, before his official transfer to their Paris embassy.53
Although 1885 brought smoother Anglo-German relations, with Britain 
concentrating on the Russian threat in Central Asia, there were other objections 
to German colonial expansion. Spanish officials were outraged at German 
advances into areas in the Pacific which they considered their own since the 
days of Magellan. German officials reported from Madrid of the “excited state of 
public feeling.” They added that “the idea that a foreign Power wanted to take 
from Spain part of its territory was enough to set the entire nation ablaze.” 
Although the Spanish King and his Conservatives kept calm, Spanish 
Republicans were trying to arouse a frenzy against Germany. One German 
negotiator revealed his frustrations in resolving the issue by commenting:
“Spain does not have a single statesman.”54 Germany had to back off 
somewhat from her more aggressive plans of seizing the Caroline Islands, 
which now Spain claimed to have held for three and a half centuries. Also,
1885 brought a new Russian threat in the Balkans for German officials and 
strategists to concentrate on. Yet, through all of this, negotiations and 
controversy regarding Southwest Africa continued.55
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In January 1885, Derby acknowledged an earlier dispatch from Cape 
Governor Robinson which reported that the Resident Magistrate of Walvis Bay, 
William Palgrave, was helping British interests in Hereroland “as far as he can 
do so, whilst residing at his post at [Walvis] Bay.” Derby was adamant that 
Palgrave give no more than token support for the Herero and give the Germans 
as much room as they needed. The Colonial Secretary rejected the idea of 
having Palgrave or anyone else become the resident magistrate with the 
Herero paramount chief, Maherero, “seeing that there has been no Resident 
with the Chief since the end of 1880, the appointment of one now would have 
the appearance of an attempt to thwart the development of the German 
protectorate which Her Majesty’s Government has recently recognised.” The 
British did not intend to reestablish themselves in Hereroland after England had 
pulled back to Walvis Bay during the Herero-Nama war of 1880.56
The joint commission to resolve private claim disputes was still organiz­
ing, though both Berlin and London dropped the issue of the major guano 
islands since both now recognized them as British and under De Pass’ lease 
from the Cape. However, the Colonial Office informed De Pass on February 10, 
1885, that “with regard to Shark Island . . . and any unnamed islets and rocks . . . 
it will be for you and your advisers to make out your title to them before the 
C o m m is s io n .”57 Three days later, Granville informed the German embassy that 
De Pass was on his own defending Shark Island or any other islet or rock not 
specifically named in his lease. The Foreign Secretary also acknowledged that 
the Cape Governor gave the Cape lease of 1869 to De Pass, replacing the 
older imperial lease of 1861 which did not include unspecified islets or rocks. 
Granville also admitted that the Cape lease of 1869 was actually made two
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years before the Cape was invested with such independent powers. Granville 
hoped Germany would not exploit this infraction since the former Governor was 
acting on good faith then. In addition, the Foreign Secretary reported to the 
German embassy “that the cable to South Africa is broken . . . instructions will 
be sent by post and will be followed by a telegraphic communication as soon as 
the cable is repaired.”58 Whether by simply using private wire channels or 
actually misleading the German government, London was still able to receive 
wired information from the region for some time. Whatever the case, this did 
interestingly enough give Britain some advantage at least in biding time.59
On February 17, 1885, after the British government waited for quite 
awhile for De Pass to go to the Cape to represent himself, De Pass wrote to the 
Colonial Office that the Commission need not wait for him, as he had a lawyer 
representing his firm already in Cape Town. The next day Derby sent 
instructions to Governor Robinson for the Commission to begin, inviting them to 
decide on the validity of conflicting claims between De Pass and Lpderitz on 
Shark Island and other unspecified islands included in the lease of 1869.
Derby instructed Robinson to have Resident Magistrate Palgrave in Walvis Bay 
announce that all those with claims in the Walvis Bay vicinity should attend the
Commission.60
However, Palgrave had been taking matters into his own hands, ignoring 
orders from London via the Cape which tried to limit his assistance to the 
Herero. Via the Reuter’s Telegraphic Agency, the British Colonial Office was 
informed on February 25, 1885: “Cape Town, February 24--Mr. Palgrave . . .  [in 
Hereroland] held conference with principal Chiefs, the result of which was
70
satisfactory, the Chiefs unanimously deciding to accept British rule.”6i Derby 
immediately sent his own telegraph back that he wanted Palgrave out of 
Hereroland and to act only within his instructions. Governor Robinson 
responded three days later that “Palgrave has returned here, having been 
recalled.” Although the Governor had not the time for an official investigation, 
he assured Derby that “if press version true, I propose to inform [Maherero] Her 
Majesty’s Government cannot accept his offer to place his people and country 
under British rule.”62 Not until March was Robinson able to furnish any official 
information on the meeting with Herero chiefs. According to Robinson’s later 
report, an English trader, Robert Lewis, visited Palgrave requesting that he visit 
Maherero (who was also known as Kamaherero), paramount chief of the 
Herero, which he had done on December 29, 1884. Palgrave reported that:
“On my arrival, Kamaherero at once took measures to collect his headmen and 
councillors, and, after some day’s deliberation, he handed me a deed of 
cession of his whole country to the British Government.” Apparently Maherero 
only stipulated that “the [Herero] laws should, as far as possible, remain in force 
until the laws of the Government were understood by his people, and that he 
should continue to be acknowledged as the paramount Chief of the country, 
and that the two mining concessions granted by him [to Lewis] should be 
respected.” Maherero’s deed of cession stated:
“ I, KAMAHERERO, paramount Chief of [Hereroland], with the 
consent of my under Chiefs and Counsellors [sic], subject ourselves to 
the Government of the Queen of England in Her Government of the 
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope as one of Her posts, namely our 
whole country . . . .  In the name, and with the consent, of myself and my 
people, I subject myself to the Government in order that we may re­
ceive that protection which we have for so long a time asked for in 
vain, and now, in firm confidence, I know for certain that we shall be
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treated in all respects as the true subjects of the Queen herself.”63
The Herero, having been defeated by the Nama who were supplied with 
German arms in exchange for land, tried to turn back to their old protectors, the 
British, who had forsaken them in the last Nama-Herero war in 1880 and 
withdrawn to Walvis Bay. However, Governor Robinson admitted to Maherero 
that the Cape had considered annexing all of the lands of the Herero and 
Nama, but that his government now recognized the German colony and was not 
going to interfere with its expansion into the heartland of the Southwest African 
tribes.64 Meanwhile, the British Colonial Secretary was busy trying to repair 
the damage caused by Palgrave’s acceptance of the Herero concession. By 
April 8, Derby sent his approval to Robinson for his actions, and received news 
that the rejection of the Herero protectorate by London and the Cape satisfied 
the Germans. Derby informed the Governor that the German embassy also 
suggested that: “Her Majesty’s Government should express to your Ministers a 
hope that no endeavour will be made to obtain influence in the country north of 
the Orange River and west of the 20th degree of east longitude. Such a hope is 
in conformity with the policy which your Ministers are aware Her Majesty’s 
Government have adopted in regard to the portion of South[ern] Africa in 
question.” However Derby, who was easily influenced by colonial 
entrepreneuring, did add that “ I consider the expression ‘influence’ to apply to 
political influence, and I have no desire to suggest that the legitimate operations 
of trade between the [British] Colonists and natives should be curtailed or 
terminated.”65 Therefore, British business was not prohibited from operating in 
German Southwest Africa. Furthermore, the British were not in a hurry to
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comply with German requests to quickly notify natives of Britain’s capitulation by 
again using the excuse of broken telegraph lines or ships having already left 
dock.66 Though the inevitable did come a week later when Foreign Secretary 
Granville’s instructions were sent to Robinson in Cape Town which confirmed 
that the tribes residing in Southwest Africa would become German subjects:
I shall be glad if, whenever an opportunity occurs for commun­
ication with any of the Chiefs living to the west of the 20th degree of 
east longitude, you will intimate to them that Her Majesty’s Govern­
ment have agreed to limit the Queen’s authority to the country east­
ward of that line [Bechuanaland], and that if the authority of the Ger­
man Government should be extended inland up to that line, Her Maj­
esty’s Government will not do anything to interfere with such and
extension.67
The British sent a copy of these instructions to the German embassy on June 9, 
1885, concluding this potential conflict.68
Matters regarding Daniel De Pass were still heated throughout this time, 
though the British Colonial Office seemed less the advocate for the company. 
Back in September 1884, Colonial Secretary Derby informed De Pass that the 
Foreign Office had requested that Germany take action against any more 
gunshots by Luderitz’s men around the guano islands. However, Derby’s office 
warned the British businessman “that the formation of a settlement in the 
immediate neighbourhood of the islands . . . [will] have a tendency to drive away 
the birds.”69 Obviously a different tone was afoot. De Pass’ associate, Captain 
John Spence, had likewise complained to Governor Robinson, reporting that _ 
the German cannons were scaring birds away (claimed that one shot could 
scare away the birds in a vicinity for years), though a similar disinterest was 
received from officials. In March 1885, De Pass had sent yet another complaint
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to the Derby’s office, claiming that he was losing money in the guano islands 
because of German traffic in Angra Pequena harbor. To emphasize this, De 
Pass reported that extracting 580 tons of guano from the islands in 1883 worth 
5,075 British pounds, comparing this with the only 300 tons extracted in 1884 
worth 2,200 pounds. De Pass then claimed that, according to Spence, they 
would be lucky to get 100 tons worth less than 750 pounds in 1885. The 
businessman complained that he had lost 4,200 pounds already and projected 
that since he had a lease for eleven to twelve more years, he would lose 40,000 
pounds at this rateTO John Bramston, the Assistant Colonial Under Secretary, 
answered him on April 4, 1885: “Lord Derby desires me in reply to say that he 
regrets to hear of the diminution in the yield of the islands, which he hopes is 
only temporary, but I am to remind you that no guarantee has ever been given 
you that settlements on the mainland would be prevented with a view to your 
benefit.”71 De Pass sent an abrupt rebuke two weeks later: “We apprehend, if 
your Lordship fully appreciated all the facts, that you would not form this 
conclusion.”72 For now, with tempers on edge, both sides allowed the matter to 
slide.
On June 8, Gladstone’s Liberals resigned over a taxation dispute and 
two weeks later Lord Salisbury, Robert Cecil, accepted Gladstone’s seal 
becoming Prime Minister. With new elections far away, a new conservative 
Tory government had to rule weakly with Parliament still in a Liberal majority. A 
worst case scenario for any British prime minister--all the responsibility without 
most of the power. Salisbury made Colonel Frederick Stanley the new Colonial 
Secretary, while reserving the office of Foreign Secretary for himself (Note:
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Salisbury governed as Prime Minister right out of the Foreign Office). Salisbury 
had criticized the Liberal government, as opposition leader in the Commons, for 
its “vacillation and inconsistency” in its African policy over the last five years. He 
had denounced Gladstone’s diplomatic defeats, the concessions to the Boers in 
the Transvaal, and the mess emerging in the Sudan with the rise of the Mahdist 
state. Salisbury wanted to make foreign policy the priority of the day. He turned 
to Percy Anderson, who held the African desk in the Foreign Office, and carved 
out a new strategy of securing England’s position in Egypt so Germany could 
never again use it as blackmail. Overall, the Prime Minister began to push a 
more vigorous British participation in the “scramble for Africa.”73
Despite this, Salisbury let Germany keep her sphere west of the 20th 
east longitude in Southwest Africa along with its gains in Cameroon. His 
strategy was not as much to inhibit the Reich in Africa as it was to race 
Germany, and everyone else, for control over the “dark continent.” Therefore, 
although Bismark and the Foreign Ministry (who were mostly conservatives) 
preferred Salisbury over Gladstone, British policy towards Germany during this 
transition of British governments remained very much the same. The fact that 
the lower government officials in London rarely changed with the leadership 
also assisted this. In the end however, Salisbury proved a more worthy 
opponent for Berlin, despite its preference for him74
In July 1885, Governor Robinson, in his first dispatch to the new 
government, requested instructions from Colonial Secretary Stanley for the joint 
commission regarding claims by British subjects caught between Luderitz’s 
coastal claim and the 20th east longitude which Britain was informally 
recognizing as the eastern limit of acceptable German advance into the
75
Kalahari. Stanley did not answer until September and then only with 
instructions for the British commissioner to operate within the bounds of his 
original instructions from Gladstone’s government. Accordingly, British subjects 
wanting London’s protection were to keep out of Germany’s way west of the 
Kalahari border.^ However, the Cape Ministers had other convictions about 
letting Germany that far inland and had hoped a change in government in 
London might effect that. In a dispatch of August 1885, the Cape Ministers 
objected to Britain’s refusal to protect or annex Hereroland east of Walvis Bay 
and requested that the Governor “urge Her Majesty’s Government to refrain 
from forcing the inhabitants of that country to acquiesce in German 
annexation.”76 However, bowing to London’s clear instructions, Robinson 
answered his ministers on July 30 with a note that sounded much like Granville 
and Derby: “Her Majesty’s Government have expressed a hope that no 
endeavour will be made by [the Cape] Ministers to obtain political influence in 
the country north of the Orange River and west of the 20th meridian of longitude, 
and the Governor trusts that [the] Ministers will be so good as to instruct the 
various frontier officers accordingly. ”77 At this time, Robinson also reported 
informing Maherero of the Herero and William Christian of the Bondelswarts (a 
southern Nama tribe just north of the Orange River) that Britain, and thus the 
Cape, refused to intervene in their regions.
In regard to the remaining rivalry between De Pass and Luderitz, the 
Joint Commission on Southwest African private claim disputes finally made its 
decisions known in September 1885. Although the German and British 
Commissioners were able to agree in some cases, they went to their respective
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corners on the major issues, as reflected in a telegraph from Robinson: “British 
Commissioner considers islands in lease of 1869, although not annexed to 
Colony, to be British, and the claims under lease valid; German Commissioner 
disagrees.” Regarding the Luderitz-De Pass rivalry on the mainland, Governor 
Robinson relayed: “British Commissioner considers De Pass, Spence, and 
Co[mpany]’s proprietary claims on mainland, under grants from [Bethanie 
Nama] Chief David Christian of 1863 and 1864, including entire coast of Angra 
Pequena, to be valid; German Commissioner disagrees.” Robinson added that 
the “British Commissioner considers De Pass, Spence, and Co[mpany]’s claims 
for rent [from Luderitz’s] German factory at Angra Pequena, and for 
compensation for damage done to Penguin island through such factory on 
mainland opposite, valid; German Commissioner d is a g re e s .”^
Robinson’s subsequent written report went into more detail. The 
Commission agreed to many small, preexisting claims by British, Boer, and 
German entrepreneurs in Southwest Africa, especially regarding small mining 
claims. The Commission also agreed to give the Rhenish Missionary Society 
land and privileges in Walvis Bay to build a church, a school, and other 
buildings throughout the Bay’s territory. Therefore all of Southwest Africa was 
now open to the RMS. The Commission did agree to deny questionable grants 
and claims made by many, especially Boers, to capitalize on the situation in the 
change of landlords. Though the British commissioner wanted to give the large 
mining grant, given by Maherero, to the British businessman Lewis, which the 
German commissioner vetoed. Likewise, the British commissioner wanted to 
give the title of land to Anders Ohlsson, an employee of De Pass, in Sandwich 
Harbor while his German counterpart only wanted to recommend that no one
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disturb him as long as he confined himself to fishing. The real conflicts came on 
issues between De Pass, Spence & Company versus Luderitz’s Southwest 
African Colonization Company, in which both commissioners backed their 
countrymen. The British representative supported De Pass’ questionable claim 
to Shark Island, whereas the German commissioner denied that it was included 
in any lease though he was willing to allow De Pass & Company to use Angra 
Pequena harbor for their guano business without any official land title. The 
German representative rejected De Pass’ 1864 deed which included the 
mainland because it was only a lease, whereas Luderitz’s was a deed of 
purchase. The German commissioner also rejected his counterpart’s support 
for De Pass’ 1000 pounds per annum rent claim on Luderitz, since by Spence’s 
own admission Luderitz’s factory was well outside De Pass’ supposed claim. 
Furthermore, the German commissioner flatly denied De Pass’ claim to 89,205 
pounds worth of damages to guano supply on Penguin island--he declared that 
Spence had submitted the claim after the established deadline anyway.
Overall, the dispute between Luderitz and De Pass remained u n re s o lv e d 7 9  a 
real scare alarmed Cape Town and London though in late September and early 
October, 1885, when the Commission found the eastern boundary of Walvis Bay 
to be incorrectly defined. However, whether respecting that Britain had 
cooperated in withdrawing support for the Herero or whether giving Salisbury’s 
new government some room, Germany decided not to exploit this and 
cooperated with the British in redefining the eastern boundary correctly.80
Making a productive colony out of Southwest Africa was just as uncertain 
and clumsy as the negotiations that created it. The first year of the German 
colony was a disappointment for Luderitz’s mining. Roads had to be laid, wells
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dug, and mines improved or created. More money was going in than coming 
out. To make matters worse, one of Luderitz’s ships, the Tilly, sunk off the coast 
with expensive drilling equipment for water wells and other essential 
equipment. This disaster coupled with a poor start put the Bremen merchant on 
the threshold of ruin. Bismark himself called Luderitz’s domain the sandpotjie 
or “ little sand pot.”8i
However the diplomatic channels became emblazed once more when 
news came that a British trader, W. W. Jordan, had purchased land from an 
Ovambo chief; the land was disputed territory between the Ovambos and the 
Herero in the northern part of the colony. The Ovambos inhabited the far 
northern regions where adequate rainfall enabled cultivation. Their numbers 
far exceeded the Herero and Nama put together, yet the southern-most of the 
Ovambo seemed dominated by the Herero, possibly because of the modern 
weapons the Herero had from English traders. What came as a shock was that 
Jordan had declared the region he purchased, which the Herero also claimed, 
an independent republic. He named his supposed republic “Upingtonia” after a 
Cape official who was a proponent of northern expansion for the Cape.82 
Jordan declared himself president and considered a group of Boer settlers 
around him as his council. The Cape’s agent-general or lobbyist in London, 
wrote to the Colonial Office on January 7, 1886, after telegraphing a short 
request to the Cape the previous day: “Excitement-Reuter’s cable Upingtonia 
Republic--Wire Facts.”83 The Cape telegraphed back:
Jordan trader alleges purchase part [Ovamboland] from Chief.
He resold in farms to Europeans who without authority have named 
district Upingtonia, and established some Council. Cape Government 
never heard of transaction till newspapers had obtained information 
and have no connexion [sic] with matter. They are studiously avoiding
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all interference north of Orange River as requested by Imperial Govern­
ment. 84
There were some British subjects who were so frustrated with not being able to 
officially keep parts of Southwest Africa out of German hands that they were 
willing to do it on their own privately. Although the Germans had not claimed 
Ovamboland as far as Portuguese Angola yet, they had already claimed control 
over Hereroland, and Upingtonia was right in between Ovamboland and 
Hereroland. The Ovambo claimed the region was their’s to sell to Jordan, 
which the Herero denied. In fact, the Herero even regarded these particular 
Ovambo as their vassals. This time the Germans supported the Herero, having 
been firm supporters of the Nama up until this time. Of course, they were 
supporting Maherero for their own gain, to eliminate any rival claims to 
Southwest Africa. Although the Cape was officially “hands off,” there were 
many who hoped Upingtonia would succeed. Colonial Secretary Stanley had 
Salisbury informed of the matter on January 12, 1886, stating that: “Having 
regard to the declarations made by Her Majesty’s Government as to their 
abandonment of all claims or interest [in Hereroland], they could not interfere . . . 
without incurring the risk of a serious misunderstanding with the German 
Government.’^  Also at this time, British officials gave attention to a Times 
article of January 8, which announced the arrival of a German official in Berlin 
with treaties securing German control over all of Southwest Africa from the 
Orange River in the south to Cape Frio in the north, and to 22 degrees east 
longitude (which was in conflict with the Anglo-German agreement regarding 
the 20 degree east longitude Kalahari border). The Colonial Office wanted 
Ambassador Edward Malet, Ampthill’s replacement in Berlin, to inquire into this
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new eastern claim “as the Government of the Cape Colony and the German 
Government have already been informed that the British protectorate over 
Bechuanaland extends westward as far as the 20th degree of East longitude 
and northward to the 22nd parallel of South latitude.”86 Furthermore, Colonial 
Secretary Stanley in a dispatch to Cape Governor Robinson on January 13, 
reaffirmed that Salisbury’s government intended to stand with the decision of 
Gladstone’s not to get involved west of the 20th east longitude, and therefore 
not to get any ideas regarding Upingtonia.87 Matters remained intense though.
Interestingly, some British subjects in Southwest Africa resented Jordan’s 
self-proclaimed republic as much as the Germans did. Robinson received a 
letter from R. Lewis, the same English mining entrepreneur who had been 
denied a Herero mining concession near Otavi (which would lie in Upingtonia) 
by the German commissioner. This time Lewis was on the German side in 
rejecting Upingtonia, for obvious self-interest. Lewis claimed to be writing to the 
Cape Governor on behalf of Maherero, though his own interests seem at the 
heart of it:
I am desired by [Maherero] . . .  to seek your aid in the withdrawal 
of one W.W. Jordan who is going about buying certain tracts of country 
belonging to me. . . . For instance he has purchased Raipoort from the 
[Nama] to whom it certainly does not belong. He has further bought 
at Ondonga from an Ovambo minor Chief, certain land on my northern 
territory, including Otavi. He is buying from whom he can, whether 
they have the power or right to sell it or not. This to him seems to be 
outside the question altogether. I would here further state that we do 
not acknowledge any such p u rc h a s e s .8 8
Lewis, still claiming Maherero’s words, went on to say that Jordan’s life was in 
danger because of his mischief and mischance. In one instance, when Jordan 
gave an Ovambo minor chief some brandy, the chief died an hour later making
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the Ovambo tribe believe that Jordan poisoned him. Maherero claimed that the 
Ovambo “will kill Jordan if they can lay hands on him.” The Herero overlord 
also reported that his own people, the Herero, “are so enraged against him . . . 
that the Chief will not hold himself responsible for what the people may do to 
him.”89 Robinson replied to the Herero request with the standard conviction that 
the Cape could not involve itself in matters west of the Kalahari line, save for 
Walvis Bay. The Governor could only suggest that Lewis write a complaint to 
the German Commissioner, and Stanley sent his approval of Robinson’s 
actions, so
German expansion in Southwest Africa continued despite the phantom 
republic of Upingtonia, making the issue of the specific eastern boundary of the 
colony sensitive. British Ambassador Malet finally did send confirmation from 
Berlin that the Germans did not claim an extended eastern border for Southwest 
Africa as the Times had earlier reported (the Germans acknowledged the 20 
degree east longitude Kalahari border, not 22 degrees east as reported by the 
London paper). However, despite the fact that Germany confirmed the 
boundary between Southwest Africa and Bechuanaland, this was really only 
applicable in the southern reaches of the colony-no border had yet been 
agreed upon north of 22 degrees south latitude, or just north of the Tropic of 
Capricorn. In the meantime the Germans tried to at least become more involved 
in the Kalahari by pushing its occupation to the very borders of Bechuanaland. 
German Ambassador Hatzfeldt informed London that “territories which are 
situated eastward of the Southwest African Protectorate . . . which belong to the 
[Nama] of Berseba and Gibeon, to the Bastards of Rehoboth, to the Herero, and 
to the Red People [a branch off the Nama] have, in consequence of Treaties . . .
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been placed under the protection of the Reich.”91 On February 3, 1886,
Colonial Secretary Stanley sent word to Robinson that Germany had finally and 
officially declared its expansion all the way to Bechuanaland, including all of 
Hereroland and Namaland. With the eastern part of the colony for the most part 
established, Germany’s only task seemed now to negotiate control over 
Ovamboland--at least in terms of international recognition--part of which laid in 
Portuguese Angola and part in Southwest A fr ic a .92
In the midst of Germany’s expansion and the resulting difficulties, a new 
government formed again in London in February 1886, with Rosebery chosen 
as Foreign Secretary and Granville, who was Gladstone’s old Foreign 
Secretary, now the new Colonial Secretary. However, again the minor officials 
in both offices remained much the same, with interdepartmental affairs 
remaining fairly u n c h a n g e d .93 in this government’s first actions regarding 
Southwest Africa, Rosebery sent Granville a note enclosing information from a 
British official in Lisbon, Portugal. The Portuguese were not happy in regards to 
Upingtonia which they considered created “by some Boers and Englishmen” 
and must have considered the district farther north than what it actually was to 
consider it a threat. The official reported that “anything likely to interfere with a 
free expansion eastward of Portuguese territory into the heart of the South 
African Continent traverses a fixed purpose of Portuguese and Colonial Policy, 
and therefore excites vigilant attention h e re .”94 Portugal had also been 
whipped into the new colonial enthusiasm and “scramble for Africa” by 
Germany’s presence and had now entered the situation as another opponent of 
Upingtonia along with Germany and the Herero. However the major
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breakthrough came in March 1886. Foreign Secretary Rosebery had sent a 
dispatch to Ambassador Malet in Berlin, ordering him to inquire from Bismark 
whether an Anglo-German conference could meet in Berlin to sort out the still 
unresolved private claims in Southwest Africa which the Joint Commission in 
Cape Town failed to agree upon. Rosebery suggested a possible meeting 
between British officials and Dr. Friedrich Krauel, the German Foreign Ministry’s 
colonial planner. Bismark agreed. If a major Anglo-German agreement could 
be made resolving all outstanding issues regarding the colonies, Germany and 
Britain could look more into a possible alliance. However, both sides delayed 
organizing the conference for several months. In the meantime, both London 
and Berlin bickered over unresolved details trying to gain an advantage. 
German Ambassador Hatzfeldt filed a complaint from Chief Manasse Noresch 
of the Red People (a subtribe of the Nama) with London, in that:
The western and northern boundary, 20 E. long, and 22 S. lat., 
fixed by the English Government for its protected district in Bechuana­
land, cuts o f f . . .  a portion of lands and hunting grounds belonging to the 
Red People. The bushmen subject to him had lived from time immem­
orial to a point as far east as Nosob. He places his boundary in the 
east as reaching from the Chamob River to the Nyami [or Ngami], 
which seems to agree with the boundary which separates the territories 
of the [Nama] from those of Betschuana. The [German] Imperial Gov­
ernment . . .  is not in a position to judge of the justness of these claims 
within the British Protectorate which it has recognised. It would how­
ever, regret if in consequence simply of a boundary drawn according 
to latitude and longitude the Red People should be deprived of lands 
which have belonged to them for a long time.95
Evidently Germany, at least along the northern section of its eastern frontier with 
Bechuanaland, felt confident enough to pursue a more eastern limit towards the 
Okavango region, a region that annually flooded to become a luscious watering 
hole in the middle of the arid region north of the Kalahari. It seemed to Britain
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that Germany wanted a piece of it, with the Germans actually using the 
suzerainty of some Nama over particular bushmen as a means to that end. This 
would definitely be one issue in the coming conference.96
In April and on into May 1886, while London was trying to get its side of a 
conference delegation organized, the Colonial Office was swamped amid an 
increased tempo of actions regarding Southwest Africa. On May 7, for example, 
De Pass & Company sent a simple request to the Colonial Office: “We should 
be happy to hear if any progress has been made in the Angra Pequena and 
coastal claims, as we have not been favoured with any communication of 
late.”97 Colonial Secretary Granville had De Pass answered with news of the 
new conference. London also received requests from the Portuguese 
government wanting information about Upingtonia. However, it was not until 
June that Granville’s office was even able to send Robinson’s report on 
Upingtonia to Foreign Secretary Rosebery. This report did confirm that Jordan 
had purchased the area from the Ovambo and was now inviting South Africans 
to come and settle. Governor Robinson also reported that Chief Maherero 
likewise claimed it and had already given it as a silver mining concession to R. 
Lewis. Yet, most of the important information the Governor sent was unrelated 
to Upingtonia but regarded the German colony in general. Cape Governor 
Robinson warned in his report that the northern regions of and around 
Bechuanaland, which was ambiguously defined (with only the southern part of 
the western boundary recognized with the German colony) be attended to else 
it “is likely to be appropriated by some other power.”98 These seemed to be 
issues destined for the planned conference. The Colonial Office was also
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prompted in May with news from Ambassador Malet that the Reichstag had 
received and recorded all treaties securing control over the Southwest African 
tribes, save the Ovambo. Such news made London quicken its pace. Granville 
suggested to Rosebery that they send John Bramston, Assistant Under 
Secretary in the Colonial Office under Gladstone and Salisbury governments, to 
the Berlin conference to help British Charge d’Affairs Scott since Bramston had 
been involved in the affair since the very genesis of the German c o lo n y .99
While London awaited the conference it received more news regarding 
the status of German and British power in the region of Southwest Africa. In late 
June, London received a dispatch from Walvis Bay that a German ship on her 
way to Cameroon had stopped there. It stated that: “The captain made 
particular inquiries as to the possibility of landing at the mouth of Swakop River, 
which the magistrate told him was not possible on account of the surf and reefs 
of rocks at the mouth.” Actually, the later German establishment of Swakop- 
mund as a port would challenge this opinion. A German professor and 
geologist also came through Walvis Bay on his way to the interior “to examine 
the various mines” while other Germans were buying up “the various mines 
from the present owners, natives, and traders.”ioo German momentum seemed 
to be building both on the coast and in the interior, while Walvis Bay was 
becoming a ghost port. A British naval commander reported that although meat 
from fishing and herding was plentiful, vegetables in Walvis Bay were rare, and 
that:
None but slightly brackish water is to be procured; all drink­
ing water is brought from the Cape by the schooners trading with the 
settlement. Of trade there is very little indeed, and that falling off; a 
good many years ago, a quantity of ivory, ostrich feathers, and skins 
used to be exported to the Cape, but little now; occasionally a few
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cattle are shipped to St. Helena. [The Resident Magistrate] said that 
one small schooner of a 100 tons would bring all the merchandise 
and carry away all the produce for a whole year. No merchant vess­
els or whalers ever visit the harbour; the coasting schooners . . . call 
about once in three months from the Cape, and bring the drinking 
water and the few stores that are required . . . and get a cargo of dried 
fish which they take to the Cape. No revenue is collected at [Walvis], 
as it is established as a free port of entry and export, except from li­
censes to sell spirits, etcJoi
Evidently Walvis Bay, also known as Walfisch (“Whale fish”) Bay, was now 
worthless with the whaling days of its namesake gone. Also, Walvis Bay was 
only of value as a doorway into Southwest Africa. With the Germans cutting it 
off from the interior, its only value to the Cape was that it was not in German 
hands. If the Germans could control a port with the geography of Walvis Bay it 
would enhance their power tremendously. Instead the Germans built 
Swakopmund next door to Walvis Bay. Luderitz had wanted to find a harbor on 
the northern coast equal in potential to that of Angra Pequena, but he settled on 
making something at the mouth of the Swakop River despite warnings against 
the surf.
Finally, the Berlin Conference on Southwest Africa met in July 1886, with 
Bramston and the British embassy Charge d’Affairs Scott representing Britain, 
and with German colonial head Dr. Friedrich Krauel and Southwest African 
commissioner Dr. Heinrich Goering (the father of the later Luftwaffe head), 
representing the Reich. Overall, the Germans were the acknowledged rulers of 
mainland Southwest Africa, with the commercial rights of Daniel De Pass 
respected only offshore though not to De Pass’ liking. Dr. Goering 
acknowledged De Pass’ private property rights on all of the islands save a few 
unspecified islets and rocks, including Shark Island in Angra Pequena harbor,
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which Goering believed to be German. He pointed out that De Pass’ lease ran 
out on some islands in 1895 after which Luderitz’s company would take over 
the private rights. Dr. Goering also affirmed that De Pass’ claims to interior 
mines and mainland areas should be canceled, using Spence’s deed as 
evidence. Where Spence had interpreted the Dutch word vergunning to mean 
land “grant” Goering pointed out that it really means “permission” to use the 
land in Dutch, which is what David Christian speaking in Dutch would have 
meant. Therefore when Luderitz purchased the land, he became the landlord 
and could cancel that permission. The German delegates presented other 
issues in arguments favorable to Luderitz’s position. However, the Germans did 
not press their issues too far, and most of the issues of private ownership or 
lease were decided in favor of the British. The main concern for Berlin was to 
resolve the issues and bring British involvement in Southwest Africa to an end, 
while still keeping Angra Pequena German and the British in a favorable 
enough mood to eventually deal with other colonial issues. The British 
delegation basically complied with Goering’s decisions, they agreed that the 
islands would become Luderitz’s after De Pass’ leases ran out and even 
agreed to give up their sovereignty over the unspecified islands, islets, and 
rocks, such as Shark Island if the Germans respected De Pass’ leases until their 
expiration. On July 15 all four representatives signed the protocol (though not 
nearly enough outstanding issues had been resolved involving Anglo-German 
rivalry over Southwest Africa let alone the other German colonies).
Unfortunately for Luderitz, he would never see the day when De Pass’ 
possessions fell into his hands. The Bremen merchant drowned later that year 
when his boat capsized while on an expedition on the Orange River. More out
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of patriotism than any faith in Southwest Africa’s resources, German 
businessmen came to the aid and formed the Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft 
fur Sudwestafrika, or German Colonial Company for Southwest Africa. This 
organization assumed control over the colony, though almost immediately many 
British investors moved in. 102
The effects of the race for private claims in Southwest Africa were being 
felt. On July 27, 1886, De Pass & Company wrote to Granville’s office informing 
them that Spence was now bankrupt and that therefore all his interests was De 
Pass’ alone. In a slightly self-serving tone, De Pass wrote: “The compensation 
and other benefits which will be made in respect of the Angra Pequena and 
coast claim will therefore belong to u s .”103 The London businessman also 
wrote that he expected that the Colonial Office would inform him of the 
settlement just completed in Berlin. Of course, unknown to De Pass, the 
Protocol of July 15 contained no monetary compensation for De Pass’ guano 
loss. The Colonial Office answered De Pass within a few days, but only 
acknowledged Spence’s reported bankruptcy and told him that they would 
furnish information on the Berlin agreement shortly.104
On August 2, the Colonial Secretary gave formal approval of the Berlin 
Protocol involving Southwest Africa. The Colonial Office reported to Rosebery 
that “Lord Granville is glad that this satisfactory termination of the questions 
awaiting settlement has been attained.”105 London, it seemed, was relieved to 
have the issue finally resolved after three years, and the attention of three 
ministries. Berlin too was delighted to have the private issues involving the 
British in Southwest Africa resolved, so that the Reich could turn its attention
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towards carving out a hinterland for the colony and resolving more official, and 
in Berlin’s eyes more important, issues with Britain concerning Southwest Africa 
and the other German colonies. At least the 1886 Berlin Protocol Agreement 
removed De Pass and Luderitz as stumbling blocks.
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Chapter 3 
Walls Raised
Late in the summer of 1886 the British government switched hands again 
when the Liberal Unionists deserted the Liberal Party. Salisbury’s old friend 
Stafford Northcote, who was now the Earl of Iddesleigh, was made Foreign 
Secretary replacing Rosebery. Likewise, Granville was replaced with Edward 
Stanhope as the new head of the Colonial Office; yet familiar names remained 
in the lower echelons of both offices--including John Bramston. Iddesleigh sent 
off a letter to the Colonial Office as early as August 9, confirming the protocol 
reached with Berlin that summer which resolved the private disputes plaguing 
Anglo-German negotiations over Southwest Africa. Again the new officials 
backed decisions of the prior ministry and there was a smooth transition in 
colonial diplomacy without any abrupt reversals. Besides, the Skeleton Coast 
and the lands between the Namib and Kalahari were not any areas to fight for; 
the real target now became the trans-Zambezi region and East Africa. Yet 
Southwest Africa continued to be important as Germany tightened its grip on the 
colony and expanded the colony into the interior. 1
Upingtonia was one standing issue of private, and official, dispute not 
dealt with by the Berlin conference. Englishman W. W. Jordan had purchased 
land from the Ovambo and declared his realm an independent republic in the 
face of German and Herero claims. In early August 1886, new Colonial 
Secretary Stanhope indirectly received a request from Upingtonia settlers to 
reveal the German efforts of supporting the Herero in their claim to the region 
over the Ovambo-and therefore over Jordan who claimed it. The Colonial 
Office obtained a copy of the April 21, 1885, deed of purchase from the Ovambo
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which had Chief Kambonde Kampingana’s (of the southern Ovambo tribe of 
Ondanga) pledge that “ in case it should at any time become necessary for Mr. 
W. W. Jordan to hold possession of [Upingtonia] . . .  by force, we pledge 
ourselves to assist him and to do so with the strength of the whole of our tribe.”2 
Of course, this was before Jordan had his brandy debacle with the Ovambo. 
Evidently Jordan made some sort of an appeal to the German representative in 
Southwest Africa, L. Nels (Reich Commissioner Goering’s representative). Nels 
replied to Jordan: “In consequence of the preliminary information which I have 
gathered the Herero will at present be protected in the possession of [the Otavi 
region or Upingtonia]. I therefore request you and those Boers commissioned 
by you to sojourn on neutral grounds till the question shall be definitely settled.” 
The German official also wrote to Jordan that “the German Government can but 
consent to a settlement of Boers in a territory under German protection provided 
that it is performed in a just and peaceful manner, as such would be favourable 
to the advancement of civilization in this territory. Please make the Boers 
acquainted with the above.” So began Germany’s attack on the phantom 
republic, while trying not to alienate any Boers. Nels informed Jordan that the 
latter would not be able to send goods through Herero territory “in consideration 
of the notorious hostile behaviour which you have formerly shown towards the 
Hereros and which has been evidently declared to me by creditable 
Europeans.” As for lifting this embargo in the future, the German declared that 
“it will depend on your future behaviour.”3 Jordan retorted:
[I] in reply beg to inform you that by virtue of deed of purchase 
and by right of occupation I and the burghers of the district intend hold­
ing firm possession of the same, and totally ignore the pretentious 
claims of the Hereros to this portion of Ovamboland in which is situat­
ed the Otavi Mines. In re[gard] to your actions in sanctioning the pro­
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hibitions of my goods and transport passing through [Hereroland], 
and of your assuming sovereign rights prior to the confirmation of the 
German Imperial Government to the establishing of its protectorate 
over [Hereroland], I will hold you responsible for all losses I sustain in 
my business or otherwise. Any further communication you have to 
make on this subject you will please address to J. Lees, Esq., 9. Cape 
Good Hope Bank Chambers, Cape Town.4
Jordan intended to fight for Upingtonia. Interestingly, though there was never 
any official support from the Cape, some Cape colonists did give Jordan some 
private support. However, Stanhope’s Colonial Office wrote to Upingtonian 
associates with the now standard response for involvement in Southwest Africa: 
Britain would not interfere west of the 20th east longitude, where Upingtonia 
was clearly situated.5
Later on October 22, 1886, news reached London that W. W. Jordan, the 
self-proclaimed president of his self-proclaimed republic of Upingtonia, had 
been murdered. The Cape Times and a private letter provided the Colonial 
Office with a description of the incident which occurred on August 8. According 
to this information, thirty Ovambo found Jordan’s wagon parked outside a 
missionary house for the evening. Talking with Jordan’s driver:
The driver replied that his master was still asleep, but that he 
would call him. Whereupon Mr. Jordan was roused, and got out of 
the wagon, greeted all those present, and sat down by the fire, and 
commenced lacing his boots. While so engaged the driver handed 
him a cup of tea, and as Jordan raised himself to take the tea, the 
Ovambo directly opposite him, at a distance of some three feet, dis­
charged the contents of a double-barreled elephant-gun right into his 
chest. Mr. Jordan fell, and death was instantaneous. The driver on 
seeing this ran to the wagon for his gun, whereupon the Ovambos 
opened fire . .. from the effects of which he died some 48 hours after. . . . 
[Their chief upon being informed] dispatched some eight bushmen 
to the scene of the murder in order to bury J o rd a n .e
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John Cane, the Cape Times correspondent in Southwest Africa, added:
It is only to be hoped that immediate steps will be taken by our 
[Cape] Government to aid us, and exterminate this cowardly, wicked, 
and treacherous Ovambo race. The blood of missionaries, the blood 
of traders, and the blood of Will Jordan to-day cries out in vengeance 
against these people, the Ovambo tribes, and we petition to you, the 
civilised Powers of Europe-England, Germany, Belgium, France, 
and Portugal-to come over and help us.7
Most of the time the Ovambo kept out of the affairs of lands farther south but 
were known in the past to have killed some Catholic missionaries and others. 
Only the FMS seemed to make headway with them evangelically, but few 
Europeans tried to ever encroach upon their land. However, in this case Jordan 
had been provoking both the Herero and the Ovambo into a confrontation, and 
he had been warned by Maherero, the paramount Herero chief who wanted the 
Cape to get Jordan out of the region. As for any revenge, obeying London’s 
instructions the Cape could not intervene in matters north of the Orange River 
and west of the Kalahari border. An anonymous letter from Southwest Africa to 
the Cape, dated August 18, read: “There is little doubt that ‘Upingtonia’ will now 
collapse, and I think the Boers will soon leave either for the Transvaal or for 
Humpata in Portuguese territory.”8 Many of the Boers did stay in Southwest 
Africa, however under German control. In fact, the Boer population increased 
steadily, with many Cape Boers finding the Germans more to their liking. It is 
doubtful that the Germans had any hand in Jordan’s murder, because the Reich 
barely had minimal control over the Herero and had never really tried to control 
the Ovambo. It seems Jordan’s mistreatment of the indigenous population 
merely caught up with him.9 Later in November 1886, the Foreign Office 
decided to have Ambassador Malet in Berlin at least bring the issue of Jordan’s
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murder to Germany’s attention, if it had not been done so already. The British 
Ambassador reported back that Count Herbert Bismark (the Chancellor’s son) 
“spoke to me with regard to it yesterday and said that the Imperial Government 
was still in negotiation with the Portuguese Government respecting the northern 
limits of the territory over which Germany desired to exert its influence, but until 
these negotiations were complete the authority of the German Government 
would not be exerted in the regions concerned, and the tribe of Ovambos 
appeared to be within them.”io In other words, Germany shrugged off 
responsibility in the matter by stating it had as yet no official power in the region 
though they were working on getting that power. This happened despite the 
fact that the German representative earlier in the year felt he had enough power 
to make sanctions against Jordan in the region. Fortunately for Berlin, London 
did not press the matter.
Meanwhile, another old issue continued to cause controversy. Governor 
Robinson had finally responded to London’s request for information on the Red 
People’s (and therefore Germany’s) claim to lands east of the 20th east 
longitude into Bechuanaland. The Cape Governor had researched the subject 
with inquiries made to those who had traveled through or resided with the Red 
People, a poor branch off the Nama who claimed suzerainty over the desert.
Dr. Theophilus Hahn for instance told Robinson that he doubted the succession 
of the chief who Germany recognized over the Red People, and therefore 
questioned their claim over particular bushmen who dwelled and/or hunted 
between his realm and the Okavango region (to which Germany wanted 
access). However, Hahn did admit that the Red People themselves inhabited 
territory over to the 21 30’ east longitude and sometimes all the way to Lake
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Ngami in the Okavango, and that bushmen did in fact extend throughout 
western Bechuanaland both in and north of the Kalahari proper. Robinson also 
cited as an authority a former Cape civil commissioner who once officiated in 
Namaland, and “a trader who has been traveling through the country for the 
past 31 years.”11 Both seemed to agree that the Red People did in fact occupy 
lands further east than the 20th east longitude in some areas and that the 
bushmen were all over western Bechuanaland; yet they also reported that all 
the subtribes of the Nama and Herero had mistreated the bushmen. In the end 
Governor Robinson, in response to Germany’s protest of the 20th east longitude 
border, believed that “any other boundary than an arbitrary astronomical line 
through such an unknown desert would be an impossibility, and it is inevitable 
that in the case of any such line drawn without reference to ethnological or 
topographical considerations, questions such as the present must arise with 
reference to claims which are sure to be set up by Chiefs on both the British and 
German sides of the b o u n d a ry .”12 Robinson suggested that London should 
inform Berlin that, no matter where the border existed, Britain would guarantee 
the Red People access to hunting grounds in what England considered 
Bechuanaland. Stanhope forwarded Robinson’s suggestion to the Foreign 
Office, with the recommendation that Iddesleigh have Berlin given the gist of it. “*3 
Although the Anglo-German private property dispute involving Southwest 
Africa had been resolved, problems for Daniel De Pass remained when his 
associate, John Spence, went bankrupt. On November 9, 1886, Daniel De 
Pass wrote once again to the Colonial Office, this time complaining about the 
Cape not Luderitz. The Cape was forfeiting Spence’s share in the company
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(which was one-third) to possible public auction rather than giving them to De 
Pass. It seemed that traditional British law and new Cape policies were in 
conflict as to how Spence’s bankrupt shares should be forfeited. Nevertheless, 
De Pass wrote to Stanhope that “if the Cape Government come into this 
property through the action of laws unprovided for, I have to urge that you will 
bring before the Cape Government the hardship and loss I should suffer should 
they take measures to sell this share by public auction, and set up a conflicting 
disturbance on the islands to the ruination of my property.”13 The Colonial 
Office replied nine days later with the confirmation that the Colonial Secretary 
understood the fact that De Pass had control over the islands before they were 
annexed to the Cape and even before the Cape was given domestic autonomy 
from Britain. Yet Stanhope remained unclear how the shares should be 
forfeited, either by Cape or British policy, but could “express no opinion on it.”n  
However, the Colonial Secretary did have the Cape consider De Pass’ 
situation, though admitting this would be his only intervention. The London firm 
wrote to Stanhope afterwards declaring their belief that the Cape policy would 
triumph and then suggested a possible deal in which the Cape could “make 
over to me this third share for, say a moderate increase of rent, the amount of 
which might be mutually arranged, and provided me with such documents that 
will protect me from the action of the present Cape insolvent law as regards 
forfeiture.”1^  The Colonial Secretary sent De Pass’ letters to the Cape for the 
Ministers to consider. London wanted no more of De Pass’ problems dealing 
with the islands off Southwest Africa.
By the end of the year more crucial issues affecting Southwest Africa
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occurred. An agreement with Portugal established Southwest Africa’s northern 
border. Germany pushed the boundary north from Cape Frio to the Kunene 
River. The border extended from the mouth of that river eastward to the 
Okavango River, which farther east dipped south into the inland delta region 
that Germany desired to gain from the British. With the northern border firmly 
established, and the southern Orange River border having been established 
very early on, Southwest Africa’s eastern border (still technically open north of 
22 south latitude) became the new focus. Berlin wanted at least part of the 
Okavango flood region and access to the Zambezi River which it considered a 
future highway into Central Africa and to German possessions in East Africa.16 
However, the colonial rivalry and negotiations among the foremost 
European powers were not resolved during the course of 1886, nor into the next 
year, primarily due to matters in Europe. The new year of 1887 brought with it 
the continued mounting emergency in the Balkans in which Austria-Hungary’s 
High Command was preparing for war with Russia in which Vienna would call 
upon Berlin for support. In addition, France again seemed to be moving further 
over to Russia’s side. By March the German Reichstag approved an increased 
military budget for the next seven years, which by the end of the year they 
increased yet again, with the German High Command preparing for a two-front 
war against both France and Russia. However, with Britain having problems 
with France regarding Egypt (and Russia in Central Asia) and with Germany 
wanting to keep as much of its troops at home rather than abroad defending 
colonies, both Berlin and London moved towards a more helpful atmosphere 
while also trying to maintain the “scramble” against one another for Africa and 
Oceania.17 Salisbury continued to bring new vitality in Britain’s race, and was
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again both Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, replacing his old friend 
Iddesleigh, and having Stanhope replaced with H. T. Holland in the Colonial 
Office-though Bramston still remained at his desk. One of Salisbury’s earliest 
actions in the Foreign Office was to officially accept the July 15 Protocol 
regarding Southwest Africa which his predecessors concluded. True to form,
De Pass did not waste any time in sending a request to Colonial Secretary 
Holland to obtain a copy of it.19
De Pass, despite Scott and Bramston’s ability to secure most of his 
private rights, was not pleased upon reading the Protocol agreement. On 
February 11, he wrote to Holland: “We have perused the copy of [the] Protocol 
. . . and do not consider that the agreement entered into . . .  in reference to our 
claims is drawn in accordance with the justice which we . . . have a right to 
expect, and we will endeavour in due course to put this plainly before you. No 
mention is made of our claims to the mainland under a grant from David 
Christian so we shall be obliged if you will inform us of the result of the 
Commissioner’s investigations of our title thereto.” De Pass then inquired “what 
documents or title deeds we shall receive in reference to the Protocol to enable 
us to sell or transfer properties therein mentioned should we at any time wish to 
do s o .”19 The Colonial Office answered De Pass on February 23, 1887, with: “ It 
was found quite impossible to induce the German Government to admit the 
present validity of the documents of 1863-64 . . . and the best compromise that 
was possible was made. . . . Further papers on the subject will shortly be 
presented to Parliament and that a copy of them will be sent to you.”20 Holland 
did agree to have the Germans provide documentation, but that was the extent
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of it.
Animosity still remained in Southwest Africa despite any agreements, as 
evident by still another complaint from De Pass on March 22, 1887, reporting 
that Germans were still firing salutes to approaching ships, even for De Pass’ 
ships who of course wanted no such thing since it scared the birds away. The 
London businessman enclosed a complaint his firm sent to the German Consul 
in Cape Town, which reported that a German employee, named only as 
Bedeker, was hurt firing a cannon salute to De Pass’ ship, the Seabird, when it 
arrived at Luderitzbucht (Angra Pequena): “From the very earliest occupation of 
the shores of Angra Pequena by Luderitz’s people we had reason to complain 
of disturbance by explosions, blasting of rocks, and firing of light and heavy 
guns. We represented through the Government that our guano islands were 
being injured, and we were informed that this unnecessary firing of heavy guns 
would be discontinued. We made certain claims through the Anglo-German 
Commission for the loss of guano, and our evidence as to disturbance was 
ignored.” To highlight the effects of this irresponsibility, the complaint continued 
with: “The man Bedeker now brought up is a living witness of the truth of our 
statement, and we hope you will give order’s to Mr. Luderitz’s representative at 
Angra Pequena to deliver up this piece of artillery, the firing of which is heard at 
[the islands] . ”22 On April 2, 1887, the Colonial Office reported to De Pass that 
Salisbury was having Germany informed of the matter, though little was done.
The standoff between Austria and Russia continued through the year and 
into 1888, with both Germany and England dragging their feet in making any 
commitments to each other as far as any alliance if war broke out. But if a 
European war was to come, no one was willing to fire the first shot. Actually, the
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death of Kaiser Wilhelm I on March 9, 1888, had a greater impact on German 
policymaking than international tensions. His son and successor, anglophile 
Crown Prince Friedrich III, however only ruled as Kaiser for 90 days before he in 
turn, died from throat cancer. So 1888 brought the Reich a new, young (only 29 
years old), energetic Kaiser, Wilhelm II who had no interest in his father’s 
liberalism but savored his grandfather’s imperialism. Despite his grandmother 
being Britain’s Queen Victoria, he was willing to shed the present anglophile 
attitudes if it served him.
The new Kaiser brought increased vitality into the “scramble for Africa,” 
countered only by Salisbury’s renewed imperialism once a vice-consul in 
Africa, Harry Johnston, gained his ear. In August, Foreign Office officials were 
astonished to open the Times of the 22nd to find all of Salisbury’s secret plans 
for British extension into Africa published. When officials asked Johnston 
whether he did this, the young official replied: “Yes, and I think I may say Lord 
Salisbury knew of my doing so and did not disapprove.”22 it told of Salisbury’s 
plan for a British corridor extending from “the Cape-to-Cairo” to be laid out with 
plans to push north from the Cape into the trans-Zambezi region, through a 
corridor skirting Leopold’s Congo and the Germans in East Africa, and to link up 
with the Nile. Diamond entrepreneur Cecil Rhodes, in South Africa, was only 
too willing to help with Salisbury’s plans to cross the Zambezi.23
As for Germany, the new Kaiser quickly began lessening tensions 
between Austria-Hungary and Russia, so that the Reich could once again focus 
on creating a large navy and extending imperial territories abroad. However, 
Chancellor Bismark seemed too old and out-dated for the young Kaiser.
Bismark began receiving more criticism from Wilhelm M’s throne than he had
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from Kaiser Friedrich’s and his English wife. The Iron Chancellor was losing his 
die-cast hold of the government. Alfred von Waldersee of the German High 
Command told Berlin officials how the Foreign Ministry many times did not know 
what the Reich Chancellery was doing and claimed that Bismark on one 
occasion drank two bottles of alcohol with him in less than two hours. Bismark 
was losing his influence and in late October 1888, he even had to remind the 
Foreign Ministry to direct matters for the Kaiser only through himself as it had 
been for so long.24 By 1890, Bismark even began losing the support of the 
German public to the gain of the young Kaiser’s popularity. Holstein advised 
Herbert Bismark that “under these circumstances it is inadvisable to push things 
to extremes as [the Chancellor] may have made up his mind to do during his 
solitary walks.”25 Tensions between Kaiser Wilhelm and the Iron Chancellor 
became too intense by now. The German emperor demanded that Bismark 
resign, which the Chancellor did in late March 1890. Holstein commented from 
the Foreign Ministry that Bismark had gradually become isolated because he 
himself avoided contact with political circles.” The Foreign Ministry official 
commented, as if looking for an epitaph: “This fact was confirmed in a way 
which even I found surprising when yesterday in the Landtag not a single party 
could find a good word for Prince Bismark, not even the Conservatives. I find 
that quite incredible, but significant.”26 in the end, Bismark alienated rather than 
balanced the forces around him. Count Munster, who had been Berlin’s 
ambassador in London (1873-1885) and now was ambassador in Paris (1885- 
1900), had been one of Bismark’s pawns in the game and wrote an analysis of 
Anglo-German relations now that Bismark had fallen. Munster acknowledged
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that Salisbury wanted to avoid colonial conflicts with Germany by reaching an 
agreement, though there were forces in London which did not--like Salisbury’s 
own Colonial Secretary. The German Ambassador did shed light on the effects 
of Bismark’s colonial policymaking:
While still Ambassador in London, I foresaw very clearly the in­
evitable outcome of the violent, reckless way in which Prince Bismark 
launched his colonial policy and unleashed a savage Press campaign 
against England. I gave repeated but fruitless warnings [to Berlin]--un- 
fortunately no one would listen. Even those Englishmen who regard 
Russia as their natural foe and Germany their natural friend are indeed 
deeply shocked at the way we conducted our colonial affairs. Envy 
and rivalry play their part too; in Central Africa the [British and German 
East Africa companies] are at each other’s throats and are setting their 
two countries against each other. . . . The wily [British East Africa Com­
pany] director, [William] Mackinnon, accordingly enlisted [Henry] Stan­
ley, whose stand against Salisbury is intended to pull the chestnuts out 
of the fire for the English Company and the British government, just as 
we have unfortunately tried to do for our own. He will not succeed, but 
he is putting the British government in a very difficult position.27
Munster then continued with comments about Paul von Hatzfeldt (the German 
ambassador in London after Munster, 1885-1901) who he believed: “Hopes to 
reach an agreement with Salisbury over East Africa through direct negotiations; 
but this will be very difficult because Salisbury can make no concessions to us 
that might endanger his position. . . .The Carolines fiasco set us at odds with 
Spain . . . the Samoa fiasco cost us well-earned influence . . . [but an East Africa 
fiasco] would be the most dangerous of all, for it would drive England into the 
arms of Russia and F ra n c e .’’28 Although not a top priority for Munster,
Southwest Africa was right in the middle of this conflict as well.
Yet before Bismark’s fall Germany had strengthened its wall around 
Southwest Africa, though it ran into some resistance. Bismark had sent Reich
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Commissioner Dr. Goering to the colony to secure additional treaties from the 
indigenous groups. Goering was successful in negotiating a treaty with 
Maherero who wanted his Herero protected from the ever strengthening Nama. 
Goering found similar success with the Rehoboth Basters who even promised to 
muster troops to fight for the Germans if necessary. However the Nama, 
particularly under the guidance of Hendrik Witbooi, proved to be more of an 
obstacle. In fact, in April 1888 the Nama attacked the Herero. Though 
Maherero’s forces were able to repel the attack the Herero paramount chief 
withdrew his treaty with Germany and expelled Goering, who quickly withdrew 
to Walvis Bay and from there to Berlin. The Herero believed the Germans 
would no more protect them from the Nama than the British had done. Goering 
convinced Berlin to send at least a few German soldiers to Southwest Africa in 
1889 under the command of Captain K. Francois. Francois, though claiming 
Windhoek to be “no man’s land” knew it was in Hereroland and in March 1890 
asked the aging Maherero to cede the area to the German forces to be used as 
a military station. When the German officer received no reply of any 
commitment he occupied the deserted Windhoek, thereby gaining control over 
the most critical crossroad in Southwest Africa. Later when the Herero 
protested Francois exclaimed that “the expected objections of the Herero came 
too late.”29 Windhoek now became Germany’s colonial capital in Southwest 
Africa. Although this gave Germany a foothold in the center of the colony (since 
up to now the Germans had only stations along the coast), this also allowed 
Francois to prevent any more modern weapons from reaching the Nama by 
controlling the interior crossroads. However, it was four years before the 
German commander felt confident enough to leave Windhoek and challenge
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the Witbooi Nama of Gibeon led by Hendrick Witbooi.
Francois became obsessed with fighting a war to subdue the indigenous 
population. When the Herero forced some of Francois men in 1892 to return 
after making an unsuccessful attempt at escorting an expedition by the 
Southwest African Company to Otavi in northern Hereroland, the German 
officer's attitudes became extreme. The German commander even gained 
Reich Commissioner Goering’s approval in taking action against the 
indigenous. However Chancellor Leo von Caprivi, former head of the Admiralty 
who succeeded Bismark, refused to allow such wars. The German commander 
in Southwest Africa could only submit plans for dealing with the Herero and 
Nama in the event that hostilities broke out. Yet ironically the most significant 
event during Francois’ command was the conclusion of a peace in November 
1892 between the Herero and Nama, ending the open rivalry which had 
affected the region for such a long time. Although the Herero and Nama 
believed that Germany was stronger than they were, the German commander 
quickly complained to Berlin about the weak position his meager force was now 
in. Not until March 1893, did Caprivi agree that Southwest Africa needed a 
greater force. Pressured by colonial supporters, of which he was not, the 
German Chancellor acquiesced: “Southwest Africa is ours. . . . How it all 
happened and whether it was a good thing or not is irrelevant. It is ours,
German territory, and it must remain so.”30
Two weeks later, 216 German soldiers landed in Southwest Africa as 
reinforcements. Then Francois, ignoring Caprivi’s orders and not informing his 
own men until the very night before, attacked Hendrik Witbooi’s camp at 
Hornkranz. He had his men fire 16,000 rounds into the camp within a half hour
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on the morning of April 12. It is uncertain how many Nama soldiers died there, 
but most sources agree that few were actually there. Yet the German troops 
slaughtered 78 women and children and wounded as many as a 100 more. 
Hendrik Witbooi and his force, however, followed the German unit back to 
Windhoek and stole most of their horses on night raids. Thus most of the 
German cavalry was now on foot. The German force became trapped in 
Windhoek like a prison, while the Nama all but halted German trade which had 
freely run through Namaland before. This fiasco was too much for Chancellor 
Caprivi and in 1894 Berlin recalled Francois replacing him with Major Theodor 
Leutwein. Leutwein, though an officer in the German Army, according to Berlin 
was Southwest Africa’s first civil governor. He succeeded in forcing Hendrik 
Witbooi to surrender his Nama into German “protection” in July 1894 (after 
which Witbooi actually helped Leutwein suppress Herero and other Nama 
revolts), though the Nama leader’s rebel spirit had yet to be crushed completely. 
By 1898, the Germans had placed the indigenous tribes in respective reserves 
and the percentage of native-held land dwindled quickly. Germany had finally 
and effectively enclosed its walls around Southwest Africa, with the exception of 
Ovamboland. Southwest Africa was truly Germany’s colony now .32
Berlin changed somewhat as a result of the new chancellor. Although a 
Prussian Conservative and opponent of colonization, Caprivi helped German 
industrialists even at the expense of Prussian agrarians. With Bismarkian 
policies brushed off the books (with his entanglement of alliances to balance 
European power), efforts at rapprochement with France and Russia were not 
given as much effort so long as Berlin could secure peace. Under Caprivi, 
Germany took a more definitive policy in European politics, supporting Austria-
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Hungary more. In Anglo-German diplomacy, Caprivi actually gave the approval 
for vigorous efforts to reach agreements with England, and possibly even an
alliance.33
The German government did continue its efforts to keep Britain and 
France apart, since an Anglo-French understanding would create “difficulties” in 
Africa. However, Britain had pretty much accepted Germany’s presence in 
Africa, which now included Togo and East Africa in addition to Southwest Africa 
and Cameroon. Carl Peters had established the German East Africa Company 
to compete with Mackinnon’s company for control of the area from Zanzibar to 
Lake Tanganyika on the border with the Congo. Germany had already many 
Lutheran and Catholic missionaries roaming the countrysides and still more 
traders. By 1890 both countries wanted to take some preventative measures to 
ensure that British and German interests would not clash in the scramble for 
hinterlands into the heart of Africa. Salisbury sent Percy Anderson, head of the 
African desk in the Foreign Office, to Berlin to create an Anglo-German 
agreement that would resolve all outstanding African issues, including 
Southwest Africa’s northeastern frontier with Bechuanaland which recently 
became uncertain since Germany’s efforts to expand towards the Okavango 
Delta and the Zambezi River.34 a similar situation was found in other parts of 
Africa where Anglo-German interests clashed. London received Anderson’s 
report on the meetings with Dr. Krauel on June 28, 1890, which described them 
as successful and that “the object has been so to define the sphere as to 
endeavour to avert the danger of the revival of ‘hinterland’ disputes.”35 
Anderson reported that the delimitation of British and German East Africa
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created two consolidated spheres in place of the checkerboard of German and 
British occupation that existed prior to the agreement. British East Africa (later 
called Kenya and Uganda) was now “from its extensive coast-line with its 
valuable harbours to the western watershed of the Upper Nile, made 
conterminous . . .  no gap is left in the boundaries.” Anderson believed German 
East Africa (later called Tanganyika, then Tanzania), was “equally protected.” 
The British negotiator admitted that allowing German East Africa to extend from 
the Indian Ocean all the way to Lake Tanganyika on the border with the Congo 
“may not correspond with the desire which has been expressed in some 
quarters that an uninterrupted British sphere should extend through Central 
Africa, but it must be remembered that the realization of this idea was already 
impracticable when the negotiations c o m m e n c e d .”36 It was the very dream of 
Cecil Rhodes, supported by Salisbury after 1888, to have the British Empire run 
from Cairo down the spine of Africa all the way to Cape Town. This had been 
the very reason why Britain had outflanked Germany by occupying 
Bechuanaland and scrambling across the Zambezi to the very shores of Lakes 
Tanganyika and Nyasa, only now to be blocked by the Germans in East Africa. 
Anderson believed that British traders now had to rely on the eighth article of 
this agreement reached with Germany for their security “which gives ample 
guarantees for untrammeled communication between the British spheres both 
by land and water.” In theory, British trade and communications were not to be 
cut off between the Cape and Cairo. In addition, Anderson included in his 
report the official boundaries of Anglo-German borders involving West Africa, 
Cameroon, East Africa, and Southwest Africa agreed upon in Berlin. Anderson 
added the comment that more permanent and consolidated German and British
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spheres would put “an end forever to the existence, in any shape, of the Slave 
Trade” which Portugal and some muslims had kept up in the reg ions .37
Most interesting in the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 was the final 
clarification of Southwest Africa’s eastern border with British Bechuanaland and 
with the Zambezi region (or Rhodesia, which Britain named after the colonial 
expansionist Cecil Rhodes). Both London and Berlin by this time knew of the 
rich potential for Ngamiland, the region situated between the Kalahari Desert 
and the Zambezi River in northwestern Bechuanaland. The Okavango River 
entered from the German-Angolan borderland bringing annual flood waters into 
this otherwise semi-arid region emptying itself into the desert in one of the 
world’s few inland deltas. At around the 18th south latitude the river during 
flood season swells over its banks to create a huge swampy lake and inland 
delta over 70 miles wide at times. Elephants, zebra, buffalo, and wildebeests 
make treks to it during and after every flood for the explosion of vegetation that 
followed; but more importantly for imperialists this region was valued for 
potential cattle ranching. Both London and Berlin in 1890 mistook this watery 
area for Lake Ngami which was the name given to this fluid sanctuary on all the 
maps at the time. However, Lake Ngami is only a part of the Okavango Delta 
and may remain dry for several years if flood waters are not high e n o u g h .38 
Whatever the name, both sides wanted it, or for Germany, at least a western 
portion of it. Anderson wrote that “the territory hitherto assigned to neither 
Power (since Britain had only officially defined the Kalahari border for southern 
Bechuanaland adjacent to Namaland, not between the northern regions of 
German Southwest Africa and northern Bechuanaland) extended from the 20th 
to the 24th degree of east longitude” with the Okavango Delta lying within it. In
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other words, there were four degrees of longitude which had remained obscure 
in the north, and Germany was trying to take its share. However, allowing for 
German gains in East Africa (Britain allowed the Germans to extend inland to 
Lake Tanganyika), British delegate Anderson remained firm in the Southwest 
Africa-Bechuanaland border dispute that “a portion covering three degrees will 
be under British, the remainder covering one degree will be under German, 
influence.”39 Therefore, Britain allowed Germany to extend the northern portion 
of Southwest Africa’s eastern border one degree east to the 21 st degree of east 
longitude, but well short of the rich Okavango Delta region which according to 
Anderson’s information laid east of the 22nd east longitude, or about 70 miles 
beyond the new German boundary. Southwest Africa only gained more arid 
land of the Omaheke Desert, which was merely a northern extension of the 
Kalahari, dividing Hereroland from the Okavango.40
However, Britain did give Germany one more concession for Southwest 
Africa: access to the Zambezi River, which runs across south-central Africa to 
empty into the Indian Ocean. German strategists predicted this would be 
Southwest Africa’s tap into rich Central Africa and a more direct highway to 
German East Africa on the Indian coast (rather than travel all the way around 
the Cape). Actually, it was less a British concession than correcting a prior 
geographical mistake. Anderson explained in his letter that this rectification “is 
inserted because in certain maps Andara, which is the southern limit of the 
Portuguese sphere under the arrangement with Germany, is placed south of the 
18th (latitude); in all the best maps, however. . .  it is placed well to the north of 
that parallel.” Therefore there was a narrow strip of land left between 
Portuguese Angola and British Bechuanaland north of the 18th south latitude.
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This gave Germany a 60 mile wide stretch of the Zambezi River, but 
unfortunately upriver from Victoria Falls which challenged navigation on it and 
thus proved less the easy highway than Berlin had imagined. Anderson 
assured his government that Germany would protect the private rights of British 
companies operating within the region where the Zambezi and Chobe rivers 
forked, which was now part of Southwest Africa.41
On July 1, 1890, Salisbury requested Ambassador Malet, in Berlin, “to 
express to Sir Percy Anderson my entire approval of the manner in which he 
has performed the duties entrusted to him in connection with this Agreement, 
and of the tact and ability with which he has carried on the negotiations with the 
German Foreign [M in is try ].”42 Regarding Southwest Africa, the third article of 
the Anglo-German African Agreement, which was negotiated and signed by 
Malet, Anderson, Dr. Krauel, and Caprivi, read:
In South-West Africa the sphere in which the exercise of influ­
ence is reserved to Germany is bounded:
1. To the south by a line commencing at the mouth of the Or­
ange River, and ascending the north bank of that river to the point of 
its intersection by the 20th degree of east longitude.
2. To the east by a line commencing at the above-named 
point, and following the 20th degree of east longitude to the point of 
its intersection by the 22nd of parallel south latitude, it runs eastward 
along that parallel to the point of its intersection by the 21st degree of 
east longitude; then it follows that degree northward to the point of its 
intersection by the 18th parallel of south latitude; it runs eastward 
along that parallel till it reaches the River Chobe; and descends the 
centre of the main channel of that river to its junction with the Zambesi, 
where it terminates.
It is understood that under this arrangement Germany shall 
have free access from her Protectorate to the Zambesi by a strip of 
territory which shall at no point be less than 20 miles in width.
The sphere in which the exercise of influence is reserved to 
Great Britain is bound to the west and north-west by the abovemen­
tioned line. It includes Lake N g am i.43
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Appropriately or not, Germany named the strip or zipfel giving Germany 
access to the Zambezi after Caprivi.44 Although in the past he had been against 
colonies, refusing to send warships at times to Angra Pequena and Zanzibar, 
and highly critical of “King Luderitz,” the German Chancellor did help bring 
Anglo-German relations to this point of cordial agreement. The third article of 
the Agreement went on in regards to the still disputed southern boundary of 
Walvis Bay, and stated that it was “reserved for arbitration, unless it shall be 
settled by the consent of the two Powers within two years from the date of the 
conclusion of this Agreement.” In addition, until such a settlement “the territory 
[in dispute] shall be considered neutral.”45 Except for Walvis Bay’s exact 
southern border, the limits of German Southwest Africa were finally established 
on all sides, since Germany had back in 1886 in an agreement with Portugal, 
pushed its northern boundary towards Angola, enveloping at least half of 
Ovamboland. After 1890, Britain washed its hands of Southwest Africa until the 
20th century, however this did not mean that matters affecting the German 
colony were quiet throughout the last decade of the old century.46
After Portugal’s monarchy fell to a republican revolution, as a result of 
humiliating Portuguese concessions to British demands in the colonies, 
Germany began negotiating with Britain over a possible division of Portuguese 
colonies in Africa-particularly with regard to Angola and Mozambique. German 
Ambassador Hatzfeldt reported to Berlin after negotiations with Salisbury on 
February 11, 1891: “Make no mistake about it, we can achieve a satisfactory 
result in this matter only by coming to a previous understanding with England 
. . . . [Otherwise] British companies and adventurers . . . would close in from all
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sides and take possession. . . . Will anyone make war on England for that, or 
even pick a serious quarrel? I think no t”47 Hatzfeldt told Prime Minister 
Salisbury a month later: “‘You are in an excellent position from which you can 
profit. Either Portugal gives in to your demands, and in that case you will get 
what you want; or the government in Lisbon falls and you will pick up her 
colonies like ripe fruit.” ’ Hatzfeldt reported to Berlin that Salisbury “said nothing 
to contradict me, and smiled with gratification to think I had grasped the 
subtleties of the situation.’^  So Germany tried to rekindle old sore spots with 
England by talking of Zanzibar and possible cooperation with French interests 
in Egypt if Britain did not back off from the possibility of taking the Portuguese 
colonies without regard to German interests. Holstein, still Senior Councillor in 
the Foreign Ministry, wrote in a memo that a Cape Colony strengthened by 
Portuguese territory would be an “undesirable neighbour for us.” Holstein 
believed that the Anglo-German African Agreement of the previous year should 
have shown “that we rate our European relations higher than our colonial 
interests,” since for instance Germany let the British have Ngamiland.49 Britain 
caught the hints from Berlin and allowed Germany to take over the mediation 
between England and Portugal, resulting in a treaty signed on June 11, 1891. 
This put on hold any possibility of splitting Portuguese territories in southern 
Africa as neither London nor Berlin wished the other to have any portion of 
them. For Britain, Delagoa Bay in southern Mozambique would have been a 
strategic possession for it would have completed the encirclement of the Boers 
in the Transvaal. It seemed, because of Germany, the Boers maintained their 
link to the neutral port as a door to the outside world. Britain could not close
119
even that open door.50
Between 1891 and 1895 London and Berlin tried to bridge their 
differences and work for a possible agreement or even an alliance. Poor Anglo- 
French relations, over several colonial and trade issues, and a Russian build-up 
in Central Asia, which Britain perceived as a threat to India, probably helped 
this process. Yet for a variety of reasons, both Germany and Britain fumbled this 
opportunity. German Ambassador Hatzfeldt reported to Berlin that Salisbury 
was “hold[ing] as far aloof as possible” from Anglo-German issues because of 
the 1892 elections 51 When the Tory prime minister lost to Gladstone’s Liberal 
government in the June general elections, German Conservatives balked.
Within a short time Hatzfeldt was criticizing Gladstone’s Colonial Office for its 
“unfriendliness” towards Germany. In addition, it did not help matters having a 
German Chancellor estranged from his own government either. Caprivi had 
lost support from the Kaiser, Conservatives, and the military for various liberal 
and commercial programs that he introduced in the Reichstag. By 1894 the 
strain between the Chancellor and the now popular Kaiser was too much. After 
resigning in October, Caprivi was replaced by Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe. 
The Kaiser’s actions frustrated the German Foreign Ministry which they believed 
hurt Berlin’s credibility and prestige abroad. Holstein criticized the young 
emperor for interfering in delicate foreign affairs and for irresponsibly replacing 
officials who stood in his way, “nowadays no European nation is ruled in the 
way he is ruling.” Somewhat prophetically Holstein wrote that this Kaiser would 
not die on the throne but fall to a republic, but in the meantime he was making 
the “whole world n e rv o u s .”52 On the British side, A. P. Primrose (Lord
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eventual partition of [Portugal’s] M o z a m b iq u e .”57 in greater detail, Hatzfeldt 
explained:
The speech of President Kruger had a very disquieting effect 
here, and Kimberley has just poured out his heart to me about it. The 
[British] Government is doing its best here for the Boers [by giving 
them Swaziland], even put the damper on [Cape Colony Prime Min­
ister, Cecil] Rhodes, and things like that speech worsen an already 
difficult situation. People here are extraordinarily sensitive about 
South Africa. The Government is especially anxious to prevent public 
opinion from turning against us on account of such speeches, espec­
ially now, when Kimberley wants to reach a closer understanding with 
us about Mozambique and in general wants to make extensive ar­
rangements in colonial matters. Moral: The moment is as favourable 
for colonial matters as is conceivable here. I must therefore very short­
ly  be prepared for a confidential talk about Moz. and other questions, 
probably the hinterland of Togo, and in order not to lose the opportu­
nity it is necessary for me to know exactly what we want and what we 
don’t want. Therefore I beg you most urgently to grant my telegraphic 
request for immediate instructions.58
Thus the Boer situation came to Germany’s rescue in developing a stronger 
international position from which it could bargain with Britain, despite the 
cooling relations between the two. The next day Berlin responded to Hatzfeldt 
with instructions that Germany could not agree to give Delagoa Bay in southern 
Mozambique to Britain nor allow British forces to occupy it in the event of the 
territory being partitioned. This stand was necessary even if Germany gained 
access to the Zambezi River on the east coast which could then access 
Southwest Africa’s Caprivi Strip, at least commercially. Unfortunately for 
negotiations, Delagoa Bay was the only strategic position Britain wanted in the 
deal. This would complete the encirclement of and therefore control over the 
Boers. Berlin even had the audacity to instruct Hatzfeldt to demand a hinterland 
for Togo which would gain access to the Niger River. This too was very
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unlikely .59
In the meantime, Governor Leutwein moved to gain further control over 
the Herero and Nama tribes in Southwest Africa. In fact one of Leutwein’s 
earliest successes was to get Witbooi to sign a protection treaty in which the 
Nama chief retained his position but promised to provide Nama troops in 
supporting the Germans if necessary. The German governor also successfully 
backed Samuel Maherero’s rise to power in the more centralized Herero tribe. 
When Samuel’s father, Maherero, died in October 1890, many Herero refused 
to acknowledge his son’s ascension since he was a baptized Christian. The 
issue of succession among the Herero remained alive until 1897 when 
Governor Leutwein faced his first revolt. A portion of the Herero, particularly in 
the eastern reaches of the colony, had refused Samuel Maherero as their chief 
and joined with the Nama of the Kalahari in an effort to gain their independence 
from the Germans. However, Hendrik Witbooi made good on his promise and 
sent his own Nama forces to help subdue the rebellion. In the end, the 
Germans and Samuel Maherero executed two eastern Herero subchiefs 
placing the paramount chief firmly in power. The Germans gave control over 
the remnants of the Kalahari Nama to Witbooi for his effort, though many of 
these defeated Nama rebels had fled into Bechuanaland. Since the Germans 
allowed the Ovambo to have their autonomy (the Germans believed they would 
be “biting off more than they could chew" if they did tried to gain control over the 
numerous Ovambo) and since the greater part of the Herero and Nama were 
now under treaties, Leutwein felt confident enough to leave the capital, 
Windhoek, with his small force and suppress smaller Nama tribes in the far 
south near the Orange River. For the most part, the German colonial
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government had effective control over Southwest Africa by 1 8 9 7 .6 0
Despite Leutwein relative control over the situation in Southwest Africa, 
factions in Berlin made Chancellor Hohenlohe’s position more difficult. Once 
more Berlin seemed poised for another catastrophe in the imperial chancellery. 
Criticism had been mounting against Hohenlohe, first for being Catholic and 
then for his dismissal of Carl Peters as governor of German East Africa for the 
latter’s severe treatment of the indigenous population there. German officials 
convinced the Kaiser in the end to not replace Hohenlohe and create another 
spectacle, though Kaiser Wilhelm made his position and beliefs known when he 
made Carl Peters his own aide-de-camp. Friction only continued between the 
Chancellor and the young Kaiser.61
However the international situation remained uncertain and full of 
controversy which affected German and British African policies as well as any 
alliance possibilities between them. Relations between England and Germany 
seemed to be heading in a better direction again, though their relations tended 
to trough and crest as frequently as waves on the ocean. Though there were 
some in Germany, including the Bismark family, who tried to stir anti-British 
sentiment. One such opinionated official even wrote to Holstein on May 3,
1895, that in matters of world trade “our deadly enemy in this field is England 
[regardless of] whether Rosebery or Salisbury is in p o w e r .”62 Yet moderate 
officials in the Foreign Ministry, like Holstein, kept such opinions in check. 
Furthermore, when France and Russia made a joint demonstration at the 
opening celebration of the Kiel Canal in Germany that June, both London and 
Berlin went back to the table to discuss better relations. A correspondent of the
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London Times even wrote to Holstein from Peking: “ I am convinced that in spite 
of keen commercial rivalry . . . between England and Germany, the political and 
in the long run commercial interests too of both countries, are, if not identical, at 
least parallel.”63 Further good news came to Berlin in July 1895, when 
Salisbury and his Conservatives won the general elections. The new Prime 
Minister even visited the Kaiser to propose future actions which might end the 
hostility between Britain and the Triple Alliance which had plagued Anglo- 
German relations. However hopes of any benefits from the return of the 
Conservatives in England fell when London refused any concessions in 
German Togo (because Britain had already given large concessions to France 
in West Africa to keep the French out of the Nile Valley). Both governments tried 
to smooth the issue over but with little productivity. Ambassador Hatzfeldt 
reported back to Berlin “the apparent concern of Salisbury that we are 
demanding too much in Africa” though the Prime Minister asked what the 
“minimum demands would be.”64 The British military attache in Berlin even 
wrote to Hatzfeldt on October 4, in a letter marked “Secret!” that: “Africa is and 
will remain a stumbling block to both Powers. . . .  we must continue the struggle 
as good humouredly as we may.”65 in the end, German sympathy for the Boers 
in South Africa became the critical obstacle.66
After the Jameson Raid in South Africa (December 29, 1895-January 2, 
1896), a deliberate though unsuccessful attempt by British subjects from Cape 
Colony to take control of Transvaal, Kaiser Wilhelm flew into a pro-Boer frenzy. 
On January 2, the Kaiser sent a letter to the Russian Tsar that, “now suddenly 
the Transvaal Republic has been attacked in a most foul way as it seems not
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without England’s knowledge. I have used very severe language in London, 
and have opened communications with Paris for common defence of our 
endangered interests, as French and German colonists have immediately 
joined hands of their own accord to help the outraged Boers.” The Kaiser then 
added: “I hope you will also kindly consider the question. . . .  I hope that all will 
come right, but come what may, I never shall allow the British to stamp out the 
T r a n s v a a l .”67 Of course any attempt to block the British, if they made further 
attacks against the Boers, would involve using Southwest Africa. However, the 
Foreign Ministry was successful in preventing some of the damage the Kaiser 
caused by not opening communications on the subject with anyone other than 
England. In an air of dissension with the Kaiser, Holstein reported in the 
Foreign Ministry on January 10 that “none of our embassies, except London, 
has received anything. . . . When our ambassadors are without instructions it is 
the best proof that they are not instructed to approach other Powers for 
support.”68 However the the Kaiser bypassed the Foreign Ministry and sent a 
message of congratulations to President Kruger for the Boer victory over the 
Jameson raiders. British public opinion exploded against the Kruger Telegram. 
Ambassador Munster in Paris reported to Berlin, having been the former 
ambassador in London:
Our Kaiser only saw the surface of things [when he visited 
London previously] . . . this is how I explain how His Majesty sent the 
telegram, without realising in advance that it was a match to set fire to 
an accumulation of inflammatory material; I do not believe that it will 
really come to war. I hope not. God preserve us from that. . . . But even 
without war the political and commercial damage is very great and 
cannot be estimated. The English Admiralty has used the pretext to 
strengthen and to arm the fleet to an enormous extent. . . . Here [in Paris] 
they are rejoicing. . . . But I can see from many signs that the French 
are trying to get closer to E n g la n d .69
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Kaiser Wilhelm pressed issues further after hearing rumors that the British had 
landed in Delagoa Bay, Mozambique, to cut off the Boers. Holstein pleaded 
with Hatzfeldt to have British newspapers print a “reassuring paragraph,” to 
have London instruct British Ambassador Malet in Berlin to make an 
announcement, or to have Salisbury at least give assurances to Hatzfeldt 
himself, that the British had taken no such actions. Also, the Kaiser planned a 
militant speech to the members of the original 1871 Reichstag, on their 25th 
anniversary assembly, to get Germany “fired up” against Britain. Wilhelm also 
requested a bill providing additional appropriations for the German navy, but 
Chancellor Hohenlohe refused to introduce it, thus widening the breach 
between the two. To the relief of the German Foreign Ministry, Hatzfeldt 
reported on January 17, 1896 that Salisbury denied any landing at Delagoa 
Bay. However, the Kaiser commented “all bosh” against the newsTo a  week 
later, Holstein stated that the emperor was “in a state of pathological 
excitement” and obsessed with a naval build-up to the point of dissolving the 
present Reichstag if he must7i
In this now trough in Anglo-German relations, Britain sent troops up the 
Nile to secure its position in Egypt and Sudan, especially since southern Africa 
seemed now so unstable. Germany could no longer hold British insecurities in 
Egypt over London’s head as it had done to secure footholds on the African 
continent. The Foreign Ministry remained apprehensive regarding the South 
African issue which the Kaiser seemed intent on keeping open. On April 8, 
Senior Councillor Holstein wrote that unless Britain “indulges in some manifest 
tactlessness in South Africa” Germany would not side with France and Russia
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and that he was “fed up with the whole of South Africa because we have 
nothing to gain there under any circumstances. ”72 Holstein even wrote to his 
superior, Bernhard Bulow, that although the possibility of an Anglo-German war 
had decreased, France was still pledging support to Britain. Germany had to 
keep a better wedge between Paris and London. 73
By May 1896 British public opinion still ran high against Germany for the 
Kruger Telegram, and tension in South Africa was getting fairly close to German 
Southwest Africa. German officials there were requesting reinforcements of 
German infantry and compulsory service for German nationals residing in the 
colony. Wilhelm agreed, though ever the naval enthusiast he wanted to send a 
battalion of marines which displayed his inexperience. The Foreign Ministry, 
the High Command, and the Kaiser’s own advisors convinced him that marines 
would not fair well crossing the Namib Desert “not withstanding the fact that no 
troops have had less training in riding.”74 Thus corrected, Wilhelm agreed to 
send mounted infantry to Southwest Africa. Governor Leutwein was likewise 
intent on making Germany’s colony defendable with the reinforcements, not 
only against possible indigenous uprisings, but against the British Cape if
necessary.75
While tensions in southern Africa escalated, and while Britain secured its 
position in Egypt, the Foreign Ministry continued its efforts to smooth relations 
with London. When Russia asked for German assistance in protesting the 
English replacement of Egyptian garrisons with Imperial troops from India,
Berlin refused. This coolness on the part of the Foreign Ministry paid off; 
Hatzfeldt reported from London in late May: “If one goes to the Foreign Office or
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meets an English statesman elsewhere, one gets the impression that Europe is 
living in a state of profound peace and that there is not a cloud on the horizon 
out of which a thunderstorm could develop within the next fifty years. . . . interest 
in the Transvaal, although it is still being stirred up by some newspapers, is 
beginning to evaporate.”76 Anglo-German relations were finally normalizing, six 
months after the Kruger Telegram 77
However by November 1896 Kaiser Wilhelm made matters worse again. 
He disclosed his real beliefs regarding Southwest Africa via a talk with the 
Director of the Colonial Department in the Foreign Ministry announcing:
“Bismark conceived of our entire colonial policy only to drive a wedge between 
ourselves and England on account of the ‘English influences’ [namely Kaiser 
and Kaiserin Friedrich] . . .  so use the money the Reichstag gives [to the 
Colonial Department] for East Africa. Nothing will come of South-West Africa in 
any case. We will have to sell that at a good price to England one of these 
days.” Holstein wondered, after all the efforts by Francois and Leutwein to gain 
control over the Southwest African natives, what “the German people will say if 
the news leaks out that the Kaiser is talking about abandoning an area which 
we have already fought to preserve. . . .  [it would be] most d is m a l.”78 To make 
matters worse by the year’s end, German newspapers and the Kaiser blamed 
the British for supporting strikes in Hamburg. The Foreign Ministry again tried to 
control the damage, but Hatzfeldt reported only grim relations with London:
“With respect to England, to be sure, our alliance possibilities won’t get any 
worse because the English seem resolved in any case to abstain from any 
alliance with u s .”79 in light of such relations, German officials observed
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Germany’s tenuous hold over her overseas colonies. The German consul- 
general in China wrote on January, 17, 1897: “Our warships can’t swim about 
here forever like homeless waifs, and we run the risk of losing prestige because 
we have expressed wishes without pushing them through. . . .  A strong maritime 
force is a vital necessity, and that our fleet cannot do without the firm support of 
a naval base in overseas territories.” Such was the case for Southwest Africa
too. 80
In February 1897 Transvaal became an issue once more when the 
Kaiser commented to a Boer representative: “You may depend on me.”
Holstein wrote to Foreign Minister Bulow on his concerns how this might affect 
England: “ I would be surprised if this remark of the Kaiser’s will pass 
unnoticed.” The Senior Councillor did however succeed in having officials 
prevent the Kaiser’s statement from going to press, commenting “ I did not know 
what else could be done.”8i This all came as divisions widened between those 
who believed Germany should have a strong global empire, which the Kaiser 
supported, and those Junkers who believed in concentrating resources at 
home. A navy bill met bitter resistance in the Reichstag with the Kaiser’s men 
showing charts of German naval strength in comparison with other Powers; but 
to emphasize their point rather deceptively they accounted for only Germany’s 
most modern vessels in comparison with every French and British ship 
including “even the most ancient barges.” Wilhelm wanted Hohenlohe to give a 
speech in the Reichstag emphasizing Germany’s “dangerous international 
position” but the Chancellor refused. Holstein even commented to Bulow that “it 
is only due to the ineptitude, ill-will, and lack of interest on the part of (the 
Kaiser’s) Government that the money for the gigantic fleet hasn’t yet been
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granted or that the first steps have not yet been taken to secure the 
appropriations.” He added further criticism that “with respect to [Wilhelm’s] 
treatment of foreign affairs . . . the Ambassadors already know . . . that in every 
conversation [the Kaiser] is trying to warn the Russians against the English and 
the English against the Russians. What do you think that will accomplish in the 
long run?” The Kaiser was Germany’s greatest liability in Anglo-German
relations.82
Matters in southern Africa heated up again in April 1897. Rumors came 
that British ships were sighted off Delagoa Bay. Holstein urged Chancellor 
Hohenlohe to resist any of the Kaiser’s demands for immediate action or words 
against England. The Chancellor agreed. However, Holstein admitted to 
Hatzfeldt that “the prevention of further disasters will not get us out of the South 
African blind alley-we must do more than this.”83 The Senior Councillor 
believed that if the Ambassador could convince Salisbury to give Germany 
some colonial concessions, German public opinion would be neutralized in 
future British actions against the Boers. Holstein added that this could be the 
opportunity to “settle once and for all the difficulties over Walvis Bay and Samoa 
both of which the Germans wanted” and that even the Kaiser “despite his naval 
hobby-horse” would then see the benefits of better relations with Britain. 
However, in a note to Hatzfeldt, Holstein emphasized two “possibilities of 
danger.” The first danger was if Britain seized Delagoa Bay. Then German 
“chauvinists” would block any compensation efforts by Britain unless it included 
giving Portuguese territory “bordering German Southwest Africa on the north 
(and) Walvis Bay.”84 Yet the Senior Councillor admitted that England had to
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move first: “So long as England leaves Portuguese possessions alone and 
only expands or intensifies her power at the expense of the Transvaal, I can see 
no half-way plausible excuse for us to annex Portuguese territory.” The German 
Foreign Ministry was willing to cut a deal with London, allowing the latter “to 
subordinate further the (Boer) elements in South Africa” if Britain gave Germany 
a fair share of Portuguese territory, especially in Angola and M o z a m b iq u e .8 5  
However, as yet, Salisbury remained unwilling to initiate this. The second 
danger, which Holstein warned, was the growing contingent in Berlin who felt 
that English “animosity” for Germany was only partly due to colonialism but 
really focused on commercial competition which could never be settled. They 
believed that Britain was setting Germany up for “a situation in which it can fail 
upon the German merchant fleet and destroy it.” Holstein admitted that “all navy 
enthusiasts think this is the c a s e .”86 in other words, with Germany’s naval build­
up increasingly souring Anglo-German relations, the Foreign Ministry knew time 
was running out for gaining any more colonial concessions from Britain and in 
particular the division of Portuguese territories. Only in an immediate Boer- 
British conflict could Germany use its offer of neutrality to gain such 
concessions. Hatzfeldt responded on April 22, 1897, with news that British 
ships could be in Delagoa Bay or in the Zambezi River moving inland, which 
prompted him to try to find Prime Minister Salisbury to make a deal. Hatzfeldt 
believed: “[Germany has] nothing to gain form a conflict between England and 
the Transvaal. . . . [and if] Hohenlohe shares this view . . .  he will have to take a 
very firm stand against new Kruger Telegrams or worse. Take my word for it: if 
[Colonial Secretary Joseph] Chamberlain, with Salisbury’s approval, has now 
actually decided on aggressive action, no protest on our part and no dispatch of
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auxiliary troops from [Southwest Africa] would prevent it from being carried out.” 
The German Ambassador then warns: “The sole result of such steps would be 
a conflict between England and ourselves, in which we could do absolutely , 
nothing . . . whereas they could . . . perhaps bombard Hamburg. To desire to 
intervene under such circumstances would therefore be sheer madness.” If 
Britain were to shake up the status quo in southern Africa with an attack on the 
Boers, Hatzfeldt informed Holstein that he would point out to Salisbury Britain’s 
choices: “Either [England] must give us compensation, which was the only thing 
by which we could calm down our public opinion; o r . . . from now on and in 
every question . . .  we would under all circumstances take the side of the 
enemies of England.” If Germany could not protect the Boers, the Foreign 
Ministry wanted to at least benefit from their demise.87
However, to the fears of the Foreign Ministry who knew time was slipping 
away for such a deal, Hatzfeldt reported that Britain was not seeking such action 
against the Transvaal yet. Though the German ambassador was not so 
convinced, believing this “by no means proves that some sort of action is not 
being prepared with Chamberlain and Rhodes behind the scenes.” Hatzfeldt 
thought Colonial Secretary Chamberlain was pushing Prime Minister Salisbury 
into stronger actions against the Boers because of the latter’s extended 
absence from London which “would be very typical of him to arrange for 
everything to happen during his absence so that he could not be immediately 
called to account.” The German embassy could only wait, with Hatzfeldt 
emphasizing to Berlin: “For Heaven’s sake no new Kruger Telegrams, no 
threats of colonial troops [in Southwest Africa], and above all, nothing whatever 
which could bring about a conflict.”88 Yet even if the Kaiser supported a deal
133
with London, Hatzfeldt believed “Walvis Bay and especially Samoa seem to me 
to be extremely dubious and I don’t think [Salisbury] would have the courage to 
defend these concessions h e re .”88 The opportunity for territorial gain in 
Southwest Africa or in the Pacific did not improve. On May 12, 1897, Hatzfeldt 
reported: “[Salisbury] hasn’t forgiven us for the Kruger Telegram, but he would 
nevertheless like to see relations improved . . .  if it doesn’t cost anything. With 
respect to the Transvaal, he assumes that Kruger will now be as amenable as 
necessary . . . and therefore sees no reason why he should make concessions 
to u s .89 This time Britain was able to close the door in Germany’s face.
By the following year, however, this stagnation in colonial expansion 
seemed to be drawing to a close. On March 29, 1898, Chamberlain actually 
approached Hatzfeldt with the possibility of an alliance and with concession 
possibilities in Africa though nothing specific. Yet by April both Berlin and 
London again fumbled the opportunity with neither side willing to make any firm 
commitments to each other. Both sides feared such commitments would 
entangle them with the other Powers. Interestingly, the German Foreign 
Ministry already at this time feared England being convinced to stand aside and 
Italy being bought off by France and Russia in an attack on Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. On a different front, Hatzfeldt reported in May that Spanish 
rule in the Pacific was coming to an end due to American victories, but warned 
against any “premature grabbing” that would upset international relations. 
However, when the German Ambassador reported what the British were willing 
to give Germany, which seemed confined to giving up British possessions in 
Borneo, the Kaiser only commented “not e n o u g h !”90 The situation in the Pacific
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improved on June 17 when Ambassador Hatzfeldt reported to Berlin that with 
the Spanish command in Manila ready to fall to the Americans, this was the time 
for Germany to seize the Carolines. Further correspondence between Hatzfeldt 
and Bulow concluded that if London and Berlin should conclude another Anglo- 
German agreement, Germany should receive southern Angola to attach to 
Southwest Africa and northern Mozambique for German East Africa, while 
Britain could have Delagoa Bay to complete their encirclement of the Boers. 
Though this was a reversal of an earlier position, the British would not support 
such an agreement. The only resolution both sides could agree on was to keep 
the Portuguese territories out of anyone eise’s hands. On August 30, 1898, 
England and Germany signed the Secret Convention on Portuguese Colonies 
which prevented any other power from moving in on Mozambique and 
Angola.91
The next year, 1899, hampered possibilities of further agreements which 
might have benefited Southwest Africa. First, Anglo-German relations became 
bleak after the king of Samoa recognized by Germany, Britain, and the United 
States died, afterwhich a civil war commenced. Military action had been taken 
by all three supervisory powers with Germany countered by England and 
America. The Germans suffered the largest set back there with much of their 
property and some ships destroyed when the British bombarded the port of 
Apia. In April Hatzfeldt soberingly told Salisbury that it gave him “no pleasure to 
watch here how my efforts over many years to bring about a better German- 
English understanding had been ruined because of a miserable object like 
S a m o a .”92 Second, in a letter written on August 27, 1899 Hatzfeldt made his 
worst prediction to date by believing there would not be a British-Boer war
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“unless they have gone mad in Pretoria.” Yet the Ambassador conceded that 
although Salisbury was firmly against war “he will be dragged along if Kruger 
insists that England must expressly renounce suzerainty” over Transvaal.93 
When tensions in southern Africa escalated Berlin used this to the utmost, with 
enthusiastic support from the Kaiser, to get concessions out of London on 
Samoa, which it finally received. On October 10, 1899, Holstein commented to 
Hatzfeldt that this militant attitude in Berlin and its international consequences 
“would then dictate Germany’s policy for the next period of history.”94 Hatzfeldt 
replied two days later doubting the Kaiser’s aggressive policy backed by the 
German Admiralty: “ If our foreign policy depends on the views of Herr Tirpitz we 
will not go far in the world.”95
However, the Kaiser’s visit to England November 20-28, which was 
made only after British concessions in Samoa, brought Anglo-German relations 
again to a better level. On the 30th, Chamberlain even made a speech in 
Leicester calling Germany and Britain a “natural a ll ia n c e .”96 Yet these feelings 
were short-lived. The Boer War which erupted by the year’s end, slowly 
finished Anglo-German rapprochement because of the Kaiser’s and the 
German public’s pro-Boer sentiment, despite the efforts by the Foreign Ministry 
to go in the opposite direction. Hatzfeldt’s assistant, H. Eckardstein, observed 
that this war was settling the question whether England would have total control 
over southern Africa or whether the Boers had the strength to push the British off 
the Cape. Foreign Minister Bulow added a marginal comment: “Surely it is in 
our interest [especially in Southwest Africa] that Boers and English should 
balance each other in South Africa, neither one completely driving out the
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other.”97 Eckardstein reported on December 21, 1899 that:
I am convinced that England will master this problem in the 
end, but if she had waited only one more year to fight this war, she 
would have been simply thrown out of South Africa. In that case we 
would have seen an Afrikander republic in South Africa . . . [which] 
would have created a kind of Monroe Doctrine for the whole of the 
South Africa continent, to which both our German colonies as well 
as the Portuguese colonies would inevitably have fallen victims. I 
am firmly convinced that within a very short time Germany would have 
lost her best colony, i .e. Southwest Africa, without being capable of 
the least resistance.98
Though the German official noted: .“[Yet] if England were to win, the danger 
could arise for us tha t . . .  a large part of the refractory Boer population, 
encouraged by German public opinion, would emigrate to German Southwest 
Africa and from there continue to intrigue constantly against England. Taking 
the pro-Boer attitude in Germany into account, our Government would after all 
probably find it very difficult to prevent this.” Bulow agreed and was already 
making plans to pursue issues like the German Baghdad railway and coaling 
stations in the Red sea, along with concession issues, with England. In other 
words, the Foreign Ministry was willing to stick to an anglophile policy as long 
as England gave concessions that Bulow could hand to the German public and 
as long as Britain did not obliterate the Boer republics. The London embassy 
even reported to Bulow’s office on January 23, 1900, that Britain probably 
would use a strong Anglo-German relationship “to get England’s chestnuts out 
of the fire” with fears of a Russian threat to Persia while the Boer War demanded 
Britain’s attention.99
However, tensions did mount when the British seized and searched 
German ships bound for southern Africa from December 1899 to January 1900.
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The German mail steamer Bundesrath was seized and searched for contraband 
heading for the Boers. On January 16, England promised to release all the 
ships and pay any indemnity, but the diplomatic damage had been done. In 
February even Holstein agreed with Karl Wichmann, a member of the 
Southwest Africa Colonial Society and a representative of the high-explosive 
industry, that an article should be published condemning these actions. The 
Senior Councillor commented that “England’s astonishment at Germany’s 
bitterness can in turn only be regarded here with the greatest astonishment. Is 
[the] English astonishment real? If yes, a slap in the face must have a different 
meaning in England than it does in Germany. Just a year ago we received 
more than one slap in the face over Samoa. The worst was the bombardment 
of A p ia .”ioo Thus even the coolest minds in Berlin were resenting British 
actions.
In April 1900, there came more doom and gloom in the Foreign Ministry 
with dissension and intrigue, along with the prolonged illness of Hatzfeldt. 
However by summer the situation improved with Holstein making calls for an 
Anglo-German agreement now that German public support of the Boer’s had 
deflated because of the latter’s new guerrilla tactics: “A nation of soldiers like 
Germany was bound to be sobered by the manner in which the Boers have 
behaved since (Boer General Piet A. Cronje’s) capitulation (on February 27, 
1900).”101 The Kaiser had even congratulated the British on their success.
Yet relations remained oscillating. It troughed once more when London 
secured an agreement from Portugal to close Delagoa Bay from arms 
shipments to the Boers, thus avoiding a deal with Germany. This was followed 
by an issued statement that Britain claimed all of southern China in its sphere
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as German interests became established there. Following the Samoan affair in 
which German property was destroyed by British warships, the search and 
seizure of ships bound for southern Africa, these new developments hurt the 
Foreign Ministry’s efforts to convince the Kaiser to support Anglo-German 
relations. Those efforts did not impress the Kaiser, despite the Anglo-German 
Yangtze Agreement (signed in October 1900, which resolved the southern 
China issue), because of continued British resistance to German policy and 
plans. Although the Kaiser was well received in London in January, 1901, 
visiting the Queen who was sick, Anglo-German relations seemed to stagnate 
with a mutual exhaustion from trying to build a colonial agreement, much less 
an alliance, in these troubled times. Hatzfeldt reported that the new Director of 
the Colonial Department in the German Foreign Ministry, Dr. O. W. Stubel, was 
received poorly in London, with the Germans dumbfounded why. In May 1901, 
the Germans tried to initiate negotiations, with Hatzfeldt telling one of 
Salisbury’s men “if an alliance treaty were not concluded now it would never be 
concluded.” Salisbury later commented to the embassy that “he refused to 
negotiate at pistol-point.’’1o2 Thus one of the last windows of opportunity slid 
shut for improved relations which might have benefited German colonies in 
Africa. A wall seemed to be raised between Britain and Germany. 103
Yet the real blow to Anglo-German relations came when certain elements 
in Germany began criticizing British conduct in dealing with the guerrilla warfare 
of the Boers, including the use of concentration camps. On October 24, 1901, 
Chamberlain gave a speech in Edinburgh challenging German criticism and 
pointing out that in the last war with France German troops were not above
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criticism, which of course threw the German public into a fury. 104 a  press war 
between the countries mounted.105 Chancellor Bulow who believed 
Chamberlain was not being “ill intentioned” but “incredibly clumsy” tried to do 
what he could to suppress German opinion, and the Kaiser’s, but admitted “we 
would only be pouring oil on the flames.”106 When one Reichstag member 
called Chamberlain “the most villainous knave on God’s earth” for criticizing the 
German Army and proceeded to criticize the British Army in South Africa, 
Chancellor Bulow rose up in rebuke: “I believe I am in accord with the vast 
majority of this House when expressing the hope that it should not become 
custom to insult foreign Ministers from the tribune of the Reichstag . . .  I am 
equally bound to express my deep regret at the manner in which the previous 
speaker referred to the army of a nation with which we live in peace and
friendship.”io7
An end of an era of opportunity in Anglo-German relations seemed to be 
felt by everyone. Following Hatzfeldt’s dismissal in 1901 and Salisbury’s 
resignation as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in 1902, the link between 
London and Berlin seemed severed. Chancellor Bulow brought an end to the 
press war but with mixed results, since both Otto von Bismark and his son 
Herbert were behind many of the insulting editorials. With the Kaiser ruining 
further attempts at reconciliation, many officials such as Eckardstein in the 
London embassy, simply resigned. Anglo-German relations were beyond 
repair, with many in Berlin feeling a sense of doom that the pax Europa would 
end with Germany attacked by everyone around them. Interestingly however, 
the Kaiser entered his first war not in Europe, but in Southwest Africa. 108
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Chapter 4 
Blood, Diamonds, and the End
In the first two decades of this century, economic, political, social, and 
military matters in Southwest Africa came to a climax with very extreme results. 
The indigenous population offered their last attempt to throw out the Germans, 
the discovery of diamonds created an economic boom, and the first world war 
ended German imperialism abroad, including the very existence of German 
Southwest Africa.
By 1904, Germany reached new levels of isolation, with the Kaiser’s 
actions doing little to help the situation, and with England moving farther and 
farther into a relationship with France and thus with Russia. On July 11,
Holstein wrote from the Foreign Ministry that “Germany’s prestige has shrunk in 
the last few years, while our opponents and rivals are on the point of encircling 
us. Difficult situations must therefore be expected to arise for which I would 
prefer not to take the share of moral responsibility which every collaborator 
bears.”1 On September 5, 1904, the Senior Councillor of the Foreign Ministry 
further wrote: “ I don’t think that our future is going to become easier, standing 
between England, France, and Japan--a group united by a common hatred of 
G e r m a n y .”2 By the year’s end Chancellor Bulow, after predicting that even Italy 
could enter as Germany’s enemy, wrote: “[In the event of an Anglo-German 
war] we are practically powerless [to do anything serious] against England. By 
capturing our colonies and shipping, England could within a foreseeable time 
force us to a disadvantageous peace.”3 By 1905, Germany was giving in to the 
French on many issues, fearing that with England, Russia, Japan, and possibly
147
Italy to aid the French, they would successfully carry out their revanche if 
matters went into open conflict. Holstein reported, after receiving news from the 
German High Command, in late June that:
[French] reservists had been called up for the frontier corps, 
while none were being released. Further that the troops in the fron­
tier garrisons had received combat uniforms and equipment with tin­
ned rations for four days. For the time being the Chancellor wants to 
prevent counter-measures being taken-l think he is definitely right in 
this, because once that starts, both sides will drive each other further 
and further. . . .  Let us hope for the best.4
Despite this particular alarm, with the creation of the entente cordiale between 
London and Paris imminent, and with the impending sensation of doom that the 
European pax  was finally over, open hostilities were still a decade off. In the 
meantime, the Kaiser had to fight his first war against his own subjects, in 
Southwest Africa.s
While the Germans were establishing themselves in Southwest Africa, by 
building their northern port of Swakopmund at the edge of Walvis Bay and by 
occupying Windhoek for their capital in the interior, the native population met 
hardship. The German mining industry was still struggling in the colony, with 
the only railway from Swakopmund to Windhoek, the Otavi Railway, still 
incomplete. In fact, the Southwest Africa Company was actually a British firm 
which obtained exclusive mining rights in the Otavi region for copper; thus the 
mining, rail building, and administration in that region of Southwest Africa were 
not even German. In addition, the Otavi Minen und Eisenbahn Gesellshaft 
(Otavi Mining and Railway Company) which had only partial rights in the Otavi 
and primary control over the Tsumeb area to the north, was a joint German- 
British firm. British businessmen seemed equally as influential in developing
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the German colony. 6 Also, whereas the Germans were able to occupy footholds 
among the Herero, like Windhoek, Okahandja, Otjimbingwa, and Omaruru, and 
thus connect Swakopmund with the interior, the Nama strongholds of Bethanie, 
Keetmanshoop, and Gibeon remained outside German control thereby 
restricting German penetration from Luderitzbucht (Angra Pequena) in the 
southern part of the colony.
In 1897 a rinderpest epidemic was actually very significant in giving the 
Germans control over their colony. Up to 90 percent of Herero cattle in some 
areas died while 50 to 95 percent, depending on the location, of European 
colonist cattle herds survived. At one point the Herero previously had 250,000 
head. These dwindled to around 40,000 in just a few years and were only 
about the number that the few hundred German farmers and ranchers owned. 
Natives sold land to German and Boer farmers and ranchers so that they could 
afford to inoculate at least some of their remaining cattle.7 Therefore both 
German and Afrikaner (Boer) control increased rapidly. Yet there were still only 
some 5,000 Germans facing 80,000 Herero and 20,000 Nama. Interestingly, 
while German colonists left the larger Ovambo tribes alone in the northern 
regions, they allied with the few thousand Basters of Rehoboth south of 
Windhoek who had themselves been vulnerable between the two super-powers 
of the grasslands--the Herero and Nama. In this way the Germans could 
concentrate on those that might rebel.
Still by 1904 Governor Leutwein had only four companies of troops in the 
colony, and early in the year had taken three of them south to deal with an 
uprising of the Bondelswart Nama on the Orange River border. This left 
Windhoek and the northern half, the Herero portion, of the colony practically
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undefended since the governor thought he had the firm allegiance of Samuel 
Maherero of the Herero and Hendrik Witbooi of the Witbooi (or Gibeon) Nama.8 
In January 1904, Samuel Maherero wrote to Hendrik Witbooi and 
revealed his plans for a revolt against German imperialism. He requested 
Nama support, despite the many years of bitter war between the tribes-which 
had finally ended in 1892 with a general peace. Later the Herero chief wrote to 
Witbooi:
All our obedience and patience with the Germans is of little 
avail, for each day they shoot someone dead for no reason at all.
Hence I appeal to you, my Brother, not to hold aloof from the uprising, 
but to make your voice heard so that all of Africa may take up arms 
against the Germans. Let us die fighting rather than die as a result of 
maltreatment, imprisonment or some other calamity. Tell all the [other 
Nama] down there to rise and do battle.9
However, this letter and others never reached Hendrik Witbooi, for other Nama 
betrayed the correspondence to the Germans. Yet this probably would not have 
altered much if it had reached the powerful Nama chief, because once the 
Herero Revolt came, Witbooi actually sent some of his own troops to help fight 
the Herero according to the promise he gave Leutwein years before. If the 
Nama had combined with the Herero effort, the outcome would have been 
much different indeed. 10
Samuel Maherero issued a decree, and told the missionaries, that “none 
of my people lay their hands upon the English, the Bast(ers), . . . the Nama and 
the Boers.”i i  Furthermore, Herero subchief Daniel Kariko reported that “at our 
clandestine meetings our chiefs decided to spare the lives of all German 
women and children-the missionaries, too.” Thus the rebels were going to act 
as humanely as possible in what would become “Germany’s bloodiest and most
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protracted colonial w a r .”12 However, despite the initial strategic advantage, 
communication was not the rebellion’s strong suit, as evident when the rebels 
failed to inform about 600 Herero working on the Otavi Railway about the revolt 
until it was too late.
On the first day of revolution, January 12, 1904 the rebels gained the 
entirety of Hereroland and the herds of the German colonists. Only the fortified 
garrison towns of Windhoek, Okahandja, Otjimbingwe, and Omaruru remained, 
but were themselves besieged. 13 Over one hundred German soldiers and 
colonists, men only, died that first day. However, unwilling to assault the 
German strongholds in Hereroland, which were defended with machine guns, 
the Herero began losing their initial advantage. The Germans refused to come 
out of their fortified towns into open battle as the Herero had intended. They 
decided to play a waiting game, calling up reservists until Leutwein and his 
troops in Namaland could return or until Berlin could send reinforcements. 
Captain Franke, on his way south to reinforce Governor Leutwein’s operation 
against the Bondelswarts, quickly turned around when informed of the revolt. 
Franke called on his troops: “ I must demand from everyman, whether trooper or 
officer, the utmost!”i4 His cavalry covered over two hundred miles of hostile 
terrain in just one hundred hours. His forces raised the siege of Windhoek, then 
further north and west relieved Okahandja and Omaruru.15 in addition, just prior 
to the Herero cutting the only communications (one telegraph line) between 
Windhoek and Swakopmund, the Germans notified their warship Habricht of the 
revolt. The warship sent eighty-five marines inland to help reinforce the 
garrison towns which Franke had relieved. By the time Germany steamed initial
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reinforcements to the colony, and by the time Leutwein disengaged himself from 
the Bondelswarts and proceeded northward, it was mid to late February. 16
The head of the Colonial Department in the Foreign Ministry had only ten 
other officials with which to deal with this colonial crisis and maintain the rest of 
Germany’s colonies. This lack of developing a colonial division autonomous 
from the Foreign Ministry and lack of personnel shown blatantly Germany’s lack 
of colonial organization. Yet ironically with only a few individuals needing to 
make the calls and very little bureaucracy needing to be crossed, this did speed 
up Germany’s reaction. On January 18, the Colonial Department called for 
reinforcements for Southwest Africa and received approval the same day.
Soon five hundred marines, who volunteered for this first war since the Franco- 
Prussian, departed. This was done despite Governor Leutwein’s initial and 
inaccurate report (which was made while he was still in the southern reaches of 
the colony) that reinforcements were unnecessary. Also, on January 18, Bulow 
went before the Reichstag and informed them of the Herero revolt after which 
the body approved a 2.8 million mark act for military operations in Southwest 
Africa. Even the noted anti-imperialist and Socialist leader, August Bebel, did 
not challenge this surge of patriotic enthusiasm in defending their first colony 
and fighting Germany’s first war of the twentieth century, though Bebel did 
request an investigation into its causes.17
While the German troops and settlers in the colony barricaded them­
selves in their fortified towns in Hereroland, the 500 marines were steaming for 
Swakopmund, and while the Army organized further reinforcements, German 
officials were already planning the inevitable fate of the Herero. The Otavi 
Railway’s chief engineer wrote to the Southwest African desk of the Colonial
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Department in Berlin, that “all here in the colony agree that this rebellion must 
be put down with severity and that all those responsible must receive their just 
desserts.” At the same time the commander of the warship Habricht cabled that 
“the most severe punishment needs to be inflicted on the enemy,” and he talked 
of confiscating all the land and cattle of the H e re ro . 18 Some who had the 
Kaiser’s ear envisioned even more severe punishment. They talked of 
executions, expulsions, forced labor camps, and even the genocide of the entire 
Herero tribe. This resembled similar talk, even about genocide, by British and 
Cape officials and journalists when W. W. Jordan was killed many years before 
by the Ovambo—and that involved only two men killed, this was over a hundred 
German colonists and still growing. Whereas the Herero leadership had 
decided to leave German missionaries, women, and children alone, the 
Germans were looking for complete revenge. One missionary described the 
horrific frenzy of revenge that was spilling from the lips of German Southwest 
Africans: “The Germans are consumed with inexpiable hatred and a terrible 
thirst for revenge, one might even say they are thirsting for the blood of the 
Herero.” The missionary reported only hearing “give no quarter” among the 
colonists and confessed: “I shudder to think of what may happen in the months 
a h e a d .”19 Already anticipating victory once their forces landed,cooler minds in 
Berlin were making plans, to export Herero throughout Germany’s overseas 
colonies for cheap la b o r .20
In the initial stage of the war, from January to June, 1904, Governor 
Leutwein, who was still dumbfounded by the Herero’s revolt, led the German 
forces. Leutwein had opposed colonists’ calls for disarming the Herero in the
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past and had criticized the rassengegenfatzen or “race-hatred” which existed 
among the colonists. He had especially denounced any murder, flogging, or 
rape of the Herero, which in fact was common. The Governor confessed being 
sickened when no jury ever convicted a white settler of these crimes .21 At the 
same time Leutwein criticized high-minded liberals like Bebel who thought 
there could be a more civilized way to colonize, once saying “colonization is 
always inhumane” and that any promises ever made to the Herero, or any 
others, was only due to “our weak strategic position at the time.”22 The 
Governor already in the first months of the revolt gave Berlin hints that he 
wanted to negotiate with Maherero, which Berlin countered with direct orders of 
demanding unconditional surrender. Leutwein was in Swakopmund by mid- 
February and by March had a force of 2,500, with cannon and machine guns, 
ready to face some 10,000 Herero rebels.23
Thousands of volunteers were offering their services in Germany to be 
shipped to Southwest Africa to fight for the Fatherland. The Kaiser almost 
immediately took the command of the war from the Colonial Department and 
placed it directly into the hands of the High Command, whose chief was 
General Graf von Schlieffen. Schlieffen appointed General Lothar von Trotha, 
who had served the Reich in the Boxer Rebellion, as commander of expedition 
to clear the colony from all resistance. Trotha was to take over all military 
operations, thus replacing Leutwein, who on April 13 fumbled his counter­
offensive at Oviumbo. Three thousand Herero surrounded Leutwein’s force 
there forcing to the Governor to withdraw, barely escaping annihilation. Despite 
his replacement as commander-in-chief it was clear that for now Leutwein was
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to remain Governor. Leutwein still hoped that once the German forces defeated 
the Herero in a few battles they could arrange a conditional surrender, because, 
as the Governor well knew, the colony needed the labor of the Herero (with 
Southwest Africa already requiring a nine million mark per annum subsidy from 
B e r lin ) .24 After the battle at Oviumbo, the Governor acknowledged that “the 
Herero apparently believe that they can expect no quarter and are therefore 
fanatically determined . . . fighting will therefore come to an end only when the 
enemy has fired his last s h o t.”25 Leutwein even sent Berlin a critical comment 
on their unconditional surrender demands: “The insurgents must know that 
there is an alternative to death-otherwise, we will only drive them to despair, 
bringing on an endless w a r .”26 He wrote:
I do not concur with those fanatics who want to see the Her­
ero destroyed altogether. Apart from the fact that a people of 60,000 
or 70,000 [his estimate was somewhat low] is not so easy to annihi­
late, I would consider such a move a grave mistake from an econom­
ic point of view. . . .  It will be quite sufficient if they are politically dead 
. . . .  denied any form of tribal government and confined to reserves. . . . 
[with those] found guilty of having looted farms or murdering innocent 
people, be[ing] sentenced to death. . . . The only favour I beg of you 
is to give me a free hand concerning the diplomatic methods to be 
used to bring the negotiations to a c io se .27
At one point the Governor balked, stating that “it is meaningless to talk of 
encirclement, for in order to encircle [the entire Herero] people we would have 
to bring together more men than this water-poor and resourceless land could 
sustain.”28 The High Command ignored Leutwein in its zeal. As for Leutwein’s 
forces, he had divided them in March into three groups. However, heavy 
casualties quickly reduced the eastern most detachment, which by April 3 was 
nearly nonexistent. Leutwein dissolved it on May 6. By the time of his dismissal
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as commander, Governor Leutwein regrouped the western detachment with the 
main force for its own protection. However, most of the battles at this point were 
relatively small in terms of numbers involved. From the opening battles of 
January 12-20 to the battle of Oviumbo on April 13 the Herero had lost only 250 
while the Germans had lost only 210 soldiers. Yet by May, General Trotha was 
already steaming for Swakopmund with more reinforcements, so Leutwein took 
the defensive and remained at the fortified points to wait. From May to June, 
2,126 soldiers, 169 officers, and 2,126 horses left Hamburg for Southwest 
Africa. 29
Trotha himself landed with his men on June 11, 1904. He gathered the 
German force and moved into the open field. With no offers of giving quarter, 
Trotha quickly had Samuel Maherero’s Herero force cornered at Waterberg 
between his forces and the expanse of the Omaheke wasteland or sandveld, 
which was several hundred miles wide and simply a northern extension of the 
Kalahari that separated Hereroland from Lake Ngami in B e c h u a n a la n d .3 0  
Trotha brought the encircling grip of his six detachments around Waterberg 
fighting an inconclusive battle from August 11-12, with the Germans impressed 
with the Herero resistance. However, Trotha left one link open for the Herero to 
find, a hole leading out into the wasteland. Despite objections made by 
Governor Leutwein and some of Trotha’s own officers, the General continued to 
squeeze the Herero through the hole. By August 20 the Herero retreated past 
the eastern edge of the Waterberg plateau and entered the Omaheke. Trotha 
immediately had the last waterhole closed off with a line of fence and 
guardposts extending over 150 miles to keep the Herero in the sandveld Over
8,000 Herero rebels with an auxiliary of women and children of twice that
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number, made their exodus into the Omaheke with whatever cattle they had 
left.31 On October 2, 1904, Trotha made his Vernichtungsbefehl or 
“extermination order” :
I, the Great General of the German soldiers, address this letter 
to the Herero people. The Herero are no longer considered German 
subjects. They have murdered, stolen, cut off ears and other parts 
from wounded soldiers, and now refuse to fight on, out of cowardice.
I have this to say to them . . . the Herero people will have to leave the 
country. Otherwise I shall force them to do so by means of guns.
Within the German boundaries, every Herero, whether found armed 
or unarmed, with or without cattle, will be shot. I shall not accept any 
more women or children. I shall drive them back to their people- 
otherwise I shall order shots to be fired at them. These are my words 
to the Herero people.32
General Trotha had offered 1,000 marks to any settler who captured a Herero 
subchief and 5,000 marks to anyone who supplied the General with Samuel 
Maherero himself. He later added that German soldiers were also eligible to 
obtain any reward, though he amended that “the firing of shots at women and 
children means firing over their heads to drive them away” which he thought two 
shots would suffice. As for Herero men he stated: “ I am in no doubt that as a 
result of this order no more male prisoners will be taken, but neither will it give 
rise to atrocities committed on women and c h ild re n .”33 Despite this the greatest 
atrocity was the maintenance of the 150-mile fortified border keeping the Herero 
in the Omaheke wasteland. Afterwards even the High Command admitted that 
the fence destroyed the Herero more than any German weapons could have. 
Most of the Herero died a slow death. Though some 1,000 Herero, including 
Samuel Maherero, made it across the sandveld to the Okavango region which 
had water, they were in turn mistreated as refugees by Sechome, the 
paramount chief of the Tswana in Bechuanaland. Samuel Maherero’s power
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was now extinguished. Some 200 Herero made it westward to Walvis Bay 
where the British quickly sent them to Cape Town, while an unknown number of 
Herero made it safely into Ovamboland. Yet the bulk of survivors who did not 
flee into the Omaheke or were not at the Waterberg battle, simply ran back to 
their homeland in Hereroland where the German army hunted them down and 
herded the survivors into concentration camps. By 1905, there were 5,000 
Herero refugees in Bechuanaland or in the Cape Colony while nearly twice that 
number remained in the labor camps of Southwest A frica .34
By now even the chief of the High Command, Schlieffen, was 
questioning General Trotha’s methods. He believed Trotha had complicated 
matters by keeping the conflict going, because the German forces could not 
reach the remnant of the Herero and the Herero could not surrender because of 
the Vernichtungbefehl (extermination order).35 Also, when the Colonial 
Department of the Foreign Ministry informed Chancellor Bulow what Trotha was 
doing, he was outraged. He immediately requested the Kaiser to lift the 
extermination order since it was uncivilized, impractical, and worked against the 
economy of Southwest Africa-in other words, everything Governor Leutwein 
had argued. Bulow bluntly told Wilhelm that this genocide was “demeaning to 
our standing among the civilized nations of the world.” After five days of 
delaying, the Kaiser consented to have Trotha “show mercy,” and only after 
eight more days did Bulow get the Kaiser to cancel the Vernichtungbefehl 
entirely.36 Bulow tried to compromise with the General by allowing him to 
create concentration camps if need be “where the rest of the Herero people 
would be placed and kept for the time being.”37 However Trotha delayed
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complying with the new cancellation orders as long as possible. Berlin had 
even insulted Trotha by demanding that he use the Rhenish Missionary Society 
(RMS) to make contact with the Herero. The General blamed the missionaries 
for the whole mess with the natives and wanted nothing to do with them. He 
reported that trie RMS wanted a letter sent to Herero leaders “to persuade their 
people to lay down their arms and to return to their old hunting grounds under 
the guiding hand of the Church.” The General threw this aside and announced 
his own plan to the missionaries: “Those of the Herero who are ready to lay 
down their arms will be transported back to areas far removed from the front 
line-there they . . . will be put in irons and employed as ia b o u r.”3s General 
Trotha and Governor Leutwein bitterly fought over Trotha’s continued massacre 
despite Chancellor Bulow and the Kaiser’s orders. Trotha even wrote to 
Leutwein: “The eastern border of the colony will remain sealed off and terrorism 
will be employed against any Hererc showing up. That nation must vanish from 
the face of the earth. Having failed to destroy them with guns, I will have to 
achieve my end in that w a y .”39 Trotha even denied that the Governor had any 
say in the military operations. After the High Command supported Trotha’s 
position, Leutwein’s future as governor was in jeopardy.
Shockingly, on October 3, 1904, the day after Trotha issued his 
extermination order, Hendrik Witbooi as leader of the most powerful Nama 
finally “put on ihe white feather of rebellion, thus bringing the Nama and all of 
the coiony s south into the revolt.^ Unfortunately because the Germans had 
exterminated Herero power the Reich could now focus its efforts entirely on the 
Nama. Also, whereas Maherero acted when the German strategic position was
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at its weakest, Hendrik Witbooi waited until thousands of German soldiers were 
in the colony for his rebellion. Troopships had dumped battalion after battalion 
into Swakopmund to make the trek across the Namib from the Skeleton Coast. 
By October 1904 there were over 10,000 German troops in Southwest Africa, 
with Witbooi only having 900 rebels to begin his assault. However, the Nama 
chief was more of a guerrilla leader than Maherero, and the Nama simply could 
no longer contain their rage after seeing the Herero nearly “wiped off the face of 
the earth.” Quickly enough half of the Nama tribes responded to Hendrick 
Witbooi’s call to arms, and admittedly there were only 500 German soldiers in 
Namaland when the revolt began.41 Sensing the increased hostility among the 
Nama, Leutwein had sent two companies and one artillery battery to 
Luderitzbucht (Angra Pequena) and further reinforcements into Namaland just 
in case, so as not to be caught as unprepared as he was with the Herero. The 
Germans quickly outnumbered these new rebels as Trotha sent waves of 
reinforcements southward, with the Nama Chief having to run for his life on 
certain occasions and even driven into the Kalahari for a time. However, the 
guerrilla tactics paid off with the interruption of supply lines. Furthermore,
Trotha was frustrated by two more rebel groups. The first was another Nama 
tribe led by a chief named Cornelius who rebelled after Witbooi led most of the 
other Nama into rebellion. The second group was led by a cattle thief from the 
Cape Colony, named Morenga, who after frustrating Cape officials crossed into 
Southwest Africa. Actually General Trotha tried negotiating with Cornelius early 
by sending his own son, a young lieutenant, to the Nama camp. But a German 
patrol, ignorant of what was going on, fired into the camp and thus Cornelius 
had the General’s son killed. Against the three rebel groups Trotha’s army, now
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15,000 strong, seemed stalemated. The Germans wanted an open battle which 
these rebels never gave them after observing what happened to the Herero.
The guerrillas only raided upon the Germans or attacked them in small groups 
at night, which actually proved far more successful.41
Morenga had been operating in the region even before Hendrik Witbooi 
donned his white feather of war. At one point the cattle raider captured the 
horses of an entire German company, with the Germans having to walk back to 
Keetmanshoop. Morenga, himself half Herero and Nama, succeeded in 
bringing both Nama and Herero into his group, the first truly Namibian force. 
Morenga gave the German’s many small defeats, but he had to be “put on the 
back burner” by the German command when the Nama Revolt broke out. The 
Cape would actually help put Morenga out of Germany’s misery when the 
cattle-raider later crossed back into British territory.42
Hendrik Witbooi had only the loyalty of half the tribes in the revolt, and yet 
the entire Nama people equaled only one fourth the size of the Herero who had 
already been defeated. More discouraging was the fact that Witbooi was being 
met by a German force almost equal to the entire Nama population in 
Southwest Africa. To offset these odds the Nama guerrilla leader put his faith in 
God. Hendrik Witbooi was a Christian fanatic, almost having his own daughter 
executed for premarital sex, and envisioned an African church free from the 
western missionaries. However, even more reinforcements arrived from 
Germany and despite Hendrik Witbooi’s religious visions the Nama cause 
looked hopeless.43
The critical blow which ended the stalemate between the German army
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and the Nama came on October 29, 1905, when the Germans fatally wounded 
the Nama rebel leader. His last words were reported thus: “ It is enough with 
me, it is all over-the children should now have rest.” Trotha called it “a beautiful 
message” and soon Samuel Witbooi, the Nama leader’s son and successor, 
surrendered.44 The Germans spared the Witbooi Nama and promised to allow 
them to remain near their old capital of Gibeon. Likewise, Cornelius’ Bethanie 
Nama (the same tribe who two decades earlier sold Angra Pequena to Luderitz) 
were also allowed to remain near Bethanie once they surrendered. Most 
surviving Nama rebels surrendered during 1905-06, but some who were 
outraged by Samuel Witbooi’s early capitulation did not surrender until 1907.45
When the High Command sided with General Trotha on many military 
issues, though he was now forced to take prisoners due to the Foreign Ministry, 
Berlin granted Governor Leutwein home leave which he apparently requested. 
This was just a dignified but forced resignation. Yet just as Berlin was frustrated 
by Leutwein’s leniency and unproductivity in the rebellions, German officials 
were themselves aghast by Trotha’s cruelty and overproductivity. The General 
had ignored certain orders and assumed powers not given to him. Berlin felt he 
was uncontrollable and therefore had him recalled. In November 1905 Trotha 
was on his way back to Germany. These two were replaced with a new team to 
run the post-rebellion colony--Friedrich von Lindequist (the former German 
Consul in Cape Town, who tried to encourage Leutwein to annihilate the Nama) 
as civilian governor, and General Dame as the new commander of Southwest
Africa.46
In November 1905, the Germans, breaking their promise, actually sent
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over one hundred Witbooi Nama (the late Hendrik Witbooi’s own tribe) to the 
German colony of Togo in West Africa. However, after the Togo officials 
shipped them back when they found them quickly dying due to illness there.
Also, after General Trotha was gone, another 6,000 returning Herero and 2,000 
of the rebelling Nama were willing to surrender-almost all going to concentra­
tion (labor) camps. In 1907, by Germany’s own admission, over half of the
2.000 Nama and now 15,000 Herero prisoners died in those camps. The worst 
camp was on Shark Island, that rock in Angra Pequena Bay (now Luderitzbucht 
in memorial to the founder) which had been long fought for between De Pass 
and the Bremen merchant. Witbooi and Bethanie Nama rebels were sent there, 
in violation of the surrender agreements made with them. Some 1,000 of the
1,700 sent to Shark Island died within seven months. Cornelius himself 
perished in the cold winds of this Skeleton Coast prison. By 1911, further 
testifying to the total extinguishment of indigenous power (save of course the 
Ovambo), only an estimated 9,800 of the 20,000 Nama and 15,000 of the
80.000 Herero survived the wars-though reports vary. Perhaps if the Nama 
had donned their white feather of war when Samuel Maherero gave his plea to 
“let us die fighting” events and results might have been different. But this was 
the first German war for this Kaiser and one of the few since 1871 for the 
German Army (though some German forces did participate in the international 
force during the Boxer Rebellion, as did General Trotha himself). Since the 
resulting enthusiasm caused by this rare call to arms sent waves of German 
volunteers to Southwest Africa, the end result would have been much the same. 
Though perhaps if the Nama had rebelled with the Herero the German victory 
might have been delayed and there would have probably been a longer
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German casualty list (2,000 Germans were actually killed in both revolts). 
However the fact remains that the Nama did not fight with the Herero and 
therefore the Germans had the luxury of dealing with them in succession. In this 
war at least, the Second Reich rivaled the Third Reich in atrocity and genocide. 
Though admittedly on a smaller numeric scale, this war was much greater in its 
per capita impact and created ghost villages and regions. Yet upon returning 
home, the Kaiser gave General Trotha the Order of Merit for his accomplish­
ments. The Treaty of Ukamas officially ended all rebellion in Southwest Africa 
in 1907, though it also at least ended the ability for settlers or soldiers to hunt 
down remaining Herero.47
With the revolts ended, the Germans and Boers took complete economic 
control over the region. The “ Imperial Decree of 26 December 1905 Pertaining 
to the Sequestration of Natives” issued by the Kaiser’s government, and 
endorsed by him personally, ensured the economic fate of the Herero. Though 
it included confiscating land from the Nama, Governor Lindequist, possibly 
because the raider Morenga was still at large, told the Colonial Department that 
it was “premature to take action against the Nama tribes at the present stage.”48 
However, once news finally arrived in Windhoek of Morenga’s death in the 
Cape nearly all of Namaland fell to the same fate as all of Hereroland. German 
colonists quickly built their homesteads on the former native soil. Despite there 
being only around a thousand white farmers, of whom over nine hundred were 
German, by 1913 they owned over 13.4 million hectares of land, or almost one- 
sixth of Southwest Africa’s entire area. Also by this time, whites owned 183,000 
of the 205,000 head of cattle, with the Basters, who had allied themselves to the 
Germans in both revolts, owning half of the remainder. This severe action
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against the indigenous population did not escape criticism from several 
elements in Berlin. Even the Reichstag opposed the Kaiser’s action. One 
deputy from the moderate Center Party called it “nothing else but robbery on a 
large scale” and that the “Decree marks the entry of modern slavery into 
Southwest Africa.”49 August Bebel, a deputy for the Social Democrats in the 
Reichstag and critic of German imperialism, said that the Decree merely used 
the rebellions as an excuse to gain what the colonists always wanted, to “wrest 
the land from the natives and transfer it to the settlers.”so The Social Democratic 
and Center parties passed a resolution through the Reichstag on May 30, 1906, 
demanding that the Kaiser’s government return at least a portion of the 
confiscated lands back to the Herero and Nama. However, because of its weak 
parliamentary powers in the German government, the Kaiser and Governor 
Lindequist basically ignored the Reichstag.
The economics of the colony remained discouraging, despite the some 
companies and enterprise making huge profits during the confiscation of Herero 
and Nama property. At the turn of the century there had been only 3,387 whites 
in Southwest Africa, but by 1913 there were 14,830. This number was actually 
a lot, since it now nearly equaled the post-revolt population of the Herero, who 
despite the genocide were still the second largest tribe in this sparsely 
populated colony. Only the Ovambo remained in their own category, and 
autonomous, with well over a hundred thousand people. With the sharp rise in 
settlers came a large increase in imports, which created a larger trade deficit. 
Governor Lindequist tried to develop the infrastructure of the colony by building 
new railways, wells, dams, and schools. However, only the discovery of 
diamonds redeemed Southwest Africa, yet this occurred only at the very end of
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this colony’s life within the German Reich. In 1908, the first year after settlers 
discovered diamonds near Luderitzbucht, 39,000 carats of diamonds were 
exported with the largest single diamond measuring 34 carats. Already by the 
next year that export figure was 483,000 carats. In 1910 the export quantity 
doubled, and by 1913 Southwest Africa exported over one and a half million 
carats from Swakopmund in the north and Luderitzbucht in the south. The latter 
of these ports, the former Angra Pequena, shipped over 36 million marks worth 
of diamond and copper in 1912 alone, the same year in which exports finally 
exceeded imports. However, Swakopmund was a difficult port with ships 
having to anchor offshore with smaller boats needed to load and unload cargo 
through the rough surf until a stable and very lengthy pier was constructed. Yet 
Swakopmund remained the gateway to Windhoek from the coast since Walvis 
Bay remained in British and then South African hands. In addition to diamonds, 
gold and silver mines likewise began producing huge profits. Luderitz’s dream, 
and that of many others, had finally come true on this return for all the 
investment. Tsumeb in the north became the largest lead mine in all of Africa 
while also yielding sixteen other metals which the new Tsumeb-Swakopmund 
railway transported to the coast. Bismark’s “little sandpot” which even the 
Kaiser wanted to give away was finally a shinning, profitable colony for the 
Reich paying off the millions of marks invested into its roads, harbors, railways, 
and defense. De Pass had given up too easily, Luderitz’s survivors could say.
De Pass settled with the bird dung of the coast rather than continuing to dig for 
Namibia’s buried wealth. The German colonial government and organizations 
built permanent offices, hospitals, and churches replacing temporary ones.
The Germans even erected a radio transmitter that could communicate directly
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with Berlin. The British Consul in the German colony reported that a new, more 
elaborate period of public construction was to begin in 1914. However, all of 
this belated economic progress came too late for German Southwest Africa, as 
a shot fired in Sarejevo determined its fate.51
There were only seven short years between the last of the revolts and the 
first world war, and an even shorter period of economic success. When the war 
began in 1914, Britain relied on the first prime minister of the Union of South 
Africa, General Louis Botha, to defend the Union and to seize the now profitable 
German colony. Yet South Africa’s forces included many Boers and English 
who were disenchanted by the Boer War and who called this conflict “Britain’s 
War” wanting no part in it. When the South African Parliament decided to go 
ahead with invasion plans for Southwest Africa, many Boers openly re b e lle d .52 
As early as August 4, Botha informed the British command that South 
African (Union) troops could take over the responsibilities of the British imperial 
troops stationed there, so that England could use the latter in the European war. 
London quickly accepted the o ffer.53  From the new seat of power at Pretoria, 
the Acting Governor General, De Villiers, wasted little time and instructed his 
ministers:
If your Ministers at the same time desire and feel themselves 
able to seize such part of German South-West Africa as will give 
them the command of Swakopmund, Luderitzbucht, and the wireless 
stations there or in the interior, we should feel this was a great and 
Imperial service. You will, however, realise that any territory now oc­
cupied must be at the disposal of the Imperial Government for pur­
poses of an ultimate settlement at the conclusion of the war. Other 
Dominions are acting in similar way on the same understanding.54
With South Africans understanding that they refrain from making claims to any
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German territory that they might occupy, London approved invasion plans on 
August 9, 1914, and called it “an urgent necessity” to take the two German 
harbors via “a joint naval and military expedition up the coast.” The British 
command also suggested that the “capture o f . . . Wind[hoek], which is of great 
importance, might follow another expedition [up the coast] . . .  or be carried out 
independently from [the] interior.”55 Regarding the invasion, Botha wrote that 
“the naval part [is] to be undertaken by the Imperial authorities and the military 
operations [are] to be undertaken by the Union Government.”56 However, 
before Botha could load South African troops on to British ships or could mass a 
land force on the border with Southwest Africa, growing resistance from Boer 
(Afrikaner) commanders and troops brought South Africa to the brink of civil 
war.
Hopes of an independent Afrikaner republic began as soon as the war 
commenced in Europe. These hopes were completely anchored on Germany’s 
early successes on the western front in Belgium and France. Another basis for 
the Afrikaner revolt had to do with the mystical visions of a man simply known as 
Van Rensburg, who prophesied a bloodless end to the Union in which the 
resurrection of the Boer Republics would not even require one shot fired. Those 
planning rebellion attempted early to enlist General De la Rey, the commander 
of western Transvaal. However, De la Rey instead calmed down the Afrikaners 
on August 15, inhibiting the revolt, though this only delayed the inevitable. Yet 
due to the General’s popularity, the conspirators still wanted to enlist him.57
Lt. Colonel Solomon Maritz, later a rebel general, was another key 
individual in the uprising. Maritz had fought in the western districts of the Cape
near Southwest Africa during the Boer War against the British, and left South 
Africa after the peace of 1902. He resided in Madagascar briefly before he went 
to Southwest Africa where he helped the Germans in the Herero Revolt. Maritz 
subsequently returned to South Africa and enlisted in the Union Police.
However, after the new Union created a Defense Force he was actually offered 
a commission and in January 1913 given the command of the twelfth military 
district, the northwestern region of the Cape where South Africa bordered 
German territory. Amazingly Maritz was in control of the same region in which 
he had fought the British in the Boer War; now he was suppose to defend British 
and Cape interests there. This remarkable, and unlikely, appointment was 
achieved through the efforts of General C. F. Beyers, even with the reluctance of 
the Union defense minister. A British report on Maritz asserted that the colonel 
was “in communication with the German authorities. . . . [even] before he was 
appointed to the command of the north-western districts.”58 Maritz himself 
reportedly confessed that he was planning for the return of an independent 
Afrikaner republic as early as 1912, which he believed an inevitable Anglo- 
German conflict would enable. Beyond German Southwest Africa, Maritz 
maintained close communication with Generals Beyers, De Wet, and Jan Kemp, 
as well as keeping contact with the leaders of the Transvaal and the Orange 
Free State which were now part of the Union of South Africa.59
As early as August 7, 1914, Maritz declared to Afrikaners in his military 
district that “we in South Africa have no enemy unless we make one ourselves” 
and exclaimed that he and his force would not be a part of any invasion of 
Southwest Africa.so Furthermore, an old associate of Maritz, Piet J. Joubert,
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who fought in the Boer War with him and commanded the Transvaal Boers, had 
been residing at a farm near Keetmanshoop in German Southwest Africa. 
Joubert returned to help Maritz’s efforts, and at one point South African locals 
accused him of being a German spy. The actions of Maritz gave Germany a 
buffer along the Orange River, at least for a while, in the early stages of World 
War I and even concealed German violations, via patrols, of the South African 
border. At one point, Maritz even allowed a German force to cross into South 
Africa to capture the Liebenbergs, an Afrikaner family who had fled from the 
German territory with their cattle and who had shot at German patrols in the 
process. 61
With the rebellion delayed by De la Rey, Maritz sent Joubert to see 
Generals Botha and Smuts, the leaders of Union forces, to put aside any 
skepticism which might have arisen because of Joubert’s return. However the 
real reason for Maritz sending his associate to Pretoria was to make contact 
with Beyers and De la Rey. Beyers had made preparations for a general 
Afrikaner revolt on September 15, 1914. Maritz was to keep protecting 
Southwest Africa from an invasion, while also allowing German support to flood 
in for the rebels. Beyers' plans were for Major J. Kemp, later a rebel general, to 
work under De la Rey in the western Transvaal, unless Beyers could not 
convince De la Rey to rebel; if such was the case Kemp would take over. By 
mid August, Maritz had traveled to Pretoria and confirmed to Beyers that the 
revolt indeed had German support. After the seer Van Rensburg revealed 
further visions to the Afrikaner people in which he saw 40,000 Germans 
marching through the streets of London, and with news of continued German 
success in western Europe, General Beyers also announced publicly that he
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too would not participate in any invasion of Southwest A fr ic a .62
Although rumors were circulating that the Germans were massing a force 
at Nakab, a watering hole close to the Orange River border with South Africa, 
Maritz covered German activity by supposedly sending out patrols that found 
nothing. He tried to keep Union leaders, Botha and Smuts, in the dark as long 
as possible. Also, the Nationalist Party, an Afrikaner dominated entity, by 
September 9 disclosed it opposed Botha’s plans for an invasion of Southwest 
Africa. Several clergy of the Dutch Reformed Church also opposed such plans 
and were in early communication with Beyers offering assistance.63
In early September, Beyers continued with plans for the uprising to begin 
on September 15, which would include a march on Pretoria in what he hoped to 
be a bloodless coupe against the Union government. The General tried 
telegraphing De la Rey to enlist him more solidly into the group, but he was 
unable to contact him. Thus Beyers had only De Wet’s support and troops in 
the Orange Free State, Maritz’s in the northwestern Cape territory, and Kemp’s 
control over part of De la Rey’s forces in the western Transvaal. On September 
11, 1914 a force led by General Duncan Mackenzie, was about ready to set sail 
from Cape Town to seize Luderitzbucht (Angra Pequena). The pressure 
mounted for those wanting to prevent a full invasion. By the 14th, Beyers had 
written his resignation from Union forces and had his car ready for quick travel. 
The next morning, Joubert met with Beyers in Pretoria “informing him that all 
arrangements [by Maritz] had been made and all was re a d y .”64 So the General 
had Joubert sent to Johannesburg in his car, since it would be safer there for 
him, and had General De la Rey brought back to Pretoria. Both Kemp and
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Beyers had already made their resignations known to their men by the time De 
la Rey arrived.65
With his arrival, Beyers made sure De la Rey was against the invasion of 
Southwest Africa, and he confirmed that he was. However the leader of the 
coup still did not reveal the true aspirations of their movements to De la Rey, but 
persuaded him to speak to Kemp’s massed troops, around 1,600 in number, at 
Potchefstroom Camp. He was to give the rebellion some integrity and to win 
over those in the ranks who might be swaying by criticizing the Union plans of 
invasion. However, as the two generals and a driver made their way from 
Pretoria to Kemp’s camp via Johannesburg, they encountered a police cordon. 
Unfortunately for the rebellion, the police were after a gang of three people who 
had recently stolen a car. When Beyers saw the police barrier he had his driver 
run it, thinking that news had leaked out about the revolt and that the police 
were looking for him. The police fired and fatally shot General De la Rey, the 
most respected and followed leader in the western Transvaal.66 Equally 
unfortunate and frustrating for coup leaders was the fact that the mystic seer, the 
“prophet,” had refused to go to any meeting and speak which might give the 
rebellion credibility, only saying “it was not yet clear to him that [this] was his
p a th . ”67
The rebellion’s rough start continued as the conspirators tried to carry it 
into action, though they made some progress. When news was heard of De la 
Rey’s death, Kemp had raced in his car to withdraw his resignation, but it was 
too late. Although there were fears that the coup would topple, Smuts and 
Botha remained ignorant of it regarding the resignations as simple protests
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against the invasion. A few days later, after the Potchefstroom debacle, Kemp 
exclaimed: “Thank God, we’ve still g o t. . . Maritz on the Orange R iv e r .”68 with 
Maritz’s continued assurances of German support, Beyers, Kemp and De Wet 
met on September 20, the evening of De la Rey’s funeral, to plot another 
attempt. The next day, under the the flag of the old Orange Free State, they 
preached to seven or eight hundred Afrikaners against the invasion of 
Southwest Africa, continuing to criticize the invasion and to draw Afrikaner 
support.. However a Union force slipped by Maritz and crossed into the 
German colony. This almost spoiled the rebellion when it was learned that the 
South African force “was badly cut up” by the G e rm a n s .6 9  Maritz continued to 
deny that any German threat existed on the border so that Afrikaners would not 
be swept up in Botha’s and Smut’s calls to arms, which would deflate the 
planned rebellion. In early October, De Wet and Kemp made speeches 
denouncing the Union government in the northern parts of the Orange Free 
State, trying to gain support for a revolt.™
Meanwhile, Union General Smuts ordered Maritz to invade Southwest 
Africa. Maritz refused, however, saying that the Germans had now 3,000 men 
on the border, a force he had been denying existed. Maritz claimed the 
Germans had machine guns and howitzers and were too strong for his 
untrained force of volunteer Afrikaner commandos. Smuts immediately 
demanded Maritz to hand over his command to Major Enslin, whom Smuts 
knew was loyal to the Union, and that Maritz come to Pretoria to explain his 
actions. Maritz refused, and Enslin secretly wired to Smuts that his commander 
was in contact with the Germans: “Will do my best [in] most difficult position--!
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am afraid to trust any one [in] camp.”7i The few Union loyalists in Maritz’s force,
in control of the maxim gun section, trained their weapons back on the camp
just in case Maritz tried anything. Yet further orders for Maritz to step down
came from Pretoria, but Maritz replied: “ It is impossible for me to come over [to
Pretoria] under circumstances and hand over command to Major Enslin, as
matters would certainly go wrong.” Trying to prevent government interference,
on October 2, 1914, Maritz wired Pretoria that he could handle the border
situation with his current force, thus contradicting his earlier report. However,
Smuts had already ordered reinforcements and a new commander to be sent to
the s c e n e .™  That afternoon, the rebel leader broke camp and moved towards
the border of Southwest Africa. Though this is what Pretoria had originally
commanded, Enslin telegraphed:
Maritz’s movement all of the sudden not understood and 
suspicious. It may be he thinks he is clearing himself from 
disobedience by moving to the border. He expressed no intention 
[of] proceeding] further, but have just ascertained he has taken all 
ammunition with him. I warned Lieutenant Freer [in] charge [of] 
machine guns [to] keep sharp lookout.™
By October 6, Maritz had made arrangements with his German contacts 
across the border for continued support. Three days later he assembled his 
force of five to six hundred men in such a way as to surround the Union loyalists 
of the maxim gun section, which he had disarmed and had taken into custody. 
Maritz then gave a lengthy speech condemning Botha, Smuts, and explained 
why he refused the orders to invade German Southwest Africa. At this time he 
revealed the plan to gain the independence of the Afrikaner regions from British 
control. The rebel commander explained:
I can assure you that I did not put on this uniform to serve
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England-far from it. I did it solely for the goodwill of my country, and 
now I am on the point to act. When General Botha insisted on my 
taking command, I told him that it was a fruitless attempt to try such a 
thing, but he would not listen . . . [and now] I lay down my distinction as 
an English Lieutenant Colonel, for I want to be nothing more than a 
common [Afrikaner] to fight for the freedom of my country, and I shall 
not cease, though my blood may flo w .™
In addition Maritz had accepted the rank of general from the Germans and 
handed over 60 Union loyalists, from his own force, to be held as prisoners in 
Southwest Africa.
Maritz’s actions quickly pushed Beyers, De Wet, and Kemp to take their 
own action which had been repeatedly delayed. They had no choice now that 
Botha and Smuts had figured out what was going on. On Monday, October 12, 
the Union government announced martial law and the existence of a rebellion, 
having newspapers announce: “Ever since the resignation of General Beyers 
. . . there have been indications that something was wrong with the forces in the 
north-west of the Cape Province [under Maritz]”. The report also denounced 
Kemp and De Wet as rebels. Full rebellion now became the coup leaders’ only 
option. Immediately, news reached Pretoria that Maritz had German weaponry 
and possibly personnel at his disposal with the rebel General reportedly 
boasting “that he would overrun the whole of South Africa.”75
In the original plan for the coup attempt, in September, Beyers was to be 
president of the Boer republic with De la Rey as commander-in-chief. Now, 
however, when Maritz forced matters to a head, the best they could do was to 
have Beyers form some sort of leadership with commandos under De Wet in 
Transvaal and under Kemp in the Orange Free State. Dutch Reformed 
ministers immediately helped by transporting the rebel leaders where they
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needed to go. However, Unionists immediately searched for Beyers, forcing the 
rebel general to hide for a time, so that De Wet had to take temporary control 
over the situation.™ De Wet addressed a crowd of Afrikaners trying to gain 
further support, stating that “you shall know shortly if happiness or misery is 
coming over the land. There are only a few here, but thousands are ready and 
waiting for the word.”77
On October 13, Beyers and a delegation met with Botha in Pretoria and 
formally announced the coup. At the same time they ordered Afrikaner troops to 
“bedank dadelik" or “resign immediately” from Union commands or posts.™ 
Three days later Beyers was in the field with his army. Later that month Beyers 
issued another call to arms: “All [Afrikaners] of the Union of South Africa from 
16 to 60 years of age are commandeered with horse, saddle, and rifle and 
ammunition complete (with) rations for eight days to appear on Tuesday 
morning, 27th October, 1914, at 8 o’clock a. m. at Hathoschlangte.”™ Hopefully 
this call would bring in larger numbers as the public finally knew the true reason 
for the rebellion-their independence.
Responding after this call, Union General Botha issued a statement on 
October 26: “Citizens who have been . . . guilty of disobedience . . . need not 
fear any action against them . . .  on the part of the Government, so long as they 
remain quietly at home and abstain from acts of violence or hostility against the 
authority of the Government of the U n io n .”80 Botha and Smuts relied on the 
offer of amnesty to keep Afrikaners from answering the call, but it went largely 
unheeded as hundreds and then thousands took to the field in the Transvaal * 
and in the Orange Free State. The next day Botha himself took to the field to do
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battle with those who had already responded to Beyers' call. Almost 
immediately, General Botha dispersed Beyers' forces at Commissie Drift, south 
of Rustenburg, and forced the rebel general into hiding once more. A couple of 
days later, the government again offered amnesty with warnings that if the rebel 
commandos did not return home the government would seize their property. 
Shortly, Union forces dispersed another rebel group, some of Beyers' and some 
of Kemp’s, at Treurfontein. So far victories had been made without blood spilt, 
so the Union government issued yet another warning to have local 
commanders “call upon [Afrikaners] to lay down their arms and go home. . . .  if 
not, they will be prosecuted and punished as rebels. ”81 At this point, amnesty 
was also offered to rebel leaders provided no blood was spilled in the
meantime.82
Union General Smuts did not want a civil war in South Africa in the 
middle of World War I, and therefore he authorized numerous attempts to open 
negotiations with De Wet and Beyers in addition to the amnesty offers. One 
report of such negotiations stated:
The conversation turned on the resolution by Parliament with 
regard to the campaign against German South-West Africa and the 
reason for General Beyers and others taking up the position in which 
they stood. Beyers stated that he was taking up a position of passive 
resistance . . . and as it was impossible to address the [Afrikaners] in 
the ordinary way, on account of the regulations under Martial Law 
being so strict they were bound to come together in the manner they 
had done, to silently protest. Such restrictions, he said, were only to 
be expected in Russia.83
Beyers at one point in negotiations denied ties with Maritz and even offered a 
compromise in which he would stop his revolt if only volunteers were used 
against Southwest Africa. However, it appears that the rebel general was just
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buying De Wet and Kemp time to build-up. The government received a report 
that De Wet would continue the fight until the Union government agreed to 
withdraw all troops that had already invaded the Skeleton Coast. Another 
report indicated that: “De Wet announces that all troops be removed from 
German South-West Africa to within Union borders. If this is not done, he will 
fight for the independence of the Transvaal and the Free State. He states that 
arms, etc., will be supplied him by Maritz.”84 De Wet also bluffed a readiness to 
undertake negotiations in order to buy time. These Boer leaders knew full well 
they were going to ride this coup to its professed end-a sovereign Afrikaner 
republic. During one set of promised negotiation meetings, De Wet instead 
used the ruse to blow up bridges and cut telegraph lines.85 On November 5, De 
Wet even felt confident enough to write:
Without making any promises now already (we are not going 
to divide the bear’s skin before the bear is shot), I wish it to be known 
that my intention is that, if we attain our ideal, those [Afrikaners] who 
support our endeavour to attain independence are to receive a re­
ward. The money for this (purpose) must come out of an assessment 
levied upon the [Afrikaners] who remained at home, [and] the un­
faithful who fought against us.86
Beyers likewise used the bluff of diplomacy to take the advantage of surprise. 
After having a face off with a Union force for hours, pending negotiations, he 
actually maneuvered his forces into an offensive against the Union 
commandos.87 One British report concluded that “it is self-evident that the rebel 
generals were trifling with the seriously meant offers of peace made by the 
Government, and were taking advantage of its anxiety to avoid bloodshed to 
concentrate their forces and to complete their organization.”88 Because of the 
delays in hostilities, in the efforts of finding peace, the Union government had
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given De Wet time enough to mass 5,000 troops in the Orange Free State 
alone.89 On November 7, Smuts reported that “fighting had already begun at 
Kroonstad in order to oppose [De Wet’s] destruction of [rail]line and blowing up 
of bridges.” On the same day, Smuts reported that Union forces had 
successfully confronted Beyers near Hoopstad and had captured 350 of his 
commandos. Regarding the issue of amnesty, Smuts the next day admitted that 
the situation had totally changed now that “private property had been destroyed 
and numerous lives have been lost.”9o
Also, Botha severely defeated De Wet at Mushroom Valley on November 
12, in which the rebels suffered heavy losses. This prompted Botha, now as 
Prime Minister of South Africa and as commander-in-chief of all Union forces in 
the field, to issue his proclamation of November 21, 1914, which again offered 
amnesty but only to those who immediately disarmed. Furthermore, he 
withdrew the offer now from all rebel leaders. Pretoria had become more 
aggressive against the rebels. Only after Mushroom Valley did De Wet finally 
agreed to serious peace negotiations, but Smut perceiving that the tables were 
turning against the rebels refused. However, Pretoria did extended the length 
of time for the “rank and file” Boer rebels to accept amnesty, even after blood 
had spilled, while also announcing that the government would confiscate the 
cattle of all rebels who remained in the field. Smuts, sensing victory over the 
coup, demanded the unconditional surrender of rebel officers, though he 
assured that “at present no intention to apply capital punishment” was being 
considered.91 Following Mushroom Valley, Union forces continued to gather 
momentum against the rebels. In early December, Botha personally led further
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operations in the Orange Free State. By the 4th he had already captured seven 
hundred rebels, adding two hundred more on that day alone. Within a week 
several rebel leaders had unconditionally surrendered around twelve hundred 
more Boers. The Union officers allowed “rank and file” rebels to return to their 
homes upon reporting to their local magistrates, but held all leaders in 
custody. 92
By the new year Union forces were decisively on the offensive. Praises 
rang in the London Times for Generals Smuts and Botha. One article described 
Smuts’ “surrounding of a rebel commando [via] horses, foot, motor-cars, and 
armoured trains, all moved with the skill of chess p la y e rs .”93 Soon it was 
reported that Union forces had heavily defeated De Wet’s Freikorps, or 
volunteer corps of commandos, after which the rebel general fled into 
Bechuanaland trying to flee to Southwest Africa. However Union motor-car 
troops ran over and killed De Wet (while Beyers drowned in a river around the 
same time). With both De Wet and Beyers out of the picture, Kemp and Maritz 
kept the revolt alive for another month and even attempted an offensive, 
although it fa ile d .9 4  Maritz and Kemp met near Upington on January 30 and 
decided to submit to the terms of the unconditional surrender. On February 3, 
news from Pretoria reported that 104 of Maritz’s men had surrendered along 
with 529 of Kemp’s. By the next day news came in that Kemp himself had 
surrendered, with Maritz expected to in a matter of days. However, it was later 
revealed that Maritz had actually crossed into German territory to collect what 
men he had there and bring them back to surrender. On February 9, 1915, 
news from Pretoria informed London that the Germans had shot Maritz in
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Southwest Africa upon finding out that Maritz was performing double treason by 
leading German artillery into a trap near Kakamas (though later reports 
indicated that he fled German territory). Before the month’s end many of the 
rebel officers captured were facing trial for their treason.95 One article in 
the Times read that “the whole of the Union Forces can be launched in the 
desired direction [against Southwest Africa].”96
After the Afrikaner coup had been snuffed out, Botha and Smuts 
concentrated their efforts on the invasion of German Southwest Africa. General 
Smuts took the command of one Union column crossing the Orange River into 
Namaland pushing northward. General Botha went to Luderitzbucht (Angra 
Pequena) where he addressed the troops who had seized the port the previous 
year and had been waiting for the end of the coup. He stated:
I know it is not your fault that you are still here. It is my fault; 
but in our country I have had to deal with a rebellion, which gave 
me much pain and sorrow. I have had to give much of my attention 
to this. Thank God it is past. (Cheers) I am here now, and may tell 
you that more men are coming along to help us achieve our object.
It has been hard for you to have to be lying apparently idle so long, 
but still you have been doing very good work. Indeed, I know that 
the British Empire is grateful. . . We in South Africa have undertaken 
this task, and we are going to carry it through with all possible de­
termination.97
Eventually, two columns pushed inland from Walvis Bay towards Windhoek, as 
Smuts pushed up from the south. The South African force of 50,000 
outnumbered and outgunned the German force of 9,000 who were mostly 
reservists. However, the use of chemical warfare was not limited to the 
European continent as the Germans poisoned most of the few wells that aided 
the crossing of the Namib Desert into the colony’s heartland. The Germans
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used the harsh environment as their greatest weapon, though in the end they 
could only fight a delaying war due to a lack of sufficient forces. The Germans 
could not get their Baster allies to fight against the South Africans because of 
that tribes reluctance to kill whites. Despite the minefields prepared by the 
Germans, Botha crossed the Namib with his column from Swakopmund and 
captured the capital of Windhoek on May 12, 1915. Then, after “double-timing” 
his force over 120 miles in one week, the South African commander cut off the 
German forces before they could retreat into the Caprivi Strip and escape 
across the Zambezi to German East Africa. Nearly 3,400 German troops and 
militia surrendered on July 9, 1915, near Tsumeb under the command of 
Colonel Franke, the same officer who had raced to Windhoek’s rescue during 
the Herero revolt. In this war of more maneuver and delay than actual combat, 
only 113 South Africans and 311 Germans actually died in combat according to 
most accounts.98 All remaining pockets of Boer resistance in South Africa 
surrendered only four days before Franke’s at Tsumeb. In reality, the Boer 
rebels in South Africa, which in November 1914 numbered 11,000, had 
defended Southwest Africa just as effectively or more so than the German 
troops. The Union of South Africa made Sir Howard Gorges the military 
governor of Southwest Africa, and he ruled under martial law until the League 
of Nations determined the fate of the former German colony.99 Therefore, nearly 
as quickly as Germany had established itself on the Skeleton Coast, it had now 
been thrown out. London and Cape Town could finally close the door they had 
left open thirty-two years earlier.
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Epilogue
As Britain and France quickly took over the other German colonies in 
Africa, along with Australia and New Zealand occupying Germany’s 
possessions in the Pacific, Southwest Africa remained under South African 
control. The Treaty of Versailles of 1919 officially stripped Germany of its 
colonial empire, though by this time the Second Reich had ended as well. In 
1920 the League of Nations handed Southwest Africa over to the Union of 
South Africa to be administered as a Mandate. This allowed South Africa to 
rule its neighbor as its own. The Mandate took effect on the first day of 1921 
when martial law was finally lifted in the former German colony. The forced 
repatriation of thousands of Germans back to Europe reduced the German 
population in Southwest Africa from 15,000 (civilian and military) to around 
8,000. Yet the white population was to double by 1926 from what it had been in 
1914. This was due to the encouragement from the South African government 
to have thousands of Afrikaners settle in Southwest Africa. 1
Most of the indigenous population viewed the South African occupation 
as a liberation bringing pre-German freedom back to the land. In the early 
years of the Mandate it looked hopeful as special courts convicted whites of 
their brutal treatment of blacks, and as they repealed the zuchtligungsrect (the 
right of a white master to punish his black servant). The Herero and the Nama 
reported horror stories of prisons and labor camps in which the Germans 
tortured, starved, or executed many. However, South Africa eventually became 
as severe in its occupation of Southwest Africa as Germany had been. There 
was, however, a critical difference. The Germans had obliterated any
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resistance from the Herero and Nama; but unlike Germany, South Africa 
attempted to eliminate the autonomy and resistance of the Ovambo. Therefore 
the size of the potential resistance actually doubled. Many from nearly all of the 
tribes of Southwest Africa, save possibly the rather passive bushmen, joined 
SWAPO (Southwest Africa People’s Organization). Having a single enemy, 
South Africa, it helped create the Namibian identity beyond the separate tribes. 
This organization formed the foundation for armed resistance against South 
African’s occupation. Likewise, with the League of Nations replaced by the 
United Nations following World War II, much of the world came to realize the 
injustice of the Mandate and gave increased pressure against South Africa to 
let Southwest Africa go. Yet South Africa held on to the territory, and to protect 
the white population it established a Police Zone where the government 
required blacks to carry passes to travel in and out of the dwindling tribal 
reserves. Namibia finally gained its independence in 1990; thus one of the last 
African regions to be colonized was also the last to be free .2
Namibia which had less than a quarter of a million inhabitants in the 
1920’s, now has a growing population of 1.6 million. Although only six percent 
of the population is white and only three percent speak German (compared with 
Afrikaans 14% and English 1% which are the official languages), the impact of 
German culture on Southwest Africa was greater than any other colony Berlin 
possessed. Of the 18,370 German emigrants (excluding troops) to southern 
Africa during her colonial period, over 12,300 went to Southwest Africa, while 
only 4,100 went to East Africa (Tanganyika) and only 1,650 went to Cameroon.
In fact, German Namibian citizens today can still live on Goering Street in 
Windhoek or drive by much of the buildings in the capital, Swakopmund,
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Luderitzbucht, or the other major cities and see evidence of German culture in 
its organization, architecture, or beer hails. Yet it was Germany’s religion which 
had the most lasting effect. Today 51% of Namibians are Lutheran. The 
Rhenish Mission has become the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Finnish 
Mission the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-Okavango Church. Also, there is the 
white German Evangelical Lutheran Church. In recent years all three have 
talked of merger. In addition to Lutherans, the present population is 20% 
Catholic, whereas the Dutch Reformed of the Afrikaners is an extreme minority. 
Another interesting comment on how well the German heritage remained in 
Southwest Africa, was the number of Germans immigrating there after the 
Second World War. Actually, half of the German immigrants living in Namibia 
were West German citizens at one time. Also interesting, was the fact that the 
Lutheran churches, at times assisted by the small Anglican Church, defied the 
Dutch Reformed by aiding SWAPO in its efforts to end South African 
occupation. South African officials expelled many Lutheran bishops from the 
country because of this. Namibians only recently have begun to forgive their 
German neighbors for the past, and are making amends with their Afrikaner 
countrymen. Only in the independence of Namibia and in the recent election of 
Nelson Mandela in South Africa has the region began to purge itself of the 
negative attributes of European imperialism. While remembering this past, 
which was at times horrible, Nambians both white and black are finally on the 
same road sharing a future and destiny.3
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